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Harper's Magazine
Feb, 2001
THE CASE AGAINST HENRY KISSINGER.(former Secretary of
State)
Author/s: Christopher Hitchens
PART ONE
The making of a war criminal
THE 1968 ELECTION INDOCHINA * CHILE
It will become clear, and may as well be stated at the
outset, that this is written by a political opponent of Henry
Kissinger. Nonetheless, I have found myself continually amazed
at how much hostile and discreditable material I have felt
compelled to omit. I am concerned only with those Kissingerian
offenses that might or should form the basis of a legal
prosecution: for war crimes, for crimes against humanity, and
for offenses against common or customary or international law,
including conspiracy to commit murder, kidnap, and torture.
Thus, I might have mentioned Kissinger's recruitment and
betrayal of the Iraqi Kurds, who were falsely encouraged by
him to take up arms against Saddam Hussein in 1972-75, and who
were then abandoned to extermination on their hillsides when
Saddam Hussein made a diplomatic deal with the Shah of Iran,
and who were deliberately lied to as well as abandoned. The
conclusions of the report by Congressman Otis Pike still make
shocking reading and reveal on Kissinger's part a callous
indifference to human life and human rights. But they fall
into the category of depraved realpolitik and do not seem to
have violated any known law.
In the same way, Kissinger's orchestration of political and
military and diplomatic cover for apartheid in South Africa
presents us with a morally repulsive record and includes the
appalling consequences of the destabilization of Angola. Again,
though, one is looking at a sordid period of Cold War and
imperial history, and an exercise of irresponsible power,
rather than an episode of organized crime. Additionally, one
must take into account the institutional nature of this policy,
which might in outline have been followed under any
administration, national security adviser, or secretary of
state.
Similar reservations can be held about Kissinger's
chairmanship of the Presidential Commission on Central America
in the early 1980s, which was staffed by Oliver North and
which whitewashed death-squad activity on the isthmus. Or
about the political protection provided by Kissinger, while in
office, for the Pahlavi dynasty in Iran and its machinery of
torture and repression. The list, it is sobering to say, could
be protracted very much further. But it will not do to blame
the whole exorbitant cruelty and cynicism of decades on one
man. (Occasionally one gets an intriguing glimpse, as when
Kissinger urges President Ford not to receive the inconvenient
Alexandr Solzhenitsyn, all the while posing as Communism's
most daring and principled foe.)
No, I have confined myself to the identifiable crimes that
can and should be placed on a proper bill of indictment,
whether the actions taken were in line with general "policy"
or not. These include, in this installment, the deliberate
mass killing of civilian populations in Indochina and the
personal suborning and planning of murder of a senior
constitutional officer in a democratic nation--Chile--with
which the United States was not at war. In a second
installment we will see that this criminal habit of mind
extends to Bangladesh, Cyprus, East Timor, and even to
Washington, D.C.
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Some of these allegations can be constructed only prima
facie, since Mr. Kissinger--in what may also amount to a
deliberate and premeditated obstruction of justice--has caused
large tranches of evidence to be withheld or possibly
destroyed. We now, however, enter upon the age when the
defense of "sovereign immunity" for state crimes has
been held to be void. As I demonstrate below, Kissinger has
understood this decisive change even if many of his critics
have not. The House of Lords' ruling in London, on the
international relevance of General Augusto Pinochet's crimes,
added to the splendid activism of the Spanish magistracy and
the verdicts of the International Tribunal at The Hague, has
destroyed the shield that immunized crimes committed under the
justification of raison d'etat. There is now no reason why a
warrant for the trial of Kissinger may not be issued in any
one of a number of jurisdictions and no reason why he may not
be compelled to answer it. Indeed, as I write, there are a
number of jurisdictions where the law is at long last
beginning to catch up with the evidence. And we have before us
in any case the Nuremberg precedent, by which the United
States solemnly undertook to be bound.
A failure to proceed will constitute a double or triple
offense to justice. First, it will violate the essential and
now uncontested principle that not even the most powerful are
above the law. Second, it will suggest that prosecutions for
war crimes and crimes against humanity are reserved for losers,
or for minor despots in relatively negligible countries. This
in turn will lead to the paltry politicization of what could
have been a noble process and to the justifiable suspicion of
double standards.
Many if not most of Kissinger's partners in politics, from
Greece to Chile to Argentina to Indonesia, are now in jail or
awaiting trial. His own lonely impunity is rank; it smells to
heaven. If it is allowed to persist then we shall shamefully
vindicate the ancient philosopher Anacharsis, who maintained
that laws were like cobwebs--strong enough to detain only the
weak and too weak to hold the strong. In the name of
innumerable victims known and unknown, it is time for justice
to take a hand.
REGARDING HENRY
On December 2, 1998, Michael Korda was being interviewed on
camera in his office at Simon & Schuster. As one of the
reigning magnates of New York publishing, he had edited and
"produced" the work of authors as various as
Tennessee Williams, Richard Nixon, Joan Crawford, and Joe
Bonanno. On this particular day, he was talking about the life
and thoughts of Cher, whose portrait adorned the wall behind
him. And then the telephone rang and there was a message to
call "Dr." Henry Kissinger as soon as possible. A
polymath like Korda knows--what with the exigencies of
publishing in these vertiginous days--how to switch in an
instant between Cher and high statecraft. The camera kept
running, and recorded the following scene for a tape that I
possess:
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Asking his secretary to get the number (759-7919--the
digits of Kissinger Associates), Korda quips dryly, to general
laughter in the office, that it "should be 1-800-CAMBODIA
... 1-800-BOMB-CAMBODIA." After a pause of nicely
calibrated duration (no senior editor likes to be put on hold
while he's receiving company, especially media company) it's
"Henry--Hi, how are you? ... You're getting all the
publicity you could want in the New York Times but not the
kind you want ... I also think it's very, very dubious for the
administration to simply say yes, they'll release these papers
... no ... no, absolutely ... no ... no ... well, hmmm, yeah.
We did it until quite recently, frankly, and he did prevail
... Well, I don't think there's any question about that, as
uncomfortable as it may be ... Henry, this is totally
outrageous ... yeah ... also the jurisdiction. This is a
Spanish judge appealing to an English court about a Chilean
head of state. So it's, it ... Also, Spain has no rational
jurisdiction over events in Chile anyway, so that makes
absolutely no sense ... Well, that's probably true ... If you
would. I think that would be by far and away the best ...
Right, yeah, no, I think it's exactly what you should do, and
I don't think it should be long, and I think it should end
with your father's letter. I think it's a very important
document ... Yes, but I think the letter is wonderful, and
central to the entire book. Can you let me read the Lebanon
chapter over the weekend?" At this point the conversation
ends, with some jocular observations by Korda about his
upcoming colonoscopy: "a totally repulsive procedure."
By means of the same tiny internal camera, or its forensic
equivalent, one could deduce not a little about the world of
Henry Kissinger from this microcosmic exchange. The first and
most important is this: Sitting in his office at Kissinger
Associates, with its tentacles of business and consultancy
stretching from Belgrade to Beijing, and cushioned by
innumerable other directorships and boards, he still shudders
when he hears of the arrest of a dictator. Syncopated the
conversation with Korda may be, but it's clear that the
keyword is "jurisdiction." What had the New York
Times been reporting that fine morning? On December 2, 1998,
its front page carried the following report from Tim Weiner,
the paper's national-security correspondent in Washington.
Under the headline "U.S. Will Release Files on Crimes
Under Pinochet," he wrote:
Treading into a political and diplomatic confrontation it tried to
avoid, the United States decided today to declassify some secret documents
on the killings and torture committed during the dictatorship of Augusto
Pinochet in Chile....
The decision to release such documents is the first sign that the United
States will cooperate in the case against General Pinochet. Clinton
Administration officials said they believed the benefits of openness in
human rights cases outweighed the risks to national security in this case.
But the decision could open "a can of worms," in the words of a former
Central Intelligence Agency official stationed in Chile, exposing the depth
of the knowledge that the United States had about crimes charged against
the Pinochet Government....
While some European government officials have supported bringing the
former dictator to court, United States officials have stayed largely
silent, reflecting skepticism about the Spanish court's power, doubts about
international tribunals aimed at former foreign rulers, and worries over
the implications for American leaders who might someday also be accused in
foreign countries. [Italics added.]
President Richard M. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger, who served as his
national security advisor and Secretary of State, supported a right-wing
coup in Chile in the early 1970s, previously declassified documents show.
But many of the actions of the United States during the 1973 coup, and
much of what American leaders and intelligence services did in liaison with
the Pinochet Government after it seized power, remain under the seal of
national security. The secret files on the Pinochet regime are held by the
C.I.A., the Defense Intelligence Agency, the State Department, the
Pentagon, the National Security Council, the National Archives, the
Presidential libraries of Gerald R. Ford and Jimmy Carter, and other
Government agencies. According to Justice Department records, these files
contain a history of human rights abuses and international terrorism:
* In 1975 State Department diplomats in Chile protested the Pinochet
regime's record of killing and torture, filing dissents to American foreign
policy with their superiors in Washington.
* The C.I.A. has files on assassinations by the regime and the Chilean
secret police. The intelligence agency also has records on Chile's attempts
to establish an international right-wing covert-action squad.
* The Ford Library contains many of Mr. Kissinger's secret files on
Chile, which have never been made public. Through a secretary, Mr.
Kissinger declined a request for an interview today.
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One must credit Kissinger with grasping what so many other
people did not: that if the Pinochet precedent became
established, then he himself was in some danger. The United
States believes that it alone pursues and indicts war
criminals and "international terrorists"; nothing in
its political or journalistic culture yet allows for the
thought that it might be harboring and sheltering such a
senior one. Yet the thought had very obliquely surfaced in
Weiner's story, and Kissinger was a worried man when he called
his editor that day to discuss the concluding volume of his
memoirs (eventually published under the unbearably dull and
self-regarding title Years of Renewal), which was still in
progress.
"Harboring and sheltering," though, are
understatements for the lavishness of Henry Kissinger's
circumstances. His advice is sought, at $30,000 an appearance,
by audiences of businessmen and academics and policymakers.
His turgid newspaper column is syndicated by the Los Angeles
Times and appears as far afield as the Washington Post. His
first volume of memoirs was in part written, and also edited,
by Harold Evans, who with Tina Brown is among the many hosts
and hostesses who solicit Kissinger's company, or perhaps one
should say society, for their New York soirees. At different
times, he has been a consultant to ABC News and CBS; his most
successful diplomacy, indeed, has probably been conducted with
the media (and his single greatest achievement has been to get
almost everybody to call him "Doctor"). Fawned on by
Ted Koppel, sought out by corporations and despots with
"image" problems or "failures of communication,"
and given respectful attention by presidential candidates and
those whose task it is to "mold" their global vision,
this man wants for little in the pathetic universe that the
"self-esteem" industry exists to serve. Of whom else
would Norman Podhoretz write, in a bended-knee encomium to the
second volume of Kissinger's memoirs, Years of Upheaval:
What we have here is writing of the very highest order. It is writing that
is equally at ease in portraiture and abstract analysis; that can shape a
narrative as skillfully as it can paint a scene; that can achieve marvels
of compression while moving at an expansive and leisurely pace. It is
writing that can shift without strain or falsity of tone from the gravitas
befitting a book about great historical events to the humor and irony
dictated by an unfailing sense of human proportion.
A critic who can suck like that, as was once dryly said by
one of my moral tutors, need never dine alone. Nor need his
subject. Except that, every now and then, the recipient (and
donor) of so much sycophancy feels a tremor of anxiety. He
leaves the well-furnished table and scurries to the bathroom.
Is it perhaps another disclosure on a newly released Nixon
tape? Some stray news from Indonesia portending the fall or
imprisonment of another patron (and perhaps the escape of an
awkward document or two)? The arrest or indictment of a
torturer or assassin; the expiry of the statute of secrecy for
some obscure cabinet papers in a faraway country? Any one of
these can instantly spoil his day. As we see from the Korda
tape, Kissinger cannot open the morning paper with the
assurance of tranquillity. Because he knows what others can
only suspect, or guess at. And he is a prisoner of the
knowledge, as, to some extent, are we.
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Notice the likable way in which Michael Korda demonstrates
his broad-mindedness with the Cambodia jest. Everybody "knows,"
after all, that Kissinger inflicted terror and misery and mass
death on that country, and great injury to the United States
Constitution at the same time. (Everybody also "knows"
that other vulnerable nations can lay claim to the same
melancholy and hateful distinction as Cambodia, with
incremental or "collateral" damage to American
democracy keeping pace.) Yet the pudgy man standing in black
tie at the Vogue party is not, surely, the man who ordered and
sanctioned the destruction of civilian populations, the
assassination of inconvenient politicians, the kidnapping and
disappearance of soldiers and journalists and clerics who got
in his way. Oh, but he is. He's exactly the same man. And that
may be among the most nauseating reflections of all. Kissinger
is not invited and feted because of his exquisite manners or
his mordant wit (his manners are in any case rather gross, and
his wit consists of a quiver of borrowed and secondhand darts).
No, he is sought after because his presence supplies a frisson,
the authentic touch of raw and unapologetic power. There's a
slight guilty nervousness on the edge of Korda's gag about the
indescribable sufferings of Indochina. And I've noticed, time
and again, standing at the back of the audience during
Kissinger speeches, that laughter of the nervous, uneasy kind
is the sort of laughter he likes to provoke. In exacting this
tribute, he flaunts not the "aphrodisiac" of power (another
of his plagiarized bons mots) but its pornography.
DRESS REHEARSAL: THE SECRET OF '68
There exists, within the political class of Washington, D.C.,
an open secret that is too momentous and too awful to tell.
Although it is well known to academic historians, senior
reporters, former Cabinet members, and ex-diplomats, it has
never been summarized all at one time in any one place. The
reason for this is, on first viewing, paradoxical. The open
secret is in the possession of both major political parties,
and it directly implicates the past statecraft of at least
three former presidencies. Thus, its full disclosure would be
in the interest of no particular faction. Its truth is
therefore the guarantee of its obscurity; it lies like Poe's
"purloined letter" across the very aisle that
signifies bipartisanship.
Here is the secret in plain words. In the fall of 1968,
Richard Nixon and some of his emissaries and underlings set
out to sabotage the Paris peace negotiations on Vietnam. The
means they chose were simple: they privately assured the South
Vietnamese military rulers that an incoming Republican regime
would offer them a better deal than would a Democratic one. In
this way, they undercut both the talks themselves and the
electoral strategy of Vice President Hubert Humphrey. The
tactic "worked," in that the South Vietnamese junta
withdrew from the talks on the eve of the election, thereby
destroying the peace initiative on which the Democrats had
based their campaign. In another way, it did not "work,"
because four years later the Nixon Administration tried to
conclude the war on the same terms that had been on offer in
Paris. The reason for the dead silence that still surrounds
the question is that in those intervening years some 20,000
Americans and an uncalculated number of Vietnamese, Cambodians,
and Laotians lost their lives. Lost them, that is to say, even
more pointlessly than had those slain up to that point. The
impact of those four years on Indochinese society, and on
American democracy, is beyond computation. The chief
beneficiary of the covert action, and of the subsequent
slaughter, was Henry Kissinger.
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I can already hear the guardians of consensus, scraping
their blunted quills to dismiss this as a "conspiracy
theory." I happily accept the challenge. Let us take,
first, the Diaries of that renowned conspirator (and theorist
of conspiracy) H. R. Haldeman, published in May 1994. I choose
to start with them for two reasons. First, because on the
logical inference of "evidence against interest" it
is improbable that Mr. Haldeman would supply evidence of his
knowledge of a crime, unless he was (posthumously) telling the
truth. Second, because it is possible to trace back each of
his entries to its origin in other documented sources.
In January 1973, the Nixon-Kissinger Administration--for
which Haldeman took the minutes--was heavily engaged on two
fronts. In Paris again, Henry Kissinger was striving to
negotiate "peace with honor" in Vietnam. In
Washington, D.C., the web of evidence against the Watergate
burglars and buggers was beginning to tighten. On January 8,
1973, Haldeman records:
John Dean called to report on the Watergate trials, says that if we can
prove in any way by hard evidence that our [campaign] plane was bugged in
'68, he thinks that we could use that as a basis to say we're going to
force Congress to go back and investigate '68 as well as '72, and thus turn
them off.
Three days later, on January 11, 1973, Haldeman hears from
Nixon ("the P," as the Diaries call him):
On the Watergate question, he wanted me to talk to [Attorney General John]
Mitchell and have him find out from [Deke] De Loach [of the FBI] if the guy
who did the bugging on us in 1968 is still at the FBI, and then [FBI acting
director Patrick] Gray should nail him with a lie detector and get it
settled, which would give us the evidence we need. He also thinks I ought
to move with George Christian [President Johnson's former press secretary,
then working with Democrats for Nixon], get LBJ to use his influence to
turn off the Hill investigation with Califano, Hubert, and so on. Later in
the day, he decided that wasn't such a good idea, and told me not to do it,
which I fortunately hadn't done.
On the same day, Haldeman reports Henry Kissinger calling
excitedly from Paris, saying "he'll do the signing in
Paris rather than Hanoi, which is the key thing." He
speaks also of getting South Vietnam's President Thieu to
"go along." On the following day:
The P also got back on the Watergate thing today, making the point that I
should talk to Connally about the Johnson bugging process to get his
judgment as to how to handle it. He wonders if we shouldn't just have
Andreas go in and scare Hubert. The problem in going at LBJ is how he'd.
react, and we need to find out from [Deke] De Loach who did it, and then
run a lie detector on him. I talked to Mitchell on the phone on this
subject and he said De Loach had told him he was up to date on the thing
because he had a call from Texas. A Star reporter was making an inquiry in
the last week or so, and LBJ got very hot and called Deke and said to him
that if the Nixon people are going to play with this, that he would release
[deleted material--national security], saying that our side was asking that
certain things be done. By our side, I assume he means the Nixon campaign
organization. De Loach took this as a direct threat from Johnson.... As he
recalls it, bugging was requested on the planes, but was turned down, and
all they did was check the phone calls, and put a tap on the Dragon Lady
[Mrs. Anna Chennault].
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This bureaucratic prose may be hard to read, but it needs
no cipher to decode itself. Under intense pressure about the
bugging of the Watergate building, Nixon instructed his chief
of staff, Haldeman, and his FBI contact, Deke DeLoach, to
unmask the bugging to which his own campaign had been
subjected in 1968. He also sounded out former president
Johnson, through former senior Democrats like Texas governor
John Connally, to gauge what his reaction to the disclosure
might be. The aim was to show that "everybody does
it." (By another bipartisan paradox, in Washington the
slogan "they all do it" is used as a slogan for the
defense rather than, as one might hope, for the prosecution.)
However, a problem presents itself at once: how to reveal
the 1968 bugging without at the same time revealing what that
bugging had been about. Hence the second thoughts ("wasn't
such a good idea ..."). In his excellent introduction to
The Haldeman Diaries, Nixon's biographer Professor Stephen
Ambrose characterizes the 1973 approach to Lyndon Johnson as
"prospective blackmail," designed to exert
backstairs pressure to close down a congressional inquiry. But
he also suggests that Johnson, himself no pushover, had some
blackmail ammunition of his own. As Professor Ambrose phrases
it, the Diaries had been vetted by the National Security
Council, and the bracketed deletion cited above is "the
only place in the book where an example is given of a deletion
by the NSC during the Carter Administration." "Eight
days later Nixon was inaugurated for his second term,"
Ambrose relays. "Ten days later Johnson died of a heart
attack. What Johnson had on Nixon I suppose we'll never know."
The professor's conclusion here is arguably too tentative.
There is a well-understood principle known as "Mutual
Assured Destruction," whereby both sides possess more
than enough material with which to annihilate the other. The
answer to the question of what the Johnson Administration
"had" on Nixon is a relatively easy one. It was
given in a book entitled Counsel to the President, published
in 1991. Its author was Clark Clifford, the quintessential
blue-chip Washington insider, who was assisted in the writing
by Richard Holbrooke, the former assistant secretary of state
and current ambassador to the United Nations. In 1968, Clark
Clifford was secretary of defense and Richard Holbrooke was a
member of the American negotiating team at the Vietnam peace
talks in Paris.
From his seat in the Pentagon, Clifford had been able to
read the intelligence transcripts that picked up and recorded
what he terms a "secret personal channel" between
President Thieu in Saigon and the Nixon campaign. The chief
interlocutor at the American end was John Mitchell, then
Nixon's campaign manager and subsequently attorney general
(and subsequently Prisoner Number 24171-157 in the Maxwell Air
Force Base prison camp). He was actively assisted by Madame
Anna Chennault, known to all as the "Dragon Lady." A
fierce veteran of the Taiwan lobby, and all-purpose right-wing
intriguer, she was a social and political force in the
Washington of her day and would rate her own biography.
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Clifford describes a private meeting at which he, President
Johnson, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, and National Security
Adviser Walt Rostow were present. Hawkish to a man, they kept
Vice President Humphrey out of the loop. But, hawkish as they
were, they were appalled at the evidence of Nixon's treachery.
They nonetheless decided not to go public with what they knew.
Clifford says that this was because the disclosure would have
ruined the Paris talks altogether. He could have added that it
would have created a crisis of confidence in American
institutions. There are some things that the voters can't be
trusted to know. And even though the bugging had been legal,
it might not have looked like fair play. (The Logan Act flatly
prohibits any American from conducting private diplomacy with
a foreign power.)
In the event, Thieu pulled out of the negotiations anyway,
ruining them just three days before the election. Clifford is
in no doubt of the advice on which he did so:
The activities of the Nixon team went far beyond the bounds of justifiable
political combat. It constituted direct interference in the activities of
the executive branch and the responsibilities of the Chief Executive, the
only people with authority to negotiate on behalf of the nation. The
activities of the Nixon campaign constituted a gross, even potentially
illegal, interference in the security affairs of the nation by private
individuals.
Perhaps aware of the slight feebleness of his lawyerly
prose, and perhaps a little ashamed of keeping the secret for
his memoirs rather than sharing it with the electorate,
Clifford adds in a footnote:
It should be remembered that the public was considerably more innocent in
such matters in the days before the Watergate hearings and the 1975 Senate
investigation of the CIA.
Perhaps the public was indeed more innocent, if only
because of the insider reticence of white-shoe lawyers like
Clifford, who thought there were some things too profane to be
made known. He claims now that he was in favor either of
confronting Nixon privately with the information and forcing
him to desist, or else of making it public. Perhaps this was
indeed his view.
A more wised-up age of investigative reporting has brought
us several updates on this appalling episode. And so has the
very guarded memoir of Richard Nixon himself. More than one
"back channel" was required for the Republican
destabilization of the Paris peace talks. There had to be
secret communications between Nixon and the South Vietnamese,
as we have seen. But there also had to be an informant inside
the incumbent administration's camp, a source of hints and
tips and early warnings of official intentions. That informant
was Henry Kissinger. In his own account, RN : The Memoirs of
Richard Nixon, the disgraced elder statesman tells us that, in
mid-September 1968, he received private word of a planned
bombing halt. In other words, the Johnson Administration would,
for the sake of the negotiations, consider suspending its
aerial bombardment of North Vietnam. This most useful advance
intelligence, Nixon tells us, came "through a highly
unusual channel." It was more unusual even than he
acknowledged. Kissinger had until then been a devoted partisan
of Nelson Rockefeller, the matchlessly wealthy prince of
liberal Republicanism. His contempt for the person and the
policies of Richard Nixon was undisguised. Indeed, President
Johnson's Paris negotiators, led by Averell Harriman,
considered Kissinger to be almost one of themselves. He had
made himself helpful, as Rockefeller's chief foreign-policy
adviser, by supplying French intermediaries with their own
contacts in Hanoi. "Henry was the only person outside of
the government we were authorized to discuss the negotiations
with," Richard Holbrooke told Walter Isaacson. "We
trusted him. It is not stretching the truth to say that the
Nixon campaign had a secret source within the U.S. negotiating
team."
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So the likelihood of a bombing halt, wrote Nixon, "came
as no real surprise to me." He added: "I told
Haldeman that Mitchell should continue as liaison with
Kissinger and that we should honor his desire to keep his role
completely confidential." It is impossible that Nixon was
unaware of his campaign manager's parallel role in colluding
with a foreign power. Thus began what was effectively a
domestic covert operation, directed simultaneously at
thwarting the talks and embarrassing the Hubert Humphrey
campaign.
Later in the month, on September 26 to be precise, and as
recorded by Nixon in his memoirs, "Kissinger called again.
He said that he had just returned from Paris, where he had
picked up word that something big was afoot regarding Vietnam.
He advised that if I had anything to say about Vietnam during
the following week, I should avoid any new ideas or proposals."
On the same day, Nixon declined a challenge from Humphrey for
a direct debate. On October 12, Kissinger once again made
contact, suggesting that a bombing halt might be announced as
soon as October 23. And so it might have been. Except that for
some reason, every time the North Vietnamese side came closer
to agreement, the South Vietnamese increased their own demands.
We now know why and how that was, and how the two halves of
the strategy were knit together. As far back as July, Nixon
had met quietly in New York with the South Vietnamese
ambassador, Bui Diem. The contact had been arranged by Anna
Chennault. Bugging of the South Vietnamese offices in
Washington, and surveillance of the "Dragon Lady,"
showed how the ratchet operated. An intercepted cable from
Diem to President Thieu on the fateful day of October 23 had
him saying: "Many Republican friends have contacted me
and encouraged us to stand firm. They were alarmed by press
reports to the effect that you had already softened your
position." The wiretapping instructions went to one
Cartha DeLoach, known as "Deke" to his associates,
who was J. Edgar Hoover's FBI liaison officer to the White
House. We met him, you may recall, in H. R. Haldeman's
Diaries.
In 1999 the author Anthony Summers was finally able to gain
access to the closed FBI file of intercepts of the Nixon
campaign, which he published in his 2000 book, The Arrogance
of Power: The Secret World of Richard Nixon. He was also able
to interview Anna Chennault. These two breakthroughs furnished
him with what is vulgarly termed a "smoking gun" on
the 1968 conspiracy. By the end of October 1968, John Mitchell
had become so nervous about official surveillance that he
ceased taking calls from Chennault. And President Johnson, in
a conference call to the three candidates, Nixon, Humphrey,
and Wallace (allegedly to brief them on the bombing halt), had
strongly implied that he knew about the covert efforts to
stymie his Vietnam diplomacy. This call created near-panic in
Nixon's inner circle and caused Mitchell to telephone
Chennault at the Sheraton Park Hotel. He then asked her to
call him back on a more secure line. "Anna," he told
her, "I'm speaking on behalf of Mr. Nixon. It's very
important that our Vietnamese friends understand our
Republican position, and I hope you made that clear to
them.... Do you think they really have decided not to go to
Paris?"
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The reproduced FBI original document shows what happened
next. On November 2, 1968, the agent reported:
MRS. ANNA CHENNAULT CONTACTED VIETNAMESE AMBASSADOR, BUI DIEM, AND ADVISED
HIM THAT SHE HAD RECEIVED A MESSAGE FROM HER BOSS (NOT FURTHER IDENTIFIED),
WHICH HER BOSS WANTED HER TO GIVE PERSONALLY TO THE AMBASSADOR. SHE SAID
THAT THE MESSAGE WAS THAT THE AMBASSADOR IS TO "HOLD ON, WE ARE GONNA WIN"
AND THAT HER BOSS ALSO SAID "HOLD ON, HE UNDERSTANDS ALL OF IT." SHE
REPEATED THAT THIS IS THE ONLY MESSAGE. "HE SAID PLEASE TELL YOUR BOSS TO
HOLD ON." SHE ADVISED THAT HER BOSS HAD JUST CALLED FROM NEW MEXICO.
Nixon's running mate, Spiro Agnew, had been campaigning in
Albuquerque, New Mexico, that day, and subsequent intelligence
analysis revealed that he and another member of his staff (the
one principally concerned with Vietnam) had indeed been in
touch with the Chennault camp.
The beauty of having Kissinger leaking from one side and
Anna Chennault and John Mitchell conducting a private foreign
policy on the other was this: It enabled Nixon to avoid being
drawn into the argument over a bombing halt. And it further
enabled him to suggest that it was the Democrats who were
playing politics with the issue. On October 25, in New York,
he used his tried-and-tested tactic of circulating an innuendo
while purporting to disown it. Of LBJ's Paris diplomacy he
said, "I am also told that this spurt of activity is a
cynical, last-minute attempt by President Johnson to salvage
the candidacy of Mr. Humphrey. This I do not believe."
Kissinger himself showed a similar ability to play both
ends against the middle. In the late summer of 1968, on
Martha's Vineyard, he had offered Nelson Rockefeller's files
on Nixon to Professor Samuel Huntington, a close adviser to
Hubert Humphrey. But when Huntington's colleague and friend
Zbigniew Brzezinski tried to get him to make good on the offer,
Kissinger became shy. "I've hated Nixon for years,"
he told Brzezinski, but the time wasn't quite ripe for the
handover. Indeed, it was a very close-run election, turning in
the end on the difference of a few hundred thousand votes, and
many hardened observers believe that the final difference was
made when Johnson ordered a bombing halt on October 31 and the
South Vietnamese made him look like a fool by boycotting the
peace talks two days later. Had things gone the other way, of
course, Kissinger was a near-certainty for a senior job in a
Humphrey administration.
With slight differences of emphasis, the larger pieces of
this story appear in Haldeman's work as cited and in
Clifford's memoir. They are also partially rehearsed in
President Johnson's autobiography, The Vantage Point, and in a
long reflection on Indochina by William Bundy (one of the
architects of the war) entitled rather tritely The Tangled
Web. Senior members of the press corps, among them Jules
Witcover in his history of 1968, Seymour Hersh in his study of
Kissinger, and Walter Isaacson, editor of Time magazine, in
his admiring but critical biography, have produced almost
congruent accounts of the same abysmal episode. The only
mention of it that is completely and utterly false, by any
literary or historical standard, appears in the memoirs of
Henry Kissinger himself. He writes just this:
Several Nixon emissaries--some self-appointed--telephoned me for counsel. I
took the position that I would answer specific questions on foreign policy,
but that I would not offer general advice or volunteer suggestions. This
was the same response I made to inquiries from the Humphrey staff.
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This contradicts even the self-serving memoir of the man
who, having won the 1968 election by these underhanded means,
made as his very first appointment Henry Kissinger as national
security adviser. One might not want to arbitrate a mendacity
competition between the two men, but when he made this choice
Richard Nixon had only once, briefly and awkwardly, met Henry
Kissinger in person. He clearly formed his estimate of the
man's abilities from more persuasive experience than that.
"One factor that had most convinced me of Kissinger's
credibility," wrote Nixon later in his own delicious
prose, "was the length to which he went to protect his
secrecy."
That ghastly secret is now out. In the January 1969 issue
of the Establishment house organ Foreign Affairs, published a
few days after his appointment as Nixon's right-hand man,
there appeared Henry Kissinger's own evaluation of the Vietnam
negotiations. On every point of substance, he agreed with the
line taken in Paris by the Johnson-Humphrey negotiators. One
has to pause for an instant to comprehend the enormity of this.
Kissinger had helped elect a man who had surreptitiously
promised the South Vietnamese junta a better deal than they
would get from the Democrats. The Saigon authorities then
acted, as Bundy ruefully confirms, as if they did indeed have
a deal. This meant, in the words of a later Nixon slogan,
"Four More Years." But four more years of an
unwinnable and undeclared and murderous war, which was to
spread before it burned out, and was to end on the same terms
and conditions as had been on the table in the fall of 1968.
This was what it took to promote Henry Kissinger. To
promote him from a mediocre and opportunistic academic to an
international potentate. The signature qualities were there
from the inaugural moment: the sycophancy and the duplicity;
the power worship and the absence of scruple; the empty
trading of old non-friends for new non-friends. And the
distinctive effects were also present: the uncounted and
expendable corpses; the official and unofficial lying about
the cost; the heavy and pompous pseudo-indignation when
unwelcome questions were asked. Kissinger's global career
started as it meant to go on. It debauched the American
republic and American democracy, and it levied a hideous toll
of casualties on weaker and more vulnerable societies.
THE CRIME OF WAR, AND BOMBING FOR VOTES
Even while compelled to concentrate on brute realities, one
must never lose sight of that element of the surreal that
surrounds Henry Kissinger. Paying a visit to Vietnam in the
middle 1960s, when many technocratic opportunists were still
convinced that the war was worth fighting and could be won,
the young Henry reserved judgment on the first point but
developed considerable private doubts on the second. He had
gone so far as to involve himself with an initiative that
extended to direct personal contact with Hanoi. He became
friendly with two Frenchmen who had a direct line to the
Communist leadership in North Vietnam's capital. Raymond
Aubrac, a French civil servant who was a friend of Ho Chi
Minh, and Herbert Marcovich, a French microbiologist, began a
series of trips to North Vietnam. On their return, they
briefed Kissinger in Paris. He in his turn parlayed their
information into high-level conversations in Washington,
relaying the actual or potential negotiating positions of Pham
Van Dong and other Communist statesmen to Defense Secretary
Robert McNamara. (In the result, the relentless bombing of the
North made any "bridge-building" impracticable. In
particular, the now forgotten American destruction of the Paul
Doumer Bridge outraged the Vietnamese side.)
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This weightless mid-position, which ultimately helped
enable his double act in 1968, allowed Kissinger to
ventriloquize Governor Rockefeller and to propose, by indirect
means, a future detente with America's chief rivals. In his
first major address as a candidate for the Republican
nomination in 1968, Rockefeller spoke ringingly of how
"in a subtle triangle with Communist China and the Soviet
Union, we can ultimately improve our relations with each--as
we test the will for peace of both." [Italics added.]
This foreshadowing of a later Kissinger strategy might
appear at first reading to illustrate prescience. But Governor
Rockefeller had no more reason than Vice President Humphrey to
suppose that his ambitious staffer would defect to the Nixon
camp, risking and postponing this same detente in order later
to take credit for a debased simulacrum of it.
Morally speaking, Kissinger treated the concept of
superpower rapprochement in the same way as he treated the
concept of a negotiated settlement in Vietnam: as something
contingent on his own needs. There was a time to feign support
of it and a time to denounce it as weak-minded and treacherous.
And there was a time to take credit for it. Some of those who
"followed orders" in Indochina may lay a claim to
that notoriously weak defense. Some who even issued the orders
may now tell us that they were acting sincerely at the time.
But Kissinger cannot avail himself of this alibi. He always
knew what he was doing, and he embarked upon a second round of
protracted warfare having knowingly helped to destroy an
alternative that he always understood was possible. This
increases the gravity of the charge against him. It also
prepares us for his improvised and retrospective defense
against that charge: that his immense depredations eventually
led to "peace." When he announced that "peace
is at hand" in October 1972, he made a boastful and false
claim that could have been made in 1968. And when he claimed
credit for subsequent superpower contacts, he was announcing
the result of a secret and corrupt diplomacy that had
originally been proposed as an open and democratic one. In the
meantime, he had illegally eavesdropped and shadowed American
citizens and public servants whose misgivings about the war,
and about unconstitutional authority, were mild compared with
those of Messieurs Aubrac and Marcovich. In establishing what
lawyers call the mens rea, we can say that in Kissinger's case
he was fully aware of, and is entirely accountable for, his
own actions.
Upon taking office at Richard Nixon's side in the winter of
1969, it was Kissinger's task to be plus royaliste que le roi
in two respects. He had to confect a rationale of "credibility"
for punitive action in an already devastated Vietnamese
theater, and he had to second his principal's wish that he
form part of a "wall" between the Nixon White House
and the Department of State. The term "two track"
was later to become commonplace. Kissinger's position on both
tracks, of promiscuous violence abroad and flagrant illegality
at home, was decided from the start. He does not seem to have
lacked relish for either commitment; one hopes faintly that
this was not the first twinge of the "aphrodisiac."
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President Johnson's "bombing halt" had not lasted
long by any standard, even if one remembers that its original
conciliatory purpose had been sordidly undercut. Averell
Harriman, who had been LBJ's chief negotiator in Paris, later
testified to Congress that the North Vietnamese had withdrawn
90 percent of their forces from the northern two provinces of
South Vietnam, in October and November 1968, in accordance
with the agreement of which the "halt" might have
formed a part. In the new context, however, this withdrawal
could be interpreted as a sign of weakness, or even as a
"light at the end of the tunnel."
The historical record of the Indochina war is voluminous,
and the resulting controversy no less so. This does not,
however, prevent the following of a consistent thread. Once
the war had been unnaturally and undemocratically prolonged,
more exorbitant methods were required to fight it and more
fantastic excuses had to be fabricated to justify it. Let us
take four connected cases in which the civilian population was
deliberately exposed to indiscriminate lethal force, in which
the customary laws of war and neutrality were violated, and in
which conscious lies had to be told in order to conceal these
facts and others.
The first such case is an example of what Vietnam might
have been spared had not the 1968 Paris peace talks been
sabotaged. In December 1968, during the "transition"
period between the Johnson and Nixon administrations, the
United States military command turned to what General
Creighton Abrams termed "total war" against the
"infrastructure" of the Vietcong/National Liberation
Front insurgency. The chief exhibit in this campaign was a
six-month clearance of the province of Kien Hoa. The code name
for the sweep was Operation "Speedy Express."
It might, in some realm of theory, be remotely conceivable
that such tactics could be justified under the international
laws and charters governing the sovereign rights of
self-defense. But no nation capable of deploying the
overwhelming and annihilating force described below would be
likely to find itself on the defensive. And it would be least
of all likely to find itself on the defensive on its own soil.
So the Nixon-Kissinger Administration was not, except in one
unusual sense, fighting for survival. The unusual sense in
which its survival was at stake is set out, yet again, in the
stark posthumous testimony of H. R. Haldeman. From his roost
at Nixon's side he describes a Kissingerian moment on December
15, 1970:
K[issinger] came in and the discussion covered some of the general thinking
about Vietnam and the P's big peace plan for next year, which K later told
me he does not favor. He thinks that any pullout next year would be a
serious mistake because the adverse reaction to it could set in well before
the `72 elections. He favors, instead, a continued winding down and then a
pullout right at the fall of `72 so that if any bad results follow they
will be too late to affect the election.
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One could hardly wish for it to be more plainly put than
that. (And put, furthermore, by one of Nixon's chief partisans
with no wish to discredit the re-election.) But in point of
fact, Kissinger himself admits to almost as much in his own
first volume of memoirs, The White House Years. The context is
a meeting with General de Gaulle, in which the old warrior
demanded to know by what right the Nixon Administration
subjected Indochina to devastating bombardment. In his own
account, Kissinger replies that "a sudden withdrawal
might give us a credibility problem." (When asked "where?"
Kissinger hazily proposed the Middle East.) It is important to
bear in mind that the future flatterer of Brezhnev and Mao was
in no real position to claim that he made war in Indochina to
thwart either. He certainly did not dare try such a callow
excuse on Charles de Gaulle. And indeed, the proponent of
secret deals with China was in no very strong position to
claim that he was combating Stalinism in general. No, it all
came down to "credibility" and to the saving of
face. It is known that 20,763 American, 109,230 South
Vietnamese, and 496,260 North Vietnamese servicemen lost their
lives in Indochina between the day that Nixon and Kissinger
took office and the day in 1973 that they withdrew American
forces and accepted the logic of 1968. Must the families of
these victims confront the fact that the chief "faces"
at risk were those of Nixon and Kissinger?
Thus the colloquially titled "Christmas bombing"
of North Vietnam, continued after that election had been won,
must be counted as a war crime by any standard. The bombing
was not conducted for anything that could be described as
"military reasons" but for twofold political ones.
The first of these was domestic: a show of strength to
extremists in Congress and a means of putting the Democratic
Party on the defensive. The second was to persuade South
Vietnamese leaders such as President Thieu--whose
intransigence had been encouraged by Kissinger in the first
place--that their objections to American withdrawal were too
nervous. This, again, was the mortgage on the initial secret
payment of 1968.
When the unpreventable collapse occurred in Cambodia and
Vietnam, in April and May 1975, the cost was infinitely higher
than it would have been seven years previously. These locust
years ended as they had begun--with a display of bravado and
deceit. On May 12, 1975, in the immediate aftermath of the
Khmer Rouge seizure of power, Cambodian gunboats detained an
American merchant vessel named the Mayaguez. The ship was
stopped in international waters claimed by Cambodia and then
taken to the Cambodian island of Koh Tang. In spite of reports
that the crew had been released, Kissinger pressed for an
immediate face-saving and "credibility"-enhancing
strike. He persuaded President Gerald Ford, the untried and
undistinguished successor to his deposed former boss, to send
in the Marines and the Air Force. Out of a Marine force of
110, 18 were killed and 50 were wounded. Twenty-three Air
Force men died in a crash. The United States used a 15,000-ton
bomb on the island, the most powerful nonnuclear device that
it possessed. Nobody has the figures for Cambodian deaths. The
casualties were pointless, because the ship's company of the
Mayaguez were nowhere on Koh Tang, having been released some
hours earlier. A subsequent congressional inquiry found that
Kissinger could have known of this by listening to Cambodian
broadcasting or by paying attention to a third-party
government that had been negotiating a deal for the
restitution of the crew and the ship. It was not as if any
Cambodians doubted, by that month of 1975, the willingness of
the U.S. government to employ deadly force.
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In Washington, D.C., there is a famous and hallowed
memorial to the American dead of the Vietnam War. Known as the
"Vietnam Veterans Memorial," it bears a name that is
slightly misleading. I was present for the extremely affecting
moment of its dedication in 1982 and noticed that the list of
nearly 60,000 names is incised in the wall not by alphabet but
by date. The first few names appear in 1959 and the last few
in 1975. The more historically minded visitors can sometimes
be heard to say that they didn't know the United States was
engaged in Vietnam as early or as late as that. Nor was the
public supposed to know. The first names are of the covert
operatives, sent in by Colonel Edward Lansdale without
congressional approval to support French colonialism. The last
names are of those thrown away in the Mayaguez fiasco. It took
Henry Kissinger to ensure that a war of atrocity, which he had
helped to prolong, should end as furtively and ignominiously
as it had begun.
A SAMPLE OF CASES: KISSINGER'S WAR CRIMES IN INDOCHINA
Some statements are too blunt for everyday, consensual
discourse. In national "debate," it is the smoother
pebbles that are customarily gathered from the stream and used
as projectiles. They leave less of a scar, even when they hit.
Occasionally, however, a single hard-edged remark will inflict
a deep and jagged wound, a gash so ugly that it must be
cauterized at once. In January 1971 there was a considered
statement from General Telford Taylor, who had been chief U.S.
prosecuting counsel at the Nuremberg trials. Reviewing the
legal and moral basis of those hearings, and also the Tokyo
trials of Japanese war criminals and the Manila trial of
Emperor Hirohito's chief militarist, General Yamashita
Tomoyuki, Taylor said that if the standard of Nuremberg and
Manila were applied evenly, and applied to the American
statesmen and bureaucrats who designed the war in Vietnam,
then "there would be a very strong possibility that they
would come to the same end [Yamashita] did." It is not
every day that a senior American soldier and jurist delivers
the opinion that a large portion of his country's political
class should probably be hooded and blindfolded and dropped
through a trapdoor on the end of a rope.
In his book Nuremberg and Vietnam, General Taylor also
anticipated one of the possible objections to this legal and
moral conclusion. It might be argued for the defense, he said,
that those arraigned did not really know what they were doing;
in other words, that they had achieved the foulest results but
from the highest and most innocent motives. The notion of
Indochina as some Heart of Darkness "quagmire" of
ignorant armies has been sedulously propagated, then and since,
in order to make such a euphemism appear plausible. Taylor had
no patience with such a view. American military and
intelligence and economic and political teams had been in
Vietnam, he wrote, for much too long to attribute anything
they did "to lack of information." It might have
been possible for soldiers and diplomats to pose as innocents
until the middle of the 1960s, but after that time, and
especially after the My Lai massacre of March 16, 1968, when
serving veterans reported major atrocities to their superior
officers, nobody could reasonably claim to have been
uninformed, and of those who could, the least believable would
be those who--far from the confusion of battle--read and
discussed and approved the panoptic reports of the war that
were delivered to Washington.
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General Taylor's book was being written while many of the
most reprehensible events of the Indochina war were still
taking place, or still to come. He was unaware of the
intensity and extent of, for example, the bombing of Laos and
Cambodia. Enough was known about the conduct of the war,
however, and about the existing matrix of legal and criminal
responsibility, for him to arrive at some indisputable
conclusions. The first of these concerned the particular
obligation of the United States to be aware of, and to respect,
the Nuremberg principles:
Military courts and commissions have customarily rendered their judgments
stark and unsupported by opinions giving the reasons for their decisions.
The Nuremberg and Tokyo judgments, in contrast, were all based on extensive
opinions detailing the evidence and analyzing the factual and legal issues,
in the fashion of appellate tribunals generally. Needless to say they were
not of uniform quality, and often reflected the logical shortcomings of
compromise, the marks of which commonly mar the opinions of multi-member
tribunals. But the process was professional in a way seldom achieved in
military courts, and the records and judgments in these trials provided a
much-needed foundation for a corpus of judge-made international penal law.
The results of the trials commended themselves to the newly formed United
Nations, and on Dec. 11, 1946, the General Assembly adopted a resolution
affirming "the principles of international law recognized by the Charter of
the Nuremberg Tribunal and the judgment of the Tribunal."
However history may ultimately assess the wisdom or unwisdom of the war
crimes trials, one thing is indisputable: At their conclusion, the United
States Government stood legally, politically and morally committed to the
principles enunciated in the charters and judgments of the tribunals. The
President of the United States, on the recommendations of the Departments
of State, War and Justice, approved the war crimes programs. Thirty or more
American judges, drawn from the appellate benches of the states from
Massachusetts to Oregon, and Minnesota to Georgia, conducted the later
Nuremberg trials and wrote the opinions. General Douglas MacArthur, under
authority of the Far Eastern Commission, established the Tokyo tribunal and
confirmed the sentences it imposed, and it was under his authority as the
highest American military officer in the Far East that the Yamashita and
other such proceedings were held. The United States delegation to the
United Nations presented the resolution by which the General Assembly
endorsed the Nuremberg principles.
Thus the integrity of the nation is staked on those principles, and
today the question is how they apply to our conduct of the war in Vietnam,
and whether the United States Government is prepared to face the
consequences of their application.
Facing and cogitating these consequences himself, General
Taylor took issue with another United States officer, Colonel
William Corson, who had written that
"[r]egardless of the outcome of ... the My Lai courts-martial and other
legal actions, the point remains that American judgment as to the effective
prosecution of the war was faulty from beginning to end and that the
atrocities, alleged or otherwise, are a result of a failure of judgment,
not criminal behavior."
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To this Taylor responded:
Colonel Corson overlooks, I fear, that negligent homicide is generally a
crime of bad judgment rather than evil intent. Perhaps he is right in the
strictly causal sense that if there had been no failure of judgment, the
occasion for criminal conduct would not have arisen. The Germans in
occupied Europe made gross errors of judgment which no doubt created the
conditions in which the slaughter of the inhabitants of Klissura [a Greek
village annihilated during the Occupation] occurred, but that did not make
the killings any the less criminal.
Referring this question to the chain of command in the
field, General Taylor noted further that the senior officer
corps had been
more or less constantly in Vietnam, and splendidly equipped with
helicopters and other aircraft, which gave them a degree of mobility
unprecedented in earlier wars, and consequently endowed them with every
opportunity to keep the course of the fighting and its consequences under
close and constant observation. Communications were generally rapid and
efficient, so that the flow of information and orders was unimpeded.
These circumstances are in sharp contrast to those that confronted
General Yamashita in 1944 and 1945, with his troops reeling back in
disarray before the oncoming American military powerhouse. For failure to
control his forces so as to prevent the atrocities they committed, Brig.
Gens. Egbert F. Bullene and Morris Handwerk and Maj. Gens. James A. Lester,
Leo Donovan and Russel B. Reynolds found him guilty of violating the laws
of war and sentenced him to death by hanging.
Nor did General Taylor omit the crucial link between the
military command and its political supervision; again a much
closer and more immediate relationship in the
American-Vietnamese instance than in the Japanese-Filipino
one, as the regular contact between, say, General Creighton
Abrams and Henry Kissinger makes clear:
How much the President and his close advisers in the White House, Pentagon
and Foggy Bottom knew about the volume and cause of civilian casualties in
Vietnam, and the physical devastation of the countryside, is speculative.
Something was known, for the late John McNaughton (then Assistant Secretary
of Defense) returned from the White House one day in 1967 with the message
that "We seem to be proceeding on the assumption that the way to eradicate
the Vietcong is to destroy all the village structures, defoliate all the
jungles, and then cover the entire surface of South Vietnam with asphalt."
This was noticed (by Townsend Hoopes, a political
antagonist of General Taylor's) before that metaphor had been
extended into two new countries, Laos and Cambodia, without a
declaration of war, a notification to Congress, or a warning
to civilians to evacuate. But Taylor anticipated the Kissinger
case in many ways when he recalled the trial of the Japanese
statesman Koki Hirota,
who served briefly as Prime Minister and for several years as Foreign
Minister between 1933 and May, 1938, after which he held no office
whatever. The so-called "rape of Nanking" by Japanese forces occurred
during the winter of 1937-38, when Hirota was Foreign Minister. Upon
receiving early reports of the atrocities, he demanded and received
assurances from the War Ministry that they would be stopped. But they
continued, and the Tokyo tribunal found Hirota guilty because he was
"derelict in his duty in not insisting before the Cabinet that immediate
action be taken to put an end to the atrocities," and "was content to rely
on assurances which he knew were not being implemented." On this basis,
coupled with his conviction on the aggressive war charge, Hirota was
sentenced to be hanged.
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Melvin Laird, as secretary of defense during the first
Nixon Administration, was queasy enough about the early
bombings of Cambodia, and dubious enough about the legality or
prudence of the intervention, to send a memo to the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, asking, "Are steps being taken, on a
continuing basis, to minimize the risk of striking Cambodian
people and structures? If so, what are the steps? Are we
reasonably sure such steps are effective?" No evidence
has surfaced that Henry Kissinger, as national security
adviser or secretary of state, ever sought even such modest
assurances. Indeed, there is much evidence of his deceiving
Congress as to the true extent to which such assurances as
were offered were deliberately false. Others involved--such as
Robert McNamara; McGeorge Bundy, national security adviser to
both Kennedy and Johnson; and William Colby--have since
offered varieties of apology or contrition or at least
explanation. Henry Kissinger, never. General Taylor described
the practice of air strikes against hamlets suspected of
"harboring" Vietnamese guerrillas as "flagrant
violations of the Geneva Convention on Civilian Protection,
which prohibits `collective penalties,' and `reprisals against
protected persons,' and equally in violation of the Rules of
Land Warfare." He was writing before this atrocious
precedent had been extended to reprisal raids that treated two
whole countries--Laos and Cambodia--as if they were disposable
hamlets.
For Henry Kissinger, no great believer in the boastful
claims of the war makers in the first place, a special degree
of responsibility attaches. Not only did he have good reason
to know that field commanders were exaggerating successes and
claiming all dead bodies as enemy soldiers--a commonplace
piece of knowledge after the spring of 1968--but he also knew
that the issue of the war had been settled politically and
diplomatically, for all intents and purposes, before he became
national security adviser. Thus he had to know that every
additional casualty, on either side, was not just a death but
an avoidable death. With this knowledge, and with a strong
sense of the domestic and personal political profit, he urged
the expansion of the war into two neutral countries--violating
international law--while persisting in a breathtakingly high
level of attrition in Vietnam itself.
From a huge menu of possible examples, I have chosen cases
that involve Kissinger directly and in which I have myself
been able to interview surviving witnesses. The first, as
foreshadowed above, is Operation "Speedy Express":
My friend and colleague Kevin Buckley, then a much admired
correspondent and Saigon bureau chief for Newsweek, became
interested in the "pacification" campaign that bore
this breezy code name. Designed in the closing days of the
Johnson-Humphrey Administration, it was put into full effect
in the first six months of 1969, when Henry Kissinger had
assumed much authority over the conduct of the war. The
objective was the American disciplining, on behalf of the
Thieu government, of the turbulent Mekong Delta province of
Kien Hoa.
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On January 22, 1968, Robert McNamara had told the Senate
that "no regular North Vietnamese units" were
deployed in the Delta, and no military intelligence documents
have surfaced to undermine his claim, so that the cleansing of
the area cannot be understood as part of the general argument
about resisting Hanoi's unsleeping will to conquest. The
announced purpose of the Ninth Division's sweep, indeed, was
to redeem many thousands of villagers from political control
by the National Liberation Front (NLF), or
"Vietcong" (VC). As Buckley found, and as his
magazine, Newsweek, partially disclosed at the rather late
date of June 19, 1972,
All the evidence I gathered pointed to a clear conclusion: a staggering
number of noncombatant civilians--perhaps as many as 5,000 according to one
official--were killed by U.S. firepower to "pacify" Kien Hoa. The death
toll there made the My Lai massacre look trifling by comparison....
The Ninth Division put all it had into the operation. Eight thousand
infantrymen scoured the heavily populated countryside, but contact with the
elusive enemy was rare. Thus, in its pursuit of pacification, the division
relied heavily on its 50 artillery pieces, 50 helicopters (many armed with
rockets and mini-guns) and the deadly support lent by the Air Force. There
were 3,381 tactical air strikes by fighter bombers during "Speedy
Express."...
"Death is our business and business is good," was the slogan painted on
one helicopter unit's quarters during the operation. And so it was.
Cumulative statistics for "Speedy Express" show that 10,899 "enemy" were
killed. In the month of March alone, "over 3,000 enemy troops were killed
... which is the largest monthly total for any American division in the
Vietnam War," said the division's official magazine. When asked to account
for the enormous body counts, a division senior officer explained that
helicopter gun crews often caught unarmed "enemy" in open fields....
There is overwhelming evidence that virtually all the Viet Cong were
well armed. Simple civilians were, of course, not armed. And the enormous
discrepancy between the body count [11,000] and the number of captured
weapons [748] is hard to explain--except by the conclusion that many
victims were unarmed innocent civilians....
The people who still live in pacified Kien Hoa all have vivid
recollections of the devastation that American firepower brought to their
lives in early 1969. Virtually every person to whom I spoke had suffered in
some way. "There were 5,000 people in our village before 1969, but there
were none in 1970," one village elder told me. "The Americans destroyed
every house with artillery, air strikes, or by burning them down with
cigarette lighters. About 100 people were killed by bombing, others were
wounded and others became refugees. Many were children killed by concussion
from the bombs which their small bodies could not withstand, even if they
were hiding underground."
Other officials, including the village police chief, corroborated the
man's testimony. I could not, of course, reach every village. But in each
of the many places where I went, the testimony was the same: 100 killed
here, 200 killed there.
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Other notes by Buckley and his friend and collaborator Alex
Shimkin (a worker for International Voluntary Services who was
later killed in the war) discovered the same evidence in
hospital statistics. In March 1969, the hospital at Ben Tre
reported 343 patients injured by "friendly" fire and
25 by "the enemy," an astonishing statistic for a
government facility to record in a guerrilla war in which
suspected membership in the Vietcong could mean death. And
Buckley's own citation for his magazine--of "perhaps as
many as 5,000" deaths among civilians in this one
sweep--is an almost deliberate understatement of what he was
told by a United States official, who actually said that
"at least 5,000" of the dead "were what we
refer to as non-combatants"--a not too exacting
distinction, as we have already seen, and as was by then well
understood. [Italics mine.]
Well understood, that is to say, not just by those who
opposed the war but by those who were conducting it. As one
American official put it to Buckley,
"The actions of the Ninth Division in inflicting civilian casualties were
worse [than My Lai]. The sum total of what the 9th did was overwhelming. In
sum, the horror was worse than My Lai. But with the 9th, the civilian
casualties came in dribbles and were pieced out over a long time. And most
of them were inflicted from the air and at night. Also, they were
sanctioned by the command's insistence on high body-counts.... The result
was an inevitable outcome of the unit's command policy."
The earlier sweep that had mopped up My Lai--during
Operation "Wheeler Wallawa"--had also at the time
counted all corpses as those of enemy soldiers, including the
civilian population of the village, who were casually included
in the mind-bending overall total of 10,000.
Confronted with this evidence, Buckley and Shimkin
abandoned a lazy and customary usage and replaced it, in a
cable to Newsweek headquarters in New York, with a more
telling and scrupulous one. The problem was not
"indiscriminate use of firepower" but "charges
of quite discriminating use--as a matter of policy in
populated areas." Even the former allegation is a gross
violation of the Geneva Convention; the second charge leads
straight to the dock in Nuremberg or The Hague.
Since General Creighton Abrams publicly praised the Ninth
Division for its work, and drew attention wherever and
whenever he could to the tremendous success of Operation
"Speedy Express," we can be sure that the political
leadership in Washington was not unaware. Indeed, the degree
of micromanagement revealed in Kissinger's memoirs quite
forbids the idea that anything of importance took place
without his knowledge or permission.
Of nothing is this more true than his own individual
involvement in the bombing and invasion of neutral Cambodia
and Laos. Obsessed with the idea that Vietnamese intransigence
could be traced to allies or resources external to Vietnam
itself, or could be overcome by tactics of mass destruction,
Kissinger at one point contemplated using thermonuclear
weapons to obliterate the pass through which ran the railway
link from North Vietnam to China, and at another stage
considered bombing the dikes that prevented North Vietnam's
irrigation system from flooding the country. Neither of these
measures (reported respectively in Tad Szulc's history of
Nixon-era diplomacy, The Illusion of Peace, and by Kissinger's
former aide Roger Morris) was taken, which removes some
potential war crimes from our bill of indictment but which
also gives an indication of the regnant mentality. There
remained Cambodia and Laos, which supposedly concealed or
protected North Vietnamese supply lines.
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As in the cases postulated by General Telford Taylor, there
is the crime of aggressive war and then there is the question
of war crimes. In the postwar period, or the period governed
by the U.N. Charter and its related and incorporated
conventions, the United States under Democratic and Republican
administrations had denied even its closest allies the right
to invade countries that allegedly gave shelter to their
antagonists. Most famously, President Eisenhower exerted
economic and diplomatic pressure at a high level to bring an
end to the invasion of Egypt by Britain, France, and Israel in
October 1956. (The British thought Egyptian president Gamal
Abdel Nasser should not control "their" Suez Canal,
the French believed Nasser to be the inspiration and source of
their troubles in Algeria, and the Israelis claimed that he
played the same role in fomenting their difficulties with the
Palestinians. The United States maintained that even if these
propaganda fantasies were true, they would not retrospectively
legalize an invasion of Egypt.) During the Algerian war of
independence, the United States had also repudiated France's
claimed right to attack a town in neighboring Tunisia that
succored Algerian guerrillas, and in 1964, at the United
Nations, Ambassador Adlai Stevenson had condemned the United
Kingdom for attacking a town in Yemen that allegedly provided
a rear guard for rebels operating in its then colony of Aden.
All this law and precedent was to be thrown to the winds
when Nixon and Kissinger decided to aggrandize the notion of
"hot pursuit" across the borders of Laos and
Cambodia. As William Shawcross reported in his 1979 book,
Sideshow, even before the actual territorial invasion of
Cambodia, for example, and very soon after the accession of
Nixon and Kissinger to power, a program of heavy bombardment
of the country was prepared and executed in secret. One might
with some revulsion call it a "menu" of bombardment,
since the code names for the raids were "Breakfast,"
"Lunch," "Snack," "Dinner," and
"Dessert." The raids were flown by B-52 bombers,
which, it is important to note, fly at an altitude too high to
be observed from the ground and carry immense tonnages of high
explosive; they give no warning of approach and are incapable
of accuracy or discrimination. Between March 1969 and May
1970, 3,630 such raids were flown across the Cambodian
frontier. The bombing campaign began as it was to go on--with
full knowledge of its effect on civilians and flagrant deceit
by Mr. Kissinger in this precise respect.
To wit, a memorandum prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff
and sent to the Defense Department and the White House stated
plainly that "some Cambodian casualties would be
sustained in the operation" and that "the surprise
effect of attack could tend to increase casualties." The
target district for "Breakfast" (Base Area 353) was
inhabited, explained the memo, by about 1,640 Cambodian
civilians; "Lunch" (Base Area 609), by 198 of them;
"Snack" (Base Area 351), by 383; "Dinner"
(Base Area 352), by 770; and "Dessert" (Base Area
350), by about 120 Cambodian peasants. These oddly exact
figures are enough in themselves to demonstrate that Kissinger
must have been lying when he later told the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee that areas of Cambodia selected for
bombing were "unpopulated."
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As a result of the expanded and intensified bombing
campaigns, it has been officially estimated that as many as
350,000 civilians in Laos and 600,000 in Cambodia lost their
lives. (These are not the highest estimates.) Figures for
refugees are several multiples of that. In addition, the
widespread use of toxic chemical defoliants created a massive
health crisis that naturally fell most heavily on children,
nursing mothers, the aged, and the already infirm. That crisis
persists to this day.
Although this appalling war, and its appalling
consequences, can and should be taken as a moral and political
crisis for American institutions, for at least five United
States presidents, and for American society, there is little
difficulty in identifying individual responsibility during
this, its most atrocious and indiscriminate stage. Richard
Nixon, as commander in chief, bears ultimate responsibility
and only narrowly escaped a congressional move to include his
crimes and deceptions in Indochina in the articles of
impeachment, the promulgation of which eventually compelled
his resignation. But his deputy and closest adviser, Henry
Kissinger, was sometimes forced, and sometimes forced himself,
into a position of virtual co-presidency where Indochina was
concerned.
For example, in the preparations for the invasion of
Cambodia in 1970, Kissinger was caught between the views of
his staff--several of whom resigned in protest when the
invasion began--and his need to please his president. His
president listened more to his two criminal associates--John
Mitchell and Bebe Rebozo--than he did to his secretaries of
state and defense, William Rogers and Melvin Laird, both of
whom were highly skeptical about widening the war. On one
especially charming occasion, Nixon telephoned Kissinger,
while drunk, to discuss the invasion plans. He then put Bebe
Rebozo on the line. "The President wants you to know if
this doesn't work, Henry, it's your ass." "Ain't
that right, Bebe?" slurred the commander in chief. (The
conversation was monitored and transcribed by one of
Kissinger's soon-to-resign staffers, William Watts.) It could
be said that in this instance the national security adviser
was under considerable pressure; nevertheless, he took the
side of the pro-invasion faction and, according to the memoirs
of General William Westmoreland, actually lobbied for that
invasion to go ahead.
A somewhat harder picture is presented by former chief of
staff H. R. Haldeman in his Diaries. On December 22, 1970, he
records:
Henry came up with the need to meet with the P today with Al Haig and then
tomorrow with Laird and Moorer because he has to use the P to force Laird
and the military to go ahead with the P's plans, which they won't carry out
without direct orders.
In his White House Years, Kissinger claims that he usurped
the customary chain of command whereby commanders in the field
receive, or believe that they receive, their orders from the
president and then the secretary of defense. He boasts that
he, together with Haldeman, Alexander Haig, and Colonel Ray
Sitton, evolved "both a military and a diplomatic
schedule" for the secret bombing of Cambodia. On board
Air Force One, which was on the tarmac at Brussels airport on
February 24, 1969, he writes, "we worked out the
guidelines for bombing of the enemy's sanctuaries." A few
weeks later, Haldeman's Diaries for March 17 record:
Historic day. K[issinger]'s "Operation Breakfast" finally came off at
2:00 PM our time.
K[issinger] really excited, as was P[resident].
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The next day's entry:
K[issinger]'s "Operation Breakfast" a great success. He came beaming in
with report, very productive.
It only got better. On April 22, 1970, Haldeman reports
that Nixon, following Kissinger into a National Security
Council meeting on Cambodia, "turned back to me with a
big smile and said, `K[issinger]'s really having fun today,
he's playing Bismarck.'"
The above is an insult to the Iron Chancellor. When
Kissinger was finally exposed in Congress and the press for
conducting unauthorized bombings, he weakly pleaded that the
raids were not all that secret, really, because Prince
Sihanouk of Cambodia had known of them. He had to be reminded
that a foreign princeling cannot give permission to an
American bureaucrat to violate the United States Constitution.
Nor, for that matter, can he give permission to an American
bureaucrat to slaughter large numbers of his "own"
civilians. It's difficult to imagine Bismarck cowering behind
such a contemptible excuse. (Prince Sihanouk, it is worth
remembering, later became an abject puppet of the Khmer
Rouge.)
Colonel Sitton, the reigning expert on B-52 tactics at the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, began to notice that by late 1969 his
own office was being regularly overruled in the matter of
selecting targets. "Not only was Henry carefully
screening the raids," said Sitton, "he was reading
the raw intelligence" and fiddling with the mission
patterns and bombing runs. In other departments of Washington
insiderdom, it was also noticed that Kissinger was becoming a
Stakhanovite committeeman. Aside from the crucial 40
Committee, which planned and oversaw all foreign covert
actions, he chaired the Washington Special Action Group
(WSAG), which dealt with breaking crises; the Verification
Panel, concerned with arms control; the Vietnam Special
Studies Group, which oversaw the day-to-day conduct of the
war; and the Defense Program Review Committee, which
supervised the budget of the Defense Department.
It is therefore impossible for him to claim that he was
unaware of the consequences of the bombings of Cambodia and
Laos; he knew more about them, and in more intimate detail,
than any other individual. Nor was he imprisoned in a culture
of obedience that gave him no alternative, or no rival
arguments. Several senior members of his own staff, most
notably Anthony Lake and Roger Morris, resigned over the
invasion of Cambodia, and more than two hundred State
Department employees signed a protest addressed to Secretary
of State William Rogers. Indeed, both Rogers and Secretary of
Defense Melvin Laird were opposed to the secret bombing
policy, as Kissinger himself records with some disgust in his
memoirs. Congress also was opposed to an extension of the
bombing (once it had agreed to become informed of it), but
even after the Nixon-Kissinger Administration had undertaken
on Capitol Hill not to intensify the raids, there was a 21
percent increase of the bombing of Cambodia in the months of
July and August 1973. The Air Force maps of the targeted areas
show them to be, or to have been, densely populated.
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Colonel Sitton does recall, it must be admitted, that
Kissinger requested the bombing avoid civilian casualties. His
explicit motive in making this request was to avoid or
forestall complaints from the government of Prince Sihanouk.
But this does no more in itself than demonstrate that
Kissinger was aware of the possibility of civilian deaths. If
he knew enough to know of their likelihood, and was director
of the policy that inflicted them, and neither enforced any
actual precautions nor reprimanded any violators, then the
case against him is legally and morally complete.
As early as the fall of 1970, an independent investigator
named Fred Branfman, who spoke Lao and knew the country as a
civilian volunteer, had gone to Bangkok and interviewed Jerome
Brown, a former targeting officer for the United States
Embassy in the Laotian capital of Vientiane. The man had
retired from the Air Force because of his disillusionment at
the futility of the bombing and his consternation at the
damage done to civilians and society. The speed and height of
the planes, he said, meant that targets were virtually
indistinguishable from the air. Pilots often chose villages as
targets, because they could be more readily identified than
alleged Pathet Lao guerrillas hiding in the jungle. Branfman,
whom I interviewed in San Francisco in the summer of 2000,
went on to provide this and other information to Henry Kamm
and Sydney Schanberg of the New York Times, to Ted Koppel of
ABC, and to many others. Under pressure from the United States
Embassy, the Laotian authorities had Branfman deported back to
the United States, which was probably, from their point of
view, a mistake. He was able to make a dramatic appearance on
Capitol Hill on April 22, 1971, at a hearing held by Senator
Edward Kennedy's subcommittee on refugees. His antagonist was
the State Department's envoy, William Sullivan, a former
ambassador to Laos. Branfman accused him in front of the
cameras of helping to conceal evidence that Laotian society
was being mutilated by ferocious aerial bombardment.
Partly as a consequence, Congressman Pete McCloskey of
California paid a visit to Laos and acquired a copy of an
internal U.S. Embassy study of the bombing. He also prevailed
on the U.S. Air Force to furnish him with aerial photographs
of the dramatic damage. Ambassador Sullivan was so disturbed
by these pictures, some of them taken in areas known to him,
that his first reaction was to establish to his own
satisfaction that the raids had occurred after he left his
post in Vientiane. (He was later to learn that, for his pains,
his own telephone was being tapped at Henry Kissinger's
instigation, one of the many such violations of American law
that were to eventuate in the Watergate tapping-and-burglary
scandal, a scandal that Kissinger was furthermore to plead--in
an astounding outburst of vanity, deceit, and self-deceit--as
his own alibi for collusion in the 1974 Cyprus crisis.)
Having done what he could to bring the Laotian nightmare to
the attention of those whose constitutional job it was to
supervise such questions, Branfman went back to Thailand and
from there to Phnom Penh, capital of Cambodia. Having gained
access to a pilot's radio, he tape-recorded the conversations
between pilots on bombing missions over the Cambodian
interior. On no occasion did they run any checks designed to
reassure themselves and others that they were not bombing
civilian targets. It had been definitely asserted, by named
U.S. government spokesmen, that such checks were run. Branfman
handed the tapes to Sydney Schanberg, whose New York Times
report on them was printed just before the Senate met to
prohibit further blitzing of Cambodia (the very resolution
that was flouted by Kissinger the following month).
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From there Branfman went back to Thailand and traveled
north to Nakhorn Phanom, the new headquarters of the U.S.
Seventh Air Force. Here, a war room code-named Blue Chip
served as the command and control center of the bombing
campaign. Branfman was able to pose as a new recruit just up
from Saigon and ultimately gained access to the war room
itself. Consoles and maps and screens plotted the progress of
the bombardment. In conversation with the "bombing
officer" on duty, he asked if pilots ever made contact
before dropping their enormous loads of ordnance. Oh, yes, he
was assured, they did. Were they worried about hitting the
innocent? Oh, no--merely concerned about the whereabouts of
CIA "ground teams" infiltrated into the area.
Branfman's report on this, which was carried by Jack
Anderson's syndicated column, was uncontroverted by any
official denial.
One reason that the American command in Southeast Asia
finally ceased employing the crude and horrific tally of
"body count" was that, as in the relatively small
but specific case of Operation "Speedy Express"
cited above, the figures began to look ominous when they were
counted up. Sometimes, totals of "enemy" dead would
turn out, when computed, to be suspiciously larger than the
number of claimed "enemy" in the field. Yet the war
would somehow drag on, with new quantitative goals being set
and enforced. Thus, according to the Pentagon, the following
are the casualty figures between the first Lyndon Johnson
bombing halt in March 1968 and February 26, 1972: Americans:
31,205 South Vietnamese regulars: 86,101 "Enemy":
475,609
The U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Refugees estimated that in
the same four-year period, rather more than 3 million
civilians were killed, injured, or rendered homeless.
In the same four-year period, the United States dropped
almost 4,500,000 tons of high explosive on Indochina. (The
Pentagon's estimated total for the amount dropped in the
entire Second World War is 2,044,000.) This total does not
include massive sprayings of chemical defoliants and
pesticides.
It is unclear how we count the murder or abduction of
35,708 Vietnamese civilians by the CIA's counterguerrilla
"Phoenix program" during the first two and a half
years of the Nixon-Kissinger Administration. There may be some
"overlap." There is also some overlap with the
actions of previous administrations in all cases. But the
truly exorbitant death tolls all occurred on Henry Kissinger's
watch; were known and understood by him; were concealed from
Congress, the press, and the public by him; and were, when
questioned, the subject of political and bureaucratic
vendettas ordered by him. They were also partly the outcome of
a secretive and illegal process in Washington, unknown even to
most Cabinet members, of which Henry Kissinger stood to be,
and became, a prime beneficiary.
On that closing point one may once again cite H. R.
Haldeman, who had no further reason to lie and who had, by the
time of his writing, paid for his crimes by serving a sentence
in prison. Haldeman describes the moment in Florida when
Kissinger was enraged by a New York Times story telling some
part of the truth about Indochina:
Henry telephoned J. Edgar Hoover in Washington from Key Biscayne on the
May morning the Times story appeared.
According to Hoover's memo of the call, Henry said the story used
"secret information which was extraordinarily damaging." Henry went on to
tell Hoover that he "wondered whether I could make a major effort to find
out where that came from ... and to put whatever resources I need to find
out who did this. I told him I would take care of this right away."
Henry was no fool, of course. He telephoned Hoover a few hours later to
remind him that the investigation be handled discreetly "so no stories will
get out." Hoover must have smiled, but said all right. And by five o'clock
he was back on the telephone to Henry with the report that the Times
reporter "may have gotten some of his information from the Southeast Asian
desk of the Department of Defense's Public Affairs Office." More
specifically, Hoover suggested the source could be a man named Mort
Halperin (a Kissinger staffer) and another man who worked in the Systems
Analysis Agency.... According to Hoover's memo, Kissinger "hoped I would
follow it up as far as we can take it and they will destroy whoever did
this if we can find him, no matter where he is."
The last line of that memo gives an accurate reflection of Henry's rage,
as I remember it.
Nevertheless, Nixon was one hundred percent behind the wiretaps. And I
was, too.
And so the program started, inspired by Henry's rage but ordered by
Nixon, who soon broadened it even further to include newsmen. Eventually,
seventeen people were wiretapped by the FBI including seven on Kissinger's
NSC staff and three on the White House staff.
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And thus, the birth of the "plumbers" and of the
assault on American law and democracy that they inaugurated.
Commenting on the lamentable end of this process, Haldeman
wrote that he still believed that ex-president Nixon (who was
then still alive) should agree to the release of the remaining
tapes. But:
This time my view is apparently not shared by the man who was one reason
for the original decision to start the taping process. Henry Kissinger is
determined to stop the tapes from reaching the public....
Nixon made the point that Kissinger was really the one who had the most
to lose from the tapes becoming public. Henry apparently felt that the
tapes would expose a lot of things he had said that would be very
disadvantageous to him publicly.
Nixon said that in making the deal for custody of his Presidential
papers, which was originally announced after his pardon but then was shot
down by Congress, that it was Henry who called him and insisted on Nixon's
right to destroy the tapes. That was, of course, the thing that destroyed
the deal.
A society that has been "plumbed" has the right
to demand that its plumbers be compelled to make some
restitution by way of full disclosure. The litigation to put
the Nixon tapes in the public trust is only partially
complete; no truthful account of the Vietnam years will be
available until Kissinger's part in what we already know has
been made fully transparent.
Until that time, Kissinger's role in the violation of
American law at the close of the Vietnam War makes the perfect
counterpart to the 1968 covert action that helped him to power
in the first place. The two parentheses enclose a series of
premeditated war crimes that still have power to stun the
imagination.
CHILE (PART I): STATESMAN AS HITMAN
In a famous expression of his contempt for democracy,
Kissinger once observed that he saw no reason why a certain
country should be allowed to "go Communist due to the
irresponsibility of its own people." The country
concerned was Chile, which at the time of this remark had a
justified reputation as the most highly evolved pluralistic
democracy in the Southern Hemisphere of the Americas. The
pluralism translated, in the years of the Cold War, into an
electorate that voted about one-third conservative, one-third
socialist and Communist, and one-third Christian Democratic
and centrist. This had made it relatively easy to keep the
Marxist element from having its turn in government, and ever
since 1962 the CIA had--as it had in Italy and other
comparable nations--largely contented itself with funding the
reliable elements. In September 1970, however, the left's
candidate actually gained a slight plurality of 36.2 percent
in the presidential elections. Divisions on the right, and the
adherence of some smaller radical and Christian parties to the
left, made it a moral certainty that the Chilean Congress
would, after the traditional sixty-day interregnum, confirm
Dr. Salvador Allende as the next president. But the very name
of Allende was anathema to the extreme right in Chile, to
certain powerful corporations (notably ITT, Pepsi-Cola, and
the Chase Manhattan Bank) that did business in Chile and the
United States, and to the CIA.
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This loathing quickly communicated itself to President
Nixon. He was personally beholden to Donald Kendall, the
president of Pepsi-Cola, who had given him his first
international account when, as a failed politician, he had
joined a Wall Street law firm. A series of Washington
meetings, within eleven days of Allende's electoral victory,
essentially settled the fate of Chilean democracy. After
discussions with Kendall, with David Rockefeller of Chase
Manhattan, and with CIA director Richard Helms, Kissinger went
with Helms to the Oval Office. Helms's notes of the meeting
show that Nixon wasted little breath in making his wishes
known. Allende was not to assume office. "Not concerned
risks involved. No involvement of embassy. $10,000,000
available, more if necessary. Full-time job--best men we
have.... Make the economy scream. 48 hours for plan of
action."
Declassified documents show that Kissinger--who had
previously neither known nor cared about Chile, describing it
offhandedly as "a dagger pointed at the heart of
Antarctica"--took seriously this chance to impress his
boss. A group was set up in Langley, Virginia, with the
express purpose of running a "two track" policy for
Chile, one the ostensible diplomatic one and the
other--unknown to the State Department or the U.S. ambassador
to Chile, Edward Korry--a strategy of destabilization,
kidnapping, and assassination designed to provoke a military
coup.
There were long- and short-term obstacles to the incubation
of such an intervention, especially in the brief interval
available before Allende took his oath of office. The
long-term obstacle was the tradition of military abstention
from politics in Chile, a tradition that marked off the
country from its neighbors. Such a military culture was not to
be degraded overnight. The short-term obstacle lay in the
person of one man: General Rene Schneider. As chief of the
Chilean Army, he was adamantly opposed to any military
meddling in the electoral process. Accordingly, it was decided
at a meeting on September 18, 1970, that General Schneider had
to go.
The plan, well documented by Seymour Hersh and others, was
to have him kidnapped by extremist officers, in such a way as
to make it appear that leftist and pro-Allende elements were
behind the plot. The resulting confusion, it was hoped, would
panic the Chilean Congress into denying Allende the
presidency. A sum of $50,000 was offered around the Chilean
capital, Santiago, for any officer or officers enterprising
enough to take on this task. Richard Helms and his director of
covert operations, Thomas Karamessines, told Kissinger that
they were not optimistic. Military circles were hesitant and
divided, or else loyal to General Schneider and the Chilean
constitution. As Helms put it in a later account of the
conversation: "We tried to make clear to Kissinger how
small the possibility of success was." Kissinger firmly
told Helms and Karamessines to press on in any case.
Here one must pause for a recapitulation. An unelected
official in the United States is meeting with others, without
the knowledge or authorization of Congress, to plan the
kidnapping of a constitutionally minded senior officer in a
democratic country with which the United States is not at war
and with which it maintains cordial diplomatic relations. The
minutes of the meetings may have an official look to them
(though they were hidden from the light of day for long
enough), but what we are reviewing is a "hit," a
piece of state-supported terrorism.
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Ambassador Edward Korry has testified that he told his
embassy staff to have nothing to do with a group styling
itself Patria y Libertad, a quasi-fascist group intent on
defying the election results. He sent two cables to Washington
warning his superiors to have nothing to do with them either.
He was unaware that his own military attaches had been told to
contact the group and to keep the fact from him. And when the
outgoing president of Chile, the Christian Democrat Eduardo
Frei, announced that he was opposed to any American
intervention and would vote to confirm the legally elected
Allende, it was precisely to this gang that Kissinger turned.
On September 15, 1970, Kissinger was told of an extremist
right-wing officer named General Roberto Viaux, who had ties
to Patria y Libertad and who was willing to accept the secret
American commission to remove General Schneider from the
chessboard. The term "kidnap" was still being
employed at this point and is often employed still.
Kissinger's "track two" group, however, authorized
the supply of machine guns as well as tear-gas grenades to
Viaux's associates and never seem to have asked what they
would do with the general once they had kidnapped him.
Let the documents tell the story. A CIA cable to
Kissinger's "track two" group from Santiago dated
October 18, 1970, reads (with the names still blacked out for
"security" purposes and cover identities written in
by hand, in my square brackets, by the ever-thoughtful
redaction service) as follows:
1. [Station cooptee] MET CLANDESTINELY EVENING 17 OCT WITH
[two Chilean Armed Forces officers] WHO TOLD HIM THEIR PLANS
WERE MOVING ALONG BETTER THAN HAD THOUGHT POSSIBLE. THEY ASKED
THAT BY EVENING 18 OCT [cooptee] ARRANGE FURNISH THEM WITH
EIGHT TO TEN TEAR GAS GRENADES. WITHIN 48 HOURS THEY NEED
THREE 45 CALIBRE MACHINE GUNS ("GREASE GUNS") WITH
500 ROUNDS AMMO EACH. [One officer] COMMENTED HAS THREE
MACHINE GUNS HIMSELF BUT CAN BE IDENTIFIED BY SERIAL NUMBERS
AS HAVING BEEN ISSUED TO HIM THEREFORE UNABLE USE THEM.
2. [Officers] SAID THEY HAVE TO MOVE BECAUSE THEY BELIEVE
THEY NOW UNDER SUSPICION AND BEING WATCHED BY ALLENDE
SUPPORTERS. [One officer] WAS LATE TO MEETING HAVING TAKEN
EVASIVE ACTION TO SHAKE POSSIBLE SURVEILLANCE BY ONE OR TWO
TAXI CABS WITH DUAL ANTENNAS WHICH HE BELIEVED BEING USED BY
OPPOSITION AGAINST HIM.
3. [Cooptee] ASKED IF [officers] HAD AIR FORCE CONTACTS.
THEY ANSWERED THEY DID NOT BUT WOULD WELCOME ONE. [Cooptee]
SEPARATELY HAS SINCE TRIED CONTACT [a Chilean Air Force
General] AND WILL KEEP TRYING UNTIL ESTABLISHED. WILL URGE
[Air Force General] MEET WITH [other two officers] ASAP.
[Cooptee] COMMENTED TO STATION THAT [Air Force General] HAS
NOT TRIED CONTACT HIM SINCE REF A TALK.
4. [Cooptee] COMMENT: CANNOT TELL WHO IS LEADER OF THIS
MOVEMENT BUT STRONGLY SUSPECTS IT IS ADMIRAL [Deleted]. IT
WOULD APPEAR FROM [his contacts'] ACTIONS AND ALLEGED ALLENDE
SUSPICIONS ABOUT THEM THAT UNLESS THEY ACT NOW THEY ARE LOST.
TRYING GET MORE INFO FROM THE EVENING 18 OCT ABOUT SUPPORT
THEY BELIEVE THEY HAVE.
|
5. STATION PLANS GIVE SIX TEAR GAS GRENADES (ARRIVING NOON
18 OCT BY SPECIAL COURIER) TO [cooptee] FOR DELIVERY TO [Armed
Forces officer] INSTEAD OF HAVING [False Flag officer] DELIVER
THEM TO VIAUX GROUP. OUR REASONING IS THAT [cooptee] DEALING
WITH ACTIVE DUTY OFFICERS. ALSO [False Flag officer] LEAVING
EVENING 18 OCT AND WILL NOT BE REPLACED BUT [cooptee] WILL
STAY HERE. HENCE IMPORTANT THAT [cooptee] CREDIBILITY WITH
[Armed Forces officers] BE STRENGTHENED BY PROMPT DELIVERY
WHAT THEY REQUESTING. REQUEST HEADQUARTERS AGREEMENT BY 1500
HOURS LOCAL TIME 18 OCT ON DECISION DELIVERY OF TEAR GAS TO
[cooptee] VICE [False Flag officer].
6. REQUEST PROMPT SHIPMENT THREE STERILE 45 CALIBRE MACHINE
GUNS AND AMMO PER PARA 1 ABOVE, BY SPECIAL COURIER IF
NECESSARY. PLEASE CONFIRM BY 2000 HOURS LOCAL TIME 18 OCT THAT
THIS CAN BE DONE SO [cooptee] MAY INFORM [his contacts]
ACCORDINGLY.
The reply, which is headed IMMEDIATE SANTIAGO (EYES ONLY
[deleted]), is dated October 18 and reads as follows:
SUB-MACHINE GUNS AND AMMO BEING SENT BY REGULAR [deleted] COURIER LEAVING
WASHINGTON 0700 HOURS 19 OCTOBER DUE ARRIVE SANTIAGO LATE EVENING 20
OCTOBER OR EARLY MORNING 21 OCTOBER. PREFERRED USE REGULAR [deleted]
COURIER TO AVOID BRINGING UNDUE ATTENTION TO OP.
A companion message, also addressed to "SANTIAGO
562," went like this:
1. DEPENDING HOW [cooptee] CONVERSATION GOES EVENING 18
OCTOBER YOU MAY WISH SUBMIT INTEL REPORT [deleted] so WE CAN
DECIDE WHETHER SHOULD BE DISSEMED.
2. NEW SUBJECT: IF [cooptee] PLANS LEAD COUP, OR BE
ACTIVELY AND PUBLICLY INVOLVED, WE PUZZLED WHY IT SHOULD
BOTHER HIM IF MACHINE GUNS CAN BE TRACED TO HIM. CAN WE
DEVELOP RATIONALE ON WHY GUNS MUST BE STERILE? WILL CONTINUE
MAKE EFFORT PROVIDE THEM BUT FIND OUR CREDULITY STRETCHED BY
NAVY [officer] LEADING HIS TROOPS WITH STERILE GUNS? WHAT IS
SPECIAL PURPOSE FOR THESE GUNS? WE WILL TRY SEND THEM WHETHER
YOU CAN PROVIDE EXPLANATION OR NOT.
The full beauty of this cable traffic cannot be appreciated
without a reading of an earlier message, dated October 16. (It
must be borne in mind that the Chilean Congress was to meet to
confirm Allende as president on the twenty-fourth of that
month.)
1. [code name Trickturn] POLICY, OBJECTIVES AND ACTIONS
WERE REVIEWED AT HIGH USG [United States Government] LEVEL
AFTERNOON 15 OCTOBER. CONCLUSIONS, WHICH ARE TO BE YOUR
OPERATIONAL GUIDE, FOLLOW:
2. IT IS FIRM AND CONTINUING POLICY THAT ALLENDE BE
OVERTHROWN BY A COUP. IT WOULD BE MUCH PREFERABLE TO HAVE THIS
TRANSPIRE PRIOR TO 24 OCTOBER BUT EFFORTS IN THIS REGARD WILL
CONTINUE VIGOROUSLY BEYOND THIS DATE. WE ARE TO CONTINUE TO
GENERATE MAXIMUM PRESSURE TOWARD THIS END UTILIZING EVERY
APPROPRIATE RESOURCE. IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT THESE ACTIONS BE
IMPLEMENTED CLANDESTINELY AND SECURELY SO THAT THE USG AND
AMERICAN HAND BE WELL HIDDEN. WHILE THIS IMPOSES ON US A HIGH
DEGREE OF SELECTIVITY IN MAKING MILITARY CONTACTS AND DICTATES
THAT THESE CONTACTS BE MADE IN THE MOST SECURE MANNER IT
DEFINITELY DOES NOT PRECLUDE CONTACTS SUCH AS REPORTED IN
SANTIAGO 544 WHICH WAS A MASTERFUL PIECE OF WORK. [Italics
added.]
|
3. AFTER THE MOST CAREFUL CONSIDERATION IT WAS DETERMINED
THAT A VIAUX COUP ATTEMPT CARRIED OUT BY HIM ALONE WITH THE
FORCES NOW AT HIS DISPOSAL WOULD FAIL. THUS, IT WOULD BE
COUNTERPRODUCTIVE TO OUR [track two] OBJECTIVES. IT WAS
DECIDED THAT [CIA] GET A MESSAGE TO VIAUX WARNING HIM AGAINST
PRECIPITATE ACTION. IN ESSENCE OUR MESSAGE IS TO STATE,
"WE HAVE REVIEWED YOUR PLANS, AND BASED ON YOUR
INFORMATION AND OURS, WE COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT YOUR
PLANS FOR A COUP AT THIS TIME CANNOT SUCCEED. FAILING, THEY
MAY REDUCE YOUR CAPABILITIES FOR THE FUTURE. PRESERVE YOUR
ASSETS. WE WILL STAY IN TOUCH. THE TIME WILL COME WHEN YOU
TOGETHER WITH ALL YOUR OTHER FRIENDS CAN DO SOMETHING. YOU
WILL CONTINUE TO HAVE OUR SUPPORT." YOU ARE REQUESTED TO
DELIVER THE MESSAGE TO VIAUX ESSENTIALLY AS NOTED ABOVE. OUR
OBJECTIVES ARE AS FOLLOWS: (A) TO ADVISE HIM OF OUR OPINION
AND DISCOURAGE HIM FROM ACTING ALONE; (B) CONTINUE TO
ENCOURAGE HIM TO AMPLIFY HIS PLANNING; (C) ENCOURAGE HIM TO
JOIN FORCES WITH OTHER COUP PLANNERS SO THAT THEY MAY ACT IN
CONCERT EITHER BEFORE OR AFTER 24 OCTOBER. (N.B. SIX GAS MASKS
AND SIX CS CANNISTERS [sic] ARE BEING CARRIED TO SANTIAGO BY
SPECIAL [deleted] COURIER ETD WASHINGTON 1100 HOURS 16
OCTOBER.)
4. THERE IS GREAT AND CONTINUING INTEREST IN THE ACTIVITIES
OF TIRADO, CANALES, VALENZUELA ET AL. AND WE WISH THEM MAXIMUM
GOOD FORTUNE.
5. THE ABOVE IS YOUR OPERATING GUIDANCE. NO OTHER POLICY
GUIDANCE YOU MAY RECEIVE FROM [indecipherable: State] OR ITS
MAXIMUM EXPONENT IN SANTIAGO, ON HIS RETURN, ARE TO SWAY YOU
FROM YOUR COURSE.
6. PLEASE REVIEW ALL YOUR PRESENT AND POSSIBLY NEW
ACTIVITIES TO INCLUDE PROPAGANDA, BLACK OPERATIONS, SURFACING
OF INTELLIGENCE OR DISINFORMATION, PERSONAL CONTACTS, OR
ANYTHING ELSE YOUR IMAGINATION CAN CONJURE WHICH WILL PERMIT
YOU TO PRESS FORWARD OUR [deleted] OBJECTIVE IN A SECURE
MANNER.
Finally, it is essential to read the White House
"MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION," dated October 15,
1970, to which the above cable directly refers and of which it
is a more honest summary. Present for the "HIGH USG
LEVEL" meeting were, as noted in the heading, "Dr.
Kissinger, Mr. Karamessines, Gen. Haig." The first
paragraph of their deliberations has been entirely blacked
out, with not so much as a scribble in the margin from the
redaction service. (Given what has since been admitted, this
sixteen-line deletion must be well worth reading.) Picking up
at paragraph two, we find:
2. Then Mr. Karamessines provided a run-down on Viaux, the
Canales meeting with Tirado, the latter's new position (after
Porta was relieved of command "for health reasons")
and, in some detail, the general situation in Chile from the
coup possibility viewpoint.
3. A certain amount of information was available to us
concerning Viaux's alleged support throughout the Chilean
military. We had assessed Viaux's claims carefully, basing our
analysis on good intelligence from a number of sources. Our
conclusion was clear: Viaux did not have more than one chance
in twenty--perhaps less--to launch a successful coup.
|
4. The unfortunate repercussions, in Chile and
internationally, of an unsuccessful coup were discussed. Dr.
Kissinger ticked off his list of these negative possibilities.
His items were remarkably similar to the ones Mr. Karamessines
had prepared.
5. It was decided by those present that the Agency must get
a message to Viaux warning him against any precipitate action.
In essence our message was to state: "We have reviewed
your plans, and based on your information and ours, we come to
the conclusion that your plans for a coup at this time cannot
succeed. Failing, they may reduce your capabilities for the
future. Preserve your assets. We will stay in touch. The time
will come when you with all your other friends can do
something. You will continue to have our support."
6. After the decision to de-fuse the Viaux coup plot, at
least temporarily, Dr. Kissinger instructed Mr. Karamessines
to preserve Agency assets in Chile, working clandestinely and
securely to maintain the capability for Agency operations
against Allende in the future. [Italics added.]
7. Dr. Kissinger discussed his desire that the word of our
encouragement to the Chilean military in recent weeks be kept
as secret as possible. Mr. Karamessines stated emphatically
that we had been doing everything possible in this connection,
including the use of false flag officers, car meetings and
every conceivable precaution. But we and others had done a
great deal of talking recently with a number of persons. For
example, Ambassador Korry's wide-ranging discussions with
numerous people urging a coup "cannot be put back into
the bottle." [Three lines of deletion follow.] (Dr.
Kissinger requested that copy of the message be sent to him on
16 October.)
8. The meeting concluded on Dr. Kissinger's note that the
Agency should continue keeping the pressure on every Allende
weak spot in sight--now, after the 24th of October, after 5
November, and into the future until such time as new marching
orders are given. Mr. Karamessines stated that the Agency
would comply.
So "track two" contained two tracks of its own.
"Track two/one" was the group of ultras led by
General Roberto Viaux and his sidekick, Captain Arturo
Marshal. These men had tried to bring off a coup in 1969
against the Christian Democrats; they had been cashiered and
were disliked even by conservatives in the officer corps.
"Track two/two" was a more ostensibly
"respectable" faction headed by General Camilo
Valenzuela, the chief of the garrison in the capital city,
whose name occurs in the cables above and whose identity is
concealed by some of the deletions. Several of the CIA
operatives in Chile felt that Viaux was too much of a madman
to be trusted. And Ambassador Korry's repeated admonitions
also had their effect. As shown in the October 15 memo cited
above, Kissinger and Karamessines developed last-minute second
thoughts about Viaux, who as late as October 13 had been given
$20,000 in cash from the CIA station and promised a
life-insurance policy of $250,000. This offer was authorized
directly from the White House. With only days to go, however,
before Allende was inaugurated, and with Nixon repeating that
"it was absolutely essential that the election of Mr.
Allende to the presidency be thwarted," the pressure on
the Valenzuela group became intense. As a direct consequence,
especially after the warm words of encouragement he had
received, General Roberto Viaux felt himself under some
obligation to deliver and to disprove those who had doubted
him.
|
On the evening of October 19, 1970, the Valenzuela group,
aided by some of Viaux's gang, and equipped with the tear-gas
grenades delivered by the CIA, attempted to grab General
Schneider as he left an official dinner. The attempt failed
because Schneider left in a private car and not the expected
official one. The failure produced an extremely significant
cable from CIA headquarters in Washington to the local
station, asking for urgent action because "HEADQUARTERS
MUST RESPOND DURING MORNING 20 OCTOBER TO QUERIES FROM HIGH
LEVELS." Payments of $50,000 each to Valenzuela and his
chief associate were then authorized on condition that they
make another attempt. On the evening of October 20 they did.
But again there was only failure to report. On October 22 the
"sterile" machine guns mentioned above were handed
to Valenzuela's group for yet another try. Later that same
day, General Roberto Viaux's gang finally murdered General
Rene Schneider.
According to the later verdict of the Chilean military
courts, this atrocity partook of elements of both tracks of
"track two." In other words, Valenzuela was not
himself on the scene, but the assassination squad, led by
Viaux, contained men who had participated in the preceding two
attempts. Viaux was convicted on charges of kidnapping and of
conspiring to cause a coup. Valenzuela was convicted of the
charge of conspiracy to cause a coup. So any subsequent
attempt to distinguish the two plots from each other, except
in point of degree, is an attempt to confect a distinction
without a difference.
It scarcely matters whether Schneider was slain because of
a kidnapping scheme that went awry (he was said by the
assassins to have had the temerity to resist) or whether his
assassination was the objective in the first place. The
Chilean military police report, as it happens, describes a
straightforward murder. Under the law of every law-bound
country (including the United States), a crime committed in
the pursuit of a kidnapping is thereby aggravated, not
mitigated. You may not say, with a corpse at your feet,
"I was only trying to kidnap him." At least, you may
not say so if you hope to plead extenuating circumstances.
Yet a version of "extenuating circumstances" has
become the paper-thin cover story with which Kissinger has
since protected himself from the charge of being an
accomplice, before and after the fact, in kidnapping and
murder. And this sorry euphemism has even found a refuge in
the written record. The Senate intelligence committee, in its
investigation of the matter, concluded that since the machine
guns supplied to Valenzuela had not been actually employed in
the killing, and since General Viaux had been officially
discouraged by the CIA a few days before the murder, there was
therefore "no evidence of a plan to kill Schneider or
that United States officials specifically anticipated that
Schneider would be shot during the abduction."
Walter Isaacson, in his biography of Kissinger, takes at
face value a memo from Kissinger to Nixon after his meeting on
October 15 with Karamessines, in which he reports to the
president about the Viaux plot, saying that he had
"turned it off." He also takes at face value the
claim that Viaux's successful hit was essentially
unauthorized. These excuses and apologies are as logically
feeble as they are morally contemptible. Henry Kissinger bears
direct responsibility for the Schneider murder, as the
following points demonstrate:
|
1) Bruce MacMaster, one of the "False Flag"
agents mentioned in the cable traffic above, a career CIA man
carrying a forged Colombian passport and claiming to represent
American business interests in Chile, has told of his efforts
to get "hush money" to jailed members of the Viaux
group, after the assassination and before they could implicate
the agency.
2) Colonel Paul M. Wimert, a military attache in Santiago
and chief CIA liaison with the Valenzuela faction, has
testified that after the Schneider killing he hastily
retrieved the two payments of $50,000 that had been paid to
Valenzuela and his partner, and also the three
"sterile" machine guns. He then drove rapidly to the
Chilean seaside town of Vina del Mar and hurled the guns into
the ocean. His accomplice in this action, CIA station chief
Henry Hecksher, had assured Washington only days before that
either Viaux or Valenzuela would be able to eliminate
Schneider and thereby trigger a coup.
3) Look again at the White House/Kissinger memo of October
15 and at the doggedly literal way it is retransmitted to
Chile. In no sense of the term does it "turn off"
Viaux. If anything, it incites him--a well-known and boastful
fanatic--to redouble his efforts. "Preserve your assets.
We will stay in touch. The time will come when you with all
your other friends can do something. You will continue to have
our support." This is not exactly the language of
standing him down. The remainder of the cable speaks plainly
of the intention to "DISCOURAGE HIM FROM ACTING
ALONE," to "CONTINUE TO ENCOURAGE HIM TO AMPLIFY HIS
PLANNING," and to "ENCOURAGE HIM TO JOIN FORCES WITH
OTHER COUP PLANNERS SO THAT THEY MAY ACT IN CONCERT EITHER
BEFORE OR AFTER 24 OCTOBER." (Italics added.) The last
three stipulations are an entirely accurate, not to say
prescient, description of what Viaux actually did.
4) Consult again the cable received by Henry Hecksher on
October 20, referring to anxious queries "from high
levels" about the first of the failed attacks on
Schneider. Thomas Karamessines, when questioned by the Senate
intelligence committee about the same phrase in a similar
cable sent to another CIA agent in Santiago, testified of his
certainty that the term "high levels" referred
directly to Kissinger. In all previous communications from
Washington, as a glance above will show, that had indeed been
the case. This on its own is enough to demolish Kissinger's
claim to have "turned off" "track two"
(.and its interior tracks) on October 15.
5) Ambassador Edward Korry later made the obvious point
that Kissinger was attempting to build a paper alibi in the
event of a failure by the Viaux group: "His interest was
not in Chile but in who was going to be blamed for what. He
wanted me to be the one who took the heat. Henry didn't want
to be associated with a failure, and he was setting up a
record to blame the State Department. He brought me in to the
President because he wanted me to say what I had to say about
Viaux; he wanted me to be the soft man."
|
The concept of "deniability" was not as well
understood in Washington in 1970 as it has since become. But
it is clear that Henry Kissinger wanted two things
simultaneously: He wanted the removal of General Schneider, by
any means and employing any proxy. (No instruction from
Washington to leave Schneider unharmed was ever given; deadly
weapons were sent by diplomatic pouch, and men of violence
were carefully selected to receive them.) And he wanted to be
out of the picture in case such an attempt might fail, or be
uncovered. These are the normal motives of anyone who solicits
or suborns murder. Kissinger, however, needed the crime very
slightly more than he needed, or was able to design, the
deniability. Without waiting for his many hidden papers to be
released or subpoenaed, we can say with safety that he is
prima facie guilty of direct collusion in the murder of a
constitutional officer in a democratic and peaceful country.
A NOTE ON PART TWO
Two well-marked and separate but consistent styles may be
noticed in Kissinger's successive, sanguinary encounters with
Indochina and Chile: in the first instance, a megalo-style,
replete with overblown operatic effects on his part and grand,
terrifying consequences for others; in the second instance, a
micro-style, involving an obsessive, almost fussy manipulation
of smaller forces. The two practices are actually quite
congruent, and there is an obvious relation between the gross
and comprehensive violence of the first case and the intimate
and personal cruelty of the second.
In Indochina, the megalo-scale of mass murder also required
much individual fawning, the tireless flattering of numerous
secret committees, and the smiling betrayal of several
associates. In Chile, the micro-scale of surreptitious
assassination was paradoxically conceived with a certain
grandeur, the objective being the destabilization of an entire
government and, ultimately, the teaching of a sharp
pedagogical lesson to a whole subcontinent.
In the March issue of Harper's Magazine, we shall again
encounter these two contrasting but symmetrical tropes. In
Chile, the destruction of an economy, a president, and a
constitution is followed by the knowing extension of the
"death squad" system across the Southern Americas.
Vendetta, in other words--against Schneider and
Allende--evolves into realpolitik. In Bangladesh, it is calmly
decided that the lives of millions of Bengalis are expendable:
they are the price of a glorifying photo-op in Beijing, the
returning of a favor to a military dictator, and payment for
an old personal resentment by Kissinger's boss. Since the
victim cannot be forgiven, this grudge is later pursued to the
threshold of assassination and beyond. In Cyprus, a fancied
slight or two from an elected but inconvenient leader is
enough to set the machinery of designated murder and wider
geopolitical "destabilization" clanking again: out
of a perceived affront to power evolves a bitter war and a
continuing tragedy. In East Timor, an uncountable hill of
corpses rises so that a covert and illegal handshake between
Henry Kissinger and a bizarre despot may be honored. While in
Washington, D.C., a lone reporter catches and offends the
world's coldest eye and nearly loses both liberty and life as
a consequence.
|
Finally--and as the most squalid illustration of the
obscene connection between the vastly lethal and the merely
paltry--we discover Henry Kissinger profiting explicitly as a
private man from the crimes he committed as a public one. The
stale image of the "revolving door" is inadequate to
depict the great mill and grindstone of influence, as it
generates misery and homicide in one corner and personal gain
in another. Now that both corners can be illuminated, it has
become both possible and necessary to sum up the legal case
against this person, a case that unsurprisingly consists of
gross violations of broad international laws and deliberate,
cumulative, identifiable breaches of local and national ones.
This is, in both declensions--and in both senses--an
American responsibility.
A NOTE ON THE "40 COMMITTEE"
In these pages, I've found it essential to allude
frequently to the "40 Committee," the
semi-clandestine body of which Henry Kissinger the chairman
between 1969 and 1976. One does not need to picture some
giant, octopus-like organization at the center of a web of
conspiracy; however, it is important to know that there was a
committee that maintained ultimate supervision over United
States covert actions overseas (and, possibly, at home)during
this period.
The CIA was originally set up by President Harry Truman at
the beginning of the Cold War. In the first Eisenhower
Administration, it was felt necessary to establish a
monitoring or watchdog body to oversee covert operations. This
panel was known as the Special Group, and sometimes also
referred to as the 54/12 Group, after the number of the
National Security Council directive that set it up. By the
time of President Johnson it was called the 303 Committee, and
during the Nixon and Ford administrations it was called the 40
Committee. Some believe that these changes of name reflect the
numbers of later NSC directives; others, the successive room
numbers in the handsome Old Executive Office Building, now
annexed to the neighboring White House, in which it met. In
fact, NSC Memorandum 40 was named after the room in which the
committee met. No mystery there.
If any fantastic rumors shroud the work of the committee,
this may be the outcome of the absurd cult of secrecy that at
one point surrounded it. At Senate hearings in 1973, Senator
Stuart Symington was questioning William Colby, then director
of central intelligence, about the origins and evolution of
the supervisory group:
SYMINGTON: Very well. What is the name of the latest
committee of this character?
COLBY: 40 Committee.
SYMINGTON: Who is the chairman?
COLBY: Well, again, I would prefer to go into executive
session on the description of the 40 Committee, Mr. Chairman.
SYMINGTON: As to who is the chairman, you would prefer an
executive session?
COLBY: The chairman--all right, Mr. Chairman--Dr. Kissinger
is the chairman, as the assistant to the president for
national security affairs.
|
Kissinger held this position ex officio, in other words.
His colleagues at the time were Air Force General George
Brown, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; William P.
Clements Jr., the deputy secretary of defense; Joseph Sisco,
the undersecretary of state for political affairs, and the
director of central intelligence, William Colby.
With slight variations, those holding these positions have
been the permanent members of the 40 Committee that, as
President Ford phrased it in a rare public reference by a
president to the group's existence, "reviews every covert
operation undertaken by our government." An important
variation was added by President Nixon, who appointed his
former campaign manager and attorney general, John Mitchell,
to sit on the committee, the only attorney general to have
done so. The founding charter of the CIA prohibits it from
taking any part in domestic operations: in January 1975,
Attorney General Mitchell was convicted of numerous counts of
perjury, obstruction, and conspiracy to cover up the Watergate
burglary, which was carried out in part by former CIA
operatives. He became the first attorney general to serve time
in prison.
We have met Mr. Mitchell, in concert with Mr. Kissinger,
before. The usefulness of this note, I hope and believe, is
that it supplies a thread that will be found throughout this
narrative. Whenever any major U.S. covert undertaking
occurred, between the years 1969 and 1976, Henry Kissinger may
be at least presumed to have had direct knowledge of, and
responsibility for, it. If he claims that he did not, then he
is claiming not to have been doing a job to which he clung
with great bureaucratic tenacity. And whether or not he cares
to accept the responsibility, the accountability is
inescapably his.

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Harper's Magazine
March, 2001
THE CASE AGAINST HENRY KISSINGER.(former secretary
of state, United States)
Author/s: Christopher Hitchens
Crimes against humanity
On the twentieth of December 2000, as the first
part of this article was being readied for
publication, we contacted Henry Kissinger's office,
stipulating our areas of interest and requesting an
interview. Receiving no direct response from him, we
wrote again and graciously offered to match the usual
sultanlike fee that he charges for making
pronouncements. This elicited only a pompous letter
from a hireling, and we were left to assume that there
are some subjects Kissinger prefers not to discuss,
not even for ready money.
Whether or not their perpetrator cares to comment
on them, the crimes discussed in Part I--the havoc
visited on Indochinese civilians, the illegal
subversion practiced on Chilean democracy --did in
fact occur, and they set the tone for the remainder of
his time in office. The murder of General Rene
Schneider was soon eclipsed by more, and more gross,
atrocities in Chile and the Southern Hemisphere. And
the same paw print of unchecked power was to be found
in Cyprus and Greece, in Bangladesh and East Timor, in
the succeeding years. These are not, as is too often
argued, the results of geopolitical forces for which
no one is to blame. They are crimes for which Henry
Kissinger is, and should be held, responsible, and
they vividly insist on an accounting.
CHILE (PART II): DEATH IN THE SOUTH
On November 9, 1970, Henry Kissinger authored
National Security Council Decision Memorandum 93,
which reviewed policy toward Chile in the immediate
wake of Salvador Allende's confirmation as president.
Various routine measures of economic harassment were
proposed (as per Nixon's instruction to "make the
economy scream"), with cutoffs in aid and
investment. More significantly, Kissinger advocated
that "close relations" be maintained with
military leaders in neighboring countries, in order to
facilitate both the coordination of pressure against
Chile and the incubation of opposition within the
country. In outline, this prefigures the disclosures
that have since been made about Operation
"Condor," a secret collusion among military
dictatorships across the hemisphere, operated with the
United States government's knowledge and indulgence.
The actual overthrow of the Allende government in a
sanguinary coup d'etat took place on September 11,
1973, while Kissinger was going through his own Senate
confirmation process as secretary of state. He falsely
assured the Foreign Relations Committee that the
United States government had played no part in the
coup. From a thesaurus of hard information to the
contrary, one might select Situation Report No. 2,
from the Navy Section of the United States Military
Group in Chile and written by U.S. Naval Attache
Patrick J. Ryan. Mr. Ryan describes his close
relationship with the officers engaged in overthrowing
the government, hails September 11, 1973, as
"our. D-Day," and observes with satisfaction
that "Chile's coup de etat [sic] was close to
perfect." Or one may peruse the declassified
files on "Project FUBELT"--the code name
under which the CIA, in frequent contact with
Kissinger and the 40 Committee,(1) conducted covert
operations against the legal and elected government of
Chile.
|
What is striking, and what points to a much more
direct complicity in individual crimes against
humanity, is the microscopic detail in which Kissinger
kept himself informed, after the coup, of Augusto
Pinochet's atrocities. On November 16, Assistant
Secretary of State Jack B. Kubisch delivered a
detailed report on the Chilean junta's execution
policy, which, as he notes to the new secretary,
"you requested by cable from Tokyo." The
memo goes on to enlighten Kissinger in various ways
about the first nineteen days of Pinochet's rule.
Summary executions during that period, we are told,
totaled 320. (This contrasts with the publicly
announced total of 100 and is based on "an
internal, confidential report prepared for the
junta" to which American officials are evidently
privy.) Looking on the bright side,
On November 14, we announced our second CCC credit to Chile--$24 million
for feed com. Our long-standing commitment to sell two surplus destroyers
to the Chilean navy has met a reasonably sympathetic response in Senate
consultations. The Chileans, meanwhile, have sent us several new requests
for controversial military equipment.
Kubisch then raises the awkward question of two
American citizens murdered by the junta--Frank Teruggi
and Charles Horman--details of whose precise fate are
still, more than a quarter century later, being sought
by their families. The reason for the length of the
search may be inferred from a telegram, dated February
11, 1974, which reports on a meeting with the junta's
foreign minister and notes that Kubisch raises the
matter of the missing Americans "IN THE CONTEXT
OF THE NEED TO BE CAREFUL TO KEEP RELATIVELY SMALL
ISSUES IN OUR RELATIONSHIP FROM MAKING OUR COOPERATION
MORE DIFFICULT."
To return, via this detour, to Operation
"Condor": "Condor" was a machinery
of cross-border assassination, abduction, torture, and
intimidation coordinated among the secret police
forces of Pinochet's Chile, Alfredo Stroessner's
Paraguay, Jorge Rafael Videla's Argentina, and other
regional caudillos. This internationalization of the
death-squad principle is now known to have been
responsible for the murder of the dissident general
Carlos Prats of Chile (and his wife) in Buenos Aires,
the murder of the Bolivian general Juan Jose Torres,
also in Argentina, and the maiming of a Christian
Democratic Chilean senator, Bernardo Leighton, in
Italy, to name only the most salient victims. A
"Condor" team also detonated a car bomb in
downtown Washington, D.C., in September 1976, killing
the former Chilean foreign minister, Orlando Letelier,
and his aide, Ronni Moffitt. United States government
complicity has been uncovered at every level of this
network. It has been established, for example, that
the FBI aided Pinochet in capturing Jorge Isaac
Fuentes de Alarcon, who was detained and tortured in
Paraguay, then turned over to the Chilean secret
police and "disappeared." Astonishingly, the
surveillance of Latin American dissident refugees in
the United States was promised to "Condor"
figures by American intelligence.
|
Stroessner has been overthrown; Videla is in
prison; Pinochet and his henchmen are being or have
been brought to account in Chile. And what of
Kissinger? All of the above-cited crimes, and many
more besides, were committed on his "watch"
as secretary of state. And all of them were and are
punishable under local or international law or both.
It can hardly be argued, by himself or by his
defenders, that he was indifferent to, or unaware of,
the true situation. In 1999 a secret memorandum was
declassified, giving excruciating details of a private
conversation between Kissinger and Pinochet in
Santiago, Chile, on June 8, 1976. The meeting took
place the day before Kissinger was due to address the
Organization of American States. The subject was human
rights. Kissinger was at some pains to explain to
Pinochet that the few pro forma remarks he was to make
on that topic were by no means to be taken seriously.
My friend Peter Kornbluh has performed the service of
comparing the "Memcon" (Memorandum of
Conversation) with the account of the meeting given by
Kissinger himself in his third volume of apologia,
Years of Renewal:
The Memoir: A considerable amount of time in my dialogue with Pinochet
was devoted to human rights, which were, in fact, the principal obstacle to
close United States relations with Chile. I outlined the main points in my
speech to the OAS which I would deliver the next day. Pinochet made no
comment.
The Memcon: I will treat human rights in general terms, and human rights
in a world context. I will refer in two paragraphs to the report on Chile
of the OAS Human Rights Commission. I will say that the human rights issue
has impaired relations between the U.S. and Chile. This is partly the
result of Congressional actions. I will add that I hope you will shortly
remove these obstacles.... I can do no less, without producing a reaction
in the U.S. which would lead to legislative restrictions. The speech is not
aimed at Chile. I wanted to tell you about this. My evaluation is that you
are a victim of all left-wing groups around the world and that your
greatest sin was that you overthrew a government that was going Communist.
The Memoir: As Secretary of State, I felt I had the responsibility to
encourage the Chilean government in the direction of greater democracy
through a policy of understanding Pinochet's concerns.... Pinochet reminded
me that "Russia supports their people 100 percent. We are behind you. You
are the leader. But you have a punitive system for your friends." I
returned to my underlying theme that any major help from us would
realistically depend on progress on human rights.
The Memcon: There is merit in what you say. It is a curious time in the
U.S. ... It is unfortunate. We have been through Viet Nam and Watergate. We
have to wait until the [1976] elections. We welcomed the overthrow of the
Communist-inclined government here. We are not out to weaken your position.
|
In an unpleasant way, Pinochet twice mentioned the
name of Orlando Letelier, the exiled Chilean
opposition leader, accusing him of misleading the
United States Congress. Kissinger's response, as can
be seen, was to apologize for the Congress and (in a
minor replay of his 1968 Paris tactic over Vietnam) to
suggest that the dictator hope for better days after
the upcoming elections. Three months later, a car bomb
in Washington killed Letelier, the only such outrage
ever committed in the nation's capital by agents of a
foreign regime (and an incident completely absent from
Kissinger's memoirs). The man responsible for
arranging the crime, the Chilean secret policeman
General Manuel Contreras, has since stated in an
affidavit that he took no action without specific and
personal orders from Pinochet. He remains in prison,
doubtless wondering why he trusted his superiors.
"I want to see our relations and friendship
improve," Kissinger told Pinochet (but not the
readers of his memoirs). "We want to help, not
undermine you." In advising a murderer and
despot, whose rule he had helped impose, to disregard
his upcoming remarks as a sop to Congress, Kissinger
insulted democracy in both countries. He also gave the
greenest of green lights to further cross-border and
internal terrorism, neither of which could have been
unknown to him. (In his memoirs, he does mention what
he calls Pinochet's "counterterrorist
intelligence agency.") Further colluding with
Pinochet against the United States Congress, which was
considering cutting off arms sales to human-rights
violators via the Kennedy Amendment, Kissinger
obsequiously remarked,
I don't know if you listen in on my phone, but if you do you have just
heard me issue instructions to Washington to [defeat the Kennedy Amendment]
if we defeat it, we will deliver the F-5Es as we agreed to do.
The foregoing passage is worth bearing in mind. It
is a good key for decoding the usual relationship
between fact and falsehood in Kissinger's ill-crafted
memoir. (And it is a huge reproach to his editors at
Simon & Schuster, and Weidenfeld & Nicolson.)
It should also act as an urgent prompting to members
of Congress, and to human-rights organizations, to
reopen the incomplete inquiries and thwarted
investigations into the multifarious crimes of this
period. Finally, and read in the light of Chile's
return to democracy and the decision of the Chilean
courts to pursue truth and justice, it repudiates
Kissinger's patronizing insult concerning the
"irresponsibility" of a dignified and humane
people, who have suffered very much more than verbal
insult at his hands.
A rule of thumb in Washington holds that any late
disclosure by officialdom will contain material that
is worse than even the cynics suspected. In September
2000, however, the CIA disgorged the results of an
internal inquiry on Chile, which had been required of
it by the Hinchey Amendment to the Intelligence
Authorization Act for that fiscal year. And the most
hardened critics and investigators were reduced to
amazement:
Support for Coup in 1970. Under "Track II" of the strategy, CIA sought
to instigate a coup to prevent Allende from taking office after he won a
plurality in the 4 September election and before, as Constitutionally
required because he did not win an absolute majority, the Chilean Congress
reaffirmed his victory. CIA was working with three different groups of
plotters. All three groups made it clear that any coup would require the
kidnapping of Army Commander Rene Schneider, who felt deeply that the
Constitution required that the Army allow Allende to assume power. CIA
agreed with that assessment. Although CIA provided weapons to one of the
groups, we have found no information that the plotters' or CIA's intention
was for the general to be killed. Contact with one group of plotters was
dropped early on because of its extremist tendencies. CIA provided tear
gas, submachine-guns and ammunition to the second group, mortally wounding
him in the attack. CIA had previously encouraged this group to launch a
coup but withdrew support four days before the attack because, in CIA's
assessment, the group could not carry it out successfully.
|
This repeats the old canard supposedly
distinguishing a kidnapping or abduction from a
murder, and once again raises the intriguing question:
What was the CIA going to do with General Schneider
once it had kidnapped him?(2) (Note, also, the studied
passivity whereby the report "found no
information that the plotters' or CIA's intention was
for the general to be killed." What would satisfy
this bizarre criterion?) But then we learn of the
supposedly unruly gang that actually took its
instructions seriously:
In November 1970 a member of the Viaux group who avoided capture
recontacted the Agency and requested financial assistance on behalf of the
group. Although the Agency had no obligation to the group because it acted
on its own, in an effort to keep the prior contact secret, maintain the
good will of the group, and for humanitarian reasons, $35,000 was passed.
"Humanitarian reasons." One has to admire
the sheer inventiveness of this explanation. At 1970
prices, $35,000 was, in Chile, a considerable sum. Not
likely the sort of sum that a local station chief
could have disbursed on his own. One wants to know how
the 40 Committee and its vigilant chairman, Henry
Kissinger, decided that the best way to dissociate
from a supposedly loose-cannon gang was to pay it a
small fortune in cash after it had committed a
cold-blooded murder.
The same question arises in an even more acute form
with another disclosure made by the CIA in the course
of the same report. This is headed "Relationship
with Contreras." Manuel Contreras was the head of
Pinochet's secret military police, and in that
capacity organized the death, torture, and
"disappearance" of innumerable Chileans as
well as the use of bombing and assassination
techniques as far afield as Washington, D.C. The CIA
admits early on in the document that it
had liaison relationships in Chile with the primary purpose of securing
assistance in gathering intelligence on external targets. The CIA offered
these services assistance in internal organization and training to combat
subversion and terrorism from abroad, not in combating internal opponents
of the government.
Such flat prose, based on a distinction between the
"external targets" and the more messy
business of internal dictatorial discipline, invites
the question: What external threat? Chile had no
foreign enemy except Argentina, which disputed some
sea-lane rights in the Beagle Channel. (In
consequence, Chile helped Mrs. Thatcher in the
Falklands war of 1982.) And in Argentina, as we know,
the CIA was likewise engaged in helping the military
regime to survive. No, Chile had no external enemies
to speak of, but the Pinochet dictatorship had many,
many external foes. They were the numerous Chileans
forced to abandon their country. Manuel Contreras's
job was to hunt them down. As the report puts it,
During a period between 1974 and 1977, CIA maintained contact with
Manuel Contreras Sepulveda, who later became notorious for his involvement
in human rights abuses. The U.S. Government policy community approved CIA's
contact with Contreras, given his position as chief of the primary
intelligence organization in Chile, as necessary to accomplish the CIA's
mission, in spite of concerns that this relationship might lay the CIA open
to charges of aiding internal political repression.
|
After a few bits of back-and-forth about the
distinction without a difference (between
"external" and "internal" police
tactics), the CIA report states candidly,
By April 1975, intelligence reporting showed that Contreras was the
principal obstacle to a reasonable human rights policy within the Junta,
but an interagency committee directed the CIA to continue its relationship
with Contreras. The U.S. Ambassador to Chile urged Deputy Director of
Central Intelligence [General Vernon] Walters to receive Contreras in
Washington in the interest of maintaining good relations with Pinochet. In
August 1975, with interagency approval, this meeting took place.
In May and June 1975, elements within the CIA recommended establishing a
paid relationship with Contreras to obtain intelligence based on his unique
position and access to Pinochet. This proposal was overruled, citing the
U.S. Government policy on clandestine relations with the head of an
intelligence service notorious for human rights abuses. However, given
miscommunications in the timing of this exchange, a one-time payment was
given to Contreras.
This does not require too much parsing. Some time
after it had been concluded, and by the CIA at that,
that Manuel Contreras was the "principal obstacle
to a reasonable human rights policy," he is given
American taxpayers' money and received at a high level
in Washington. The CIA's memorandum is careful to
state that, where doubts exist, they are stilled by
the "U.S. Government policy community" and
by "an interagency committee." It also tries
to suggest, with unconscious humor, that the head of a
murderous foreign secret service was given a large
bribe by mistake. One wonders who was reprimanded for
this blunder, and how it got past the scrutiny of the
40 Committee.
The report also contradicts itself, stating at one
point that Contreras's activities overseas were opaque
and at another that
[w]ithin a year after the coup, the CIA and other U.S. Government agencies
were aware of bilateral cooperation among regional intelligence services to
track the activities of and, in at least a few cases, kill political
opponents. This was the precursor to Operation Condor, an
intelligence-sharing arrangement among Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay
and Uruguay established in 1975.
So now we know: The internationalization of the
death-squad principle was understood and approved by
American intelligence and its political masters across
two administrations. The senior person concerned in
both administrations was Henry Kissinger. Whichever
"interagency committee" is meant, and
whether it is the 40 Committee or the interagency
committee on Chile, we are led back to the same
source.
On leaving the State Department, Kissinger made an
extraordinary bargain whereby he gifted his papers to
the Library of Congress (having first hastily trucked
them for safekeeping to the Rockefeller estate at
Pocantico Hills, New York) on the sole condition that
they remain under seal until five years after his
death. Kissinger's friend Manuel Contreras, however,
made a mistake when he killed an American citizen,
Ronni Karpen Moffitt, in the Washington car bomb that
also murdered Orlando Letelier in 1976. By late 2000,
the Federal Bureau of Investigation had finally sought
and received subpoena power to review the Library of
Congress papers, a subpoena with which Kissinger dealt
only through his attorneys. It was a start, but it was
pathetic when compared with the efforts of
truth-and-justice commissions in Chile, Argentina,
Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay, which have now emerged
from years of Kissinger-befriended dictatorship and
are seeking a full accounting. We await the moment
when the United States Congress will inaugurate a
comparable process and finally subpoena all the hidden
documents that obscure the view of unpunished crimes
committed in our names.
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CYPRUS: A TURBULENT PRIEST
In the second volume of his trilogy of memoirs,
Years of Upheaval, Henry Kissinger found the subject
of the 1974 Cyprus catastrophe so awkward that he
decided to postpone consideration of it:
I must leave a full discussion of the Cyprus episode to another
occasion, for it stretched into the Ford Presidency and its legacy exists
unresolved today.
This argued a certain nervousness on his part, if
only because the subjects of Vietnam, Cambodia, the
Middle East, Angola, Chile, China, and the SALT
negotiations all bear legacies that are
"unresolved today" and were unresolved then.
(To say that these matters "stretched into the
Ford Presidency" is to say, in effect, nothing at
all except that this pallid interregnum did,
historically speaking, occur.)
In most of his writing about himself (and, one
presumes, in most of his presentations to his clients)
Kissinger projects a strong impression of a man at
home in the world and on top of his brief. But there
are a number of occasions when it suits him to pose as
a sort of Candide, naive and ill prepared and easily
unhorsed by events. No doubt this pose costs him
something in self-esteem. It is a pose, furthermore,
that he often adopts at precisely the time when the
record shows him to be knowledgeable and when
knowledge or foreknowledge would also confront him
with charges of responsibility or complicity.
Cyprus in 1974 is just such a case. Kissinger now
argues, in the third volume of his memoirs, Years of
Renewal, that he was prevented and distracted, by
Watergate and the deliquescence of the Nixon
presidency, from taking a timely or informed interest
in the crucial triangle of Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus.
This is a bizarre disclaimer: the phrase "eastern
flank of NATO" was then a geopolitical
commonplace of the first importance, and the proximity
of Cyprus to the Middle East was a factor never absent
from American strategic thinking. There was no reason
of domestic policy to prevent the region from engaging
his attention. Furthermore, the very implosion of
Nixonian authority, cited as a reason for Kissinger's
own absence of mind, in fact bestowed extraordinary
powers upon him. To restate the obvious once more:
When he became secretary of state in 1973, he took
care to retain his post as "special assistant to
the president for national security affairs," or,
as we now say, national security adviser. This made
him the first and only secretary of state to hold the
chairmanship of the 40 Committee, which, of course,
considered and approved covert actions by the CIA.
Meanwhile, as chairman of the National Security
Council, he held a position in which every important
intelligence plan passed across his desk. His former
NSC aide, Roger Morris, was not exaggerating by much,
if at all, when he said that Kissinger's dual
position, plus Nixon's eroded one, made him "no
less than acting chief of state for national
security."
Kissinger gives one hostage to fortune in Years of
Upheaval and another in Years of Renewal. In the
former volume he says, quite plainly: "I had
always taken it for granted that the next communal
crisis in Cyprus would provoke Turkish
intervention"--i.e., would at least risk the
prospect of a war within NATO between Greece and
Turkey and would certainly involve the partition of
the island. That this was indeed common knowledge may
not be doubted by any person even lightly acquainted
with Cypriot affairs. In the latter volume, wherein
Kissinger finally takes up the challenge implicitly
refused in the first volume, he repeatedly asks the
reader why anyone (such as himself, so burdened with
Watergate) would have sought "a crisis in the
eastern Mediterranean between two NATO allies."
|
These two disingenuous statements need to be
qualified in the light of a third one, which appears
on page 199 of Years of Renewal. Here, President
Makarios of Cyprus is described without adornment as
"the proximate cause of most of Cyprus's
tensions." Makarios was the democratically
elected leader of a virtually unarmed republic, which
was at the time in an association agreement with the
European Economic Community, as well as a member of
the United Nations and of the Commonwealth. His rule
was challenged, and the independence of Cyprus
threatened, by a military dictatorship in Athens and a
highly militarized government in Turkey, both of which
sponsored right-wing gangster organizations on the
island, and both of which had plans to annex the
greater or lesser part of it. In spite of this,
"intercommunal" violence had been on the
decline in Cyprus throughout the 1970s. Most killings
were, in fact, "intramural": of Greek and
Turkish democrats or internationalists by their
respective nationalist and authoritarian rivals.
Several attempts, by Greek and Greek Cypriot fanatics,
had been made on the life of President Makarios
himself. To describe his person as the "proximate
cause" of most of the tensions is to make a
wildly aberrant moral judgment.
This same aberrant judgment, however, supplies the
key that unlocks the lie at the heart of Kissinger's
chapter. If the elected civilian authority (and
spiritual leader of the Greek Orthodox community) is
the "proximate cause" of the tensions, then
his removal from the scene is self-evidently the cure
for them. If one can demonstrate that there was such a
removal plan, and that Kissinger knew about it in
advance, then it follows logically and naturally that
he was not ostensibly looking for a crisis--as he
self-pityingly asks us to disbelieve--but for a
solution. The fact that he got a crisis, which was
also a hideous calamity for Cyprus and the region,
does not change the equation or undo the syllogism.
The scheme to remove Makarios, on which the
"solution" depended, was in practice a
failure. But those who willed the means and wished the
ends are not absolved from guilt by the refusal of
reality to match their schemes.
It is, from Kissinger's own record and
recollection, as well as the subsequent official
inquiry, quite easy to demonstrate that he did have
advance knowledge of the plan to depose and kill
Makarios. He admits as much himself, by noting that
the Greek dictator Dimitrios Ioannides, head of the
secret police, was determined to mount a coup in
Cyprus and bring the island under the control of
Athens. This was one of the better-known facts of the
situation, as was the more embarrassing fact that
Brigadier Ioannides was dependent on American military
aid and political sympathy. His police state had long
since been expelled from the Council of Europe and
blocked from joining the EEC, and it was largely the
advantage conferred by his agreement to "home
port" the U.S. Sixth Fleet, and host a string of
U.S. air force and intelligence bases, that kept him
in power. This lenient policy was highly controversial
in Congress and in the American press, and the
argument over it was part of Kissinger's daily bread
long before the Watergate drama.
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Thus it was understood in general that the Greek
dictatorship, an American client, wished to see
Makarios overthrown and had already tried to kill him
or have him killed. (Overthrow and assassination,
incidentally, are effectively coterminous in this
account; there was no possibility of leaving such a
charismatic leader alive, and those who sought his
removal invariably intended his death.) This was also
understood in particular. The most salient proof is
this: In May of 1974, two months before the coup in
Cyprus's capital, Nicosia, which Kissinger later
claimed came as a shock to him, he received a
memorandum from the head of his State Department
Cyprus desk, Thomas Boyatt. Boyatt summarized all the
cumulative and persuasive reasons for believing that a
Greek junta attack on Cyprus and Makarios was
imminent. He further argued that, in the absence of an
American demarche to Athens, warning the dictators to
desist, it might be assumed that the United States was
indifferent to this. And he added what everybody knew:
that such a coup, if it went forward, would beyond
doubt trigger a Turkish invasion.
Prescient memos are a dime a dozen in Washington
after a crisis; they are often then read for the first
time, or leaked to the press or to Congress in order
to enhance (or protect) some bureaucratic reputation.
But Kissinger now admits that he saw this document in
real time, while engaged in his shuttle between Syria
and Israel (both of them within half an hour's flying
time of Cyprus). Yet no demarche bearing his name or
carrying his authority was issued to the Greek junta.
A short while afterward, on June 7, 1974, the
National Intelligence Daily, which is the
breakfast-table reading of all senior State
Department, Pentagon, and national security officials,
cited an American field report, dated June 3, that
stated the views of the dictator in Athens:
Ioannides claimed that Greece is capable of removing Makarios and his
key supporters from power in twenty-four hours with little if any blood
being shed and without EOKA assistance. [EOKA was a Greek-Cypriot fascist
underground, armed and paid by the junta.] The Turks would quietly
acquiesce to the removal of Makarios, a key enemy ... Ioannides stated that
if Makarios decides on some type of extreme provocation against Greece to
obtain a tactical advantage, he (Ioannides) is not sure whether he should
merely pull the Greek troops out of Cyprus and let Makarios fend for
himself, or remove Makarios once and for all and have Greece deal directly
with Turkey over Cyprus' future.
This report and its contents were later
authenticated before Congress by CIA staff who had
served in Athens at the relevant time. The fact that
it made Brigadier Ioannides seem bombastic and
delusional--both of which he was--should have
underlined the obvious and imminent danger.
At about the same time, Kissinger received a call
from Senator J. William Fulbright, the chairman of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Senator Fulbright
had been briefed about the impending coup by a senior
Greek dissident journalist in Washington named Elias
P. Demetracopoulos. According to Demetracopoulos,
Fulbright told Kissinger that steps should be taken to
avert the planned Greek action, and he gave three
reasons. The first was that it would repair some of
the moral damage done by America's indulgence of the
junta. The second was that it would head off a
confrontation between Greece and Turkey in the
Mediterranean. The third was that it would enhance
American prestige on the island. Kissinger declined to
take the recommended steps, on the bizarre grounds
that he could not intervene in Greek "internal
affairs" at a time when the Nixon Administration
was resisting pressure from Senator Henry Jackson to
link U.S.-Soviet trade to the free emigration of
Russian Jewry. However odd this line of argument, it
still makes it quite impossible for Kissinger to
claim, as he still does, that he had had no warning.
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So there was still no American high-level concern
registered with Athens. The difficulty is sometimes
presented as one of protocol or etiquette, as if
Kissinger's regular custom was to whisper and tread
lightly. Ioannides was the de facto head of the regime
but technically only its secret police chief. For the
U.S. ambassador, Henry Tasca, it was awkward to make
diplomatic approaches to a man he described as "a
cop." But again I remind you that Henry
Kissinger, in addition to his formal diplomatic
eminence, was also head of the 40 Committee, and
therefore the supervisor of American covert action,
and was dealing in private with an Athens regime that
had long-standing ties to the CIA. The 1976 House
Committee on Intelligence later phrased the problem
rather deftly in its report:
Tasca, assured by the CIA station chief that Ioannides would continue to
deal only with the CIA, and not sharing the State Department desk officer's
alarm, was content to pass a message to the Greek leader indirectly.... It
is clear, however, that the Embassy took no steps to underscore for
Ioannides the depth of U.S. concern over a Cyprus coup attempt. This
episode, the exclusive CIA access to Ioannides, Tasca's indications that he
may not have seen all important messages to and from the CIA Station,
Ioannides' suggestions of U.S. acquiescence, and Washington's well-known
coolness to Makarios have led to public speculation that either U.S.
officials were inattentive to the reports of the developing crisis or
simply allowed it to happen.... [Italics added.]
Thomas Boyatt's memoranda, warning of precisely
what was to happen (and echoing the views of several
mid-level officials besides himself), were classified
as secret and still have never been released. Asked to
testify at the above hearings, he was at first
forbidden by Kissinger to appear before Congress and
was finally permitted to do so only in order that he
might avoid a citation for contempt. His evidence was
taken in Executive Session, with the hearing room
cleared of staff, reporters, and visitors.
Matters continued to gather pace. On July 1, 1974,
three senior officials of the Greek foreign ministry,
all of them known for their moderate views on the
Cyprus question, publicly tendered their resignations.
On July 3, President Makarios made public an open
letter to the Greek junta, which made the direct
accusation of foreign interference and subversion:
In order to be absolutely clear, I say that the cadres of the military
regime of Greece support and direct the activities of the EOKA-B terrorist
organization.... I have more than once so far felt, and some cases I have
almost touched, a hand invisibly extending from Athens and seeking to
liquidate my human existence.
He called for the withdrawal from Cyprus of the
Greek officers responsible.
Some days after the coup, which eventually occurred
on July 15, 1974, and when challenged at a press
conference about his apparent failure to foresee or
avert it, Kissinger replied that "the information
was not lying around on the streets." Actually,
it nearly was. It had been available to him round the
clock, in both his diplomatic and intelligence
capacities. His decision to do nothing was therefore a
direct decision to do something, or to let something
be done.
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To the rest of the world, two things were obvious
about the coup. The first was that it had been
instigated from Athens and carried out with the help
of regular Greek forces, and was thus a direct
intervention in the internal affairs of one country by
another. The second was that it violated all the
existing treaties governing the status of the island.
The obvious and unsavory illegality was luridly
emphasized by the junta itself, which chose a
notorious chauvinist gunman named Nikos Sampson to be
its proxy "president." Sampson must have
been well known to the chairman of the 40 Committee as
a long-standing recipient of financial support from
the CIA; he also received money for his fanatical
Nicosia newspaper Makhi ("Combat") from a
pro-junta CIA proxy in Athens, Mr. Savvas
Constantopoulos, the publisher of the pro-junta organ
Eleftheros Kosmos ("Free World"). No
European government treated Sampson as anything but a
pariah during the brief nine days in which he held
power and launched a campaign of murder against his
democratic Greek opponents. But Kissinger told the
American envoy in Nicosia to receive Sampson's
"foreign minister" as foreign minister, thus
making the United States the first and only government
to extend de facto recognition. (At this point, it
might be emphasized, the whereabouts of President
Makarios were unknown. His palace had been heavily
shelled and his death announced on the junta's radio.
He had in fact made his escape, and was able to
broadcast the fact a few days afterward--to the
enormous irritation of certain well-placed persons.)
In Washington, Kissinger's press spokesman, Robert
Anderson, flatly denied that the coup--later described
by Makarios from the podium of the United Nations as
"an invasion"--constituted foreign
intervention. "No," he replied to a direct
question on this point. "In our view there has
been no outside intervention." This surreal
position was not contradicted by Kissinger when he met
with the Cypriot ambassador and failed to offer the
customary condolences on the reported death of his
president--the "proximate cause," we now
learn from him, of all the unpleasantness. When asked
if he still recognized the elected Makarios government
as the legal one, Kissinger doggedly and astonishingly
refused to answer. When asked if the United States was
moving toward recognition of the Sampson regime, his
spokesman declined to deny it. When Senator Fulbright
helped facilitate a visit by the escaped Makarios to
Washington, the State Department was asked whether he
would be received by Kissinger "as a private
citizen, as Archbishop, or as President of
Cyprus?" The answer? "[Kissinger]'s meeting
with Archbishop Makarios on Monday." Every other
government in the world, save the rapidly collapsing
Greek dictatorship, recognized Makarios as the
legitimate head of the Cyprus republic. Kissinger's
unilateralism on the point is without diplomatic
precedent and argues strongly for his collusion and
sympathy with the armed handful who felt the same way.
|
It is worth emphasizing that Makarios was invited
to Washington in the first place, as elected and legal
president of Cyprus, by Senator William J. Fulbright
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and by his
counterpart, Congressman Thomas Morgan, chairman of
the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Credit for their
invitation belongs to the above-mentioned Elias
Demetracopoulos, who had long warned of the coup and
who was a friend of Fulbright's. It was he who
conveyed the invitation to Makarios, who was by then
in London meeting with the British foreign secretary.
This initiative crowned a series of anti-junta
activities by this guerrilla journalist and one-man
band, who had already profoundly irritated Kissinger
and become a special object of his spite. At the very
last moment, and with a very poor grace, Kissinger was
compelled to announce that he was receiving Makarios
in his presidential and not his episcopal capacity.
Since Kissinger himself tells us that he had always
known or assumed that another outbreak of violence in
Cyprus would trigger a Turkish military intervention,
we can assume in our turn that he was not surprised
when such an intervention came. Nor does he seem to
have been very much disconcerted. While the Greek
junta remained in power, his efforts were principally
directed to shielding it from retaliation. He was
opposed to the return of Makarios to the island and
strongly opposed to Turkish or British use of force to
undo the Greek coup (Britain being a guarantor power
with a treaty obligation and troops on Cyprus). This
same counsel of inertia or inaction--amply testified
to in Kissinger's own memoirs as well as everyone
else's--translated later into equally strict and
repeated admonitions against any measures to block a
Turkish invasion. Sir Tom McNally, then the chief
political adviser to Britain's then foreign secretary
and future prime minister, James Callaghan, has since
disclosed that Kissinger "vetoed" at least
one British military action to preempt a Turkish
landing.
This may seem paradoxical, but the long-standing
sympathy for a partition of Cyprus, repeatedly
expressed by the State and Defense departments, make
it seem much less so. The demographic composition of
the island (82 percent Greek, 18 percent Turkish) made
it more logical for the partition to be imposed by
Greece. But a second best was to have it imposed by
Turkey. And once Turkey had conducted two brutal
invasions and occupied almost 40 percent of Cypriot
territory, Kissinger exerted himself very strongly
indeed to protect Turkey from any congressional
reprisal for this outright violation of international
law and promiscuous and illegal misuse of American
weaponry. He became so pro-Turkish, in fact, that it
was if he had never heard of the Greek colonels
(though his expressed dislike of the returned Greek
democratic leaders supplied an occasional reminder).
Not all the elements of this partitionist policy
can be charged to Kissinger personally; he inherited
the Greek junta and the official dislike of Makarios.
Even in the dank obfuscatory prose of his own memoirs,
however, he does admit what can otherwise be concluded
from independent sources. Using covert channels, and
short-circuiting the democratic process in his own
country, he made himself a silent accomplice in a plan
of political assassination, and when this plan went
awry it led to the deaths of thousands of civilians,
the violent uprooting of almost 200,000 refugees, and
the creation of an unjust and unstable amputation of
Cyprus that constitutes a serious threat to peace a
full quarter century later.
|
On July 10, 1976, the European Commission of Human
Rights adopted a report, prepared by eighteen
distinguished jurists and chaired by Professor J.E.S.
Fawcett, resulting from a year's research into the
consequences of the Turkish invasion. It found that
the Turkish army had engaged in the deliberate killing
of civilians, in the execution of prisoners, in the
torture and ill-treatment of detainees, in the
arbitrary collective punishment and mass detention of
civilians, and in systematic and unpunished acts of
rape, torture, and looting. A large number of
"disappeared" persons, both prisoners of war
and civilians, are still "missing" from this
period. This number included a dozen holders of United
States passports, which is evidence in itself of an
indiscriminate strategy when conducted by an army
dependent on American aid and materiel.
Perhaps it was a reluctance to accept his
responsibility for these outrages, as well as his
responsibility for the original Sampson coup, that led
Kissinger to tell a bizarre sequence of lies to his
new friends, the Chinese. On October 2, 1974, he held
a high-level meeting in New York with Qiao Guanhua,
vice foreign minister of the People's Republic. It was
the first substantive Sino-American meeting since the
visit of Deng Xiaoping, and the first order of
business was Cyprus. The memorandum, which is headed
"TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES
ONLY," has Kissinger first rejecting China's
public claim that he had helped engineer the removal
of Makarios. "We did not. We did not oppose
Makarios" (a claim belied by his own memoirs). He
says, "When the coup occurred I was in
Moscow," which he was not. He says, "My
people did not take these intelligence reports
[concerning an impending coup] seriously," even
though they had. He says that neither did Makarios
take them seriously, even though Makarios had gone
public in a denunciation of the Greek junta for its
coup plans. He then makes the amazing claim that
"we knew the Soviets had told the Turks to
invade," which would make this the first
Soviet-instigated invasion to be conducted by a NATO
army and paid for with American aid.
A good liar must have a good memory. Kissinger is a
stupendous liar with a remarkable memory. So perhaps
some of this hysterical lying is explained by its
context: the need to enlist China's anti-Soviet
instincts. But the total of falsity is so impressive
that it suggests something additional, something more
like denial or delusion, or even a confession by other
means.
BLOODBATH IN BANGLADESH
Cyprus was not the first instance in which a
perceived need to mollify China outweighed even the
most minimal concern for human life elsewhere. On
April 6, 1971, a cable of protest was written from the
United States Consulate in what was then East
Pakistan, the Bengali "wing" of the Muslim
state of Pakistan, known to its restive nationalist
inhabitants by the name Bangladesh. The cable's senior
signatory, the consul general in Dhaka, was named
Archer Blood, though it might have become known as the
Blood Telegram in any case. Sent directly to
Washington, its purpose was, quite simply, to denounce
the complicity of the United States government in
genocide. Its main section read:
OUR GOVERNMENT HAS FAILED TO DENOUNCE THE SUPPRESSION OF DEMOCRACY. OUR
GOVERNMENT HAS FAILED TO TAKE FORCEFUL MEASURES TO PROTECT ITS CITIZENS
WHILE AT THE SAME TIME BENDING OVER BACKWARDS TO PLACATE THE WEST
PAK[ISTAN] DOMINATED OVERNMENT. OUR GOVERNMENT HAS EVIDENCED WHAT MANY WILL
CONSIDER MORAL BANKRUPTCY, IRONICALLY AT A TIME WHEN THE USSR SENT
PRESIDENT YAHYA KHAN A MESSAGE DEFENDING DEMOCRACY, CONDEMNING THE ARREST
OF A LEADER OF A DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED MAJORITY PARTY. ... BUT WE HAVE
CHOSEN NOT TO INTERVENE, EVEN MORALLY, ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE AWAMI
CONFLICT, IN WHICH UNFORTUNATELY THE OVERWORKED TERM GENOCIDE IS
APPLICABLE, IS PURELY AN INTERNAL MATTER OF A SOVEREIGN STATE. PRIVATE
AMERICANS HAVE EXPRESSED DISGUST. WE, AS PROFESSIONAL PUBLIC SERVANTS,
EXPRESS OUR DISSENT WITH CURRENT POLICY AND FERVENTLY HOPE THAT OUR TRUE
AND LASTING INTERESTS HERE CAN BE DEFINED AND OUR POLICIES REDIRECTED....
[Italics added.]
|
This was signed by twenty members of the United
States' diplomatic equipe in Bangladesh and, on its
arrival at the State Department, by a further nine
senior officers in the South Asia division. It was the
most public and the most strongly worded demarche,
from State Department servants to the State
Department, that has ever been recorded.
The circumstances fully warranted the protest. In
December 1970, the Pakistani military elite had
permitted the first open elections in a decade. The
vote was easily won by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the
leader of the Bengali-based Awami League, who gained a
large overall majority in the proposed National
Assembly. (In the East alone, it won 167 out of 169
seats.) This, among other things, meant a challenge to
the political and military and economic hegemony of
the Western "wing." The National Assembly
had been scheduled to meet on March 3, 1971. On March
1, General Yahya Khan, head of the supposedly outgoing
military regime, postponed its convening, which
resulted in mass protests and nonviolent civil
disobedience in the East.
On March 25, 1971, the Pakistani army struck at the
Bengali capital of Dhaka. Having arrested and
kidnapped Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, and taken him to West
Pakistan, it set about massacring his supporters. The
foreign press had been preemptively expelled from the
city, but much of the direct evidence of what then
happened was provided via a radio transmitter operated
by the American consulate. Archer Blood himself
supplied an account of one episode directly to the
State Department and to Henry Kissinger's National
Security Council. Having readied the ambush, Pakistani
regular soldiers set fire to the women's dormitory at
the university and then mowed the occupants down with
machine guns as they sought to escape. (The guns,
along with all the other weaponry, had been furnished
under American military-assistance programs.)
Other reports, since amply vindicated, were
supplied to the London Times and Sunday Times by the
courageous reporter Anthony Mascarenhas and flashed
around a horrified world. Rape, murder, dismemberment,
and the state murder of children were employed as
deliberate methods of repression and intimidation. At
least 10,000 civilians were butchered in the first
three days. The eventual civilian death toll has never
been placed at less than half a million and has been
put as high as 3 million. Since almost all Hindu
citizens were at risk by definition from Pakistani
military chauvinism (not that Pakistan's Muslim
co-religionists were spared), a vast movement of
millions of refugees--perhaps as many as 10 million
began to cross the Indian frontier. To summarize,
then: first, the direct negation of a democratic
election; second, the unleashing of a genocidal
policy; third, the creation of a very dangerous
international crisis. Within a short time, Ambassador
Kenneth Keating, the ranking American diplomat in New
Delhi, had added his voice to those of the dissenters.
It was a time, he told Washington, when a principled
stand against the authors of this aggression and
atrocity would also make the best pragmatic sense.
Keating, a former senator from New York, used a very
suggestive phrase in his cable of March 29, 1971,
calling on the administration to "PROMPTLY,
PUBLICLY AND PROMINENTLY DEPLORE THIS BRUTALITY."
It was "MOST IMPORTANT THESE ACTIONS BE TAKEN
NOW," he warned, "PRIOR TO INEVITABLE AND
IMMINENT EMERGENCE OF HORRIBLE TRUTHS."
|
Nixon and Kissinger acted quickly. That is to say,
Archer Blood was immediately recalled from his post,
and Ambassador Keating was described by the president
to Kissinger, with some contempt, as having been
"taken over by the Indians." In late April
1971, at the very height of the mass murder, Kissinger
sent a message to General Yahya Khan, thanking him for
his "delicacy and tact."
We now know of one reason why the general was so
favored at a time when he had made himself--and his
patrons--responsible for the grossest crimes against
humanity. In April 1971, an American Ping-Pong team
had accepted a surprise invitation to compete in
Beijing, and by the end of that month, using the
Pakistani ambassador as an intermediary, the Chinese
authorities had forwarded a letter inviting Nixon to
send an envoy. Thus there was one motive of
realpolitik for the shame that Nixon and Kissinger
were to visit on their own country for its complicity,
in the extermination of the Bengalis.
Those who like to plead realpolitik, however, might
wish to consider some further circumstances. There
already was, and had been for some time, a "back
channel" between Washington and Beijing. It ran
through Nicolae Ceausescu's Romania; not a decorative
choice but not, at that stage, a positively criminal
one. To a serious person like Chou En-Lai, there was
no reason to confine approaches to the narrow channel
afforded by a blood-soaked (and short-lived, as it
turned out) despot like the delicate and tactful Yahya
Khan. Either Chou En-Lai wanted contact, in other
words, or he did not. As Lawrence Lifschultz, the
primary historian of this period, has put it:
Winston Lord, Kissinger's deputy at the National Security Council,
stressed to investigators the internal rationalization developed within the
upper echelons of the Administration. Lord told [the staff of the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace], "We had to demonstrate to China we were
a reliable government to deal with. We had to show China that we respect a
mutual friend." How, after two decades of belligerent animosity with the
People's Republic, mere support for Pakistan in its bloody civil war was
supposed to demonstrate to China that the U.S. "was a reliable government
to deal with" was a mystifying proposition which more cynical observers of
the events, both in and outside the U.S. government, consider to have been
an excuse justifying the simple convenience of the Islamabad link--a link
which Washington had no overriding desire to shift.
Second, the knowledge of this secret diplomacy and
its accompanying privileges obviously freed the
Pakistani general of such restraints as might have
inhibited him. He told his closest associates,
including his minister of communications, G. W.
Choudhury, that his private understanding with
Washington and Beijing would protect him. Choudhury
later wrote, "If Nixon and Kissinger had not
given him that false hope, he'd have been more
realistic." Thus the collusion with him in the
matter of China increases the direct complicity of
Nixon and Kissinger in the massacres.
|
Only a reopened congressional inquiry with subpoena
power could determine whether there was any direct
connection, apart from the self-evident ones of
consistent statecraft attested by recurring and
reliable testimony, between the secret genocidal
diplomacy of 1971 and the secret destabilizing
diplomacy of 1975. The task of disproving such a
connection, meanwhile, would appear to rest on those
who believe that everything is an accident.
TIMOR MORTIS
One small but significant territory has the
distinction of being omitted--entirely omitted--from
Henry Kissinger's memoirs. And since East Timor is
left out of the third and final volume (Years of
Renewal) it cannot hope, like Cyprus, for a hasty
later emendation. It has, in short, been airbrushed.
The date of the Indonesian invasion of this small
neighboring country--December 7, 1975--is significant.
On that date, President Gerald Ford and his secretary
of state, Henry Kissinger, arrived in Hawaii, having
concluded an official visit to Jakarta. Since they had
come fresh from a meeting with Indonesia's military
junta, and since the United States was Indonesia's
principal supplier of military hardware (Portugal, a
NATO ally, had broken relations with Indonesia on the
point), it seemed reasonable to inquire whether the
two leaders had given the invaders any impression
amounting to a "green light." The president
was evasive:
When he landed at Hawaii, reporters asked Mr. Ford for comment on the
invasion of Timor. He smiled and said: "We'll talk about that later." But
press secretary Ron Nessen later gave reporters a statement saying: "The
United States is always concerned about the use of violence. The President
hopes it can be resolved peacefully."
The literal incoherence of this official
utterance--a peaceful resolution to a use of
violence--may perhaps have possessed an inner
coherence: the hope of a speedy victory for
overwhelming force. Kissinger moved this suspicion a
shade nearer to actualization in his own more candid
comment, which was offered while he was still on
Indonesian soil. He told the press in Jakarta that the
United States would not recognize the republic
declared by FRETILIN (Revolutionary Front for the
Liberation of East Timor) and that "the United
States understands Indonesia's position on the
question."
So gruesome were the subsequent reports of mass
slaughter, rape, and deliberate starvation that
bluntness fell somewhat out of fashion. The killing of
several Australian journalists who had witnessed
Indonesia's atrocities, the devastation in the capital
city of Dili, and the stubbornness of FRETILIN's
hugely outgunned rural resistance made East Timor an
embarrassment to, rather than an advertisement for,
Jakarta's new order. Kissinger generally attempted to
avoid any discussion of his involvement in the
extirpation of the Timorese--an ongoing involvement,
since he authorized backdoor shipments of weapons to
those doing the extirpating--and was ably seconded in
this by his ambassador to the United Nations, Daniel
Patrick Moynihan, who later confided in his memoir, A
Dangerous Place, that in the matter of East Timor the
initial invasion toll was "almost the proportion
of casualties experienced by the Soviet Union during
the Second World War." Moynihan continued:
[T]he United States wished things to turn out as they did, and worked to
bring this about. The Department of State desired that the United Nations
prove utterly ineffective in whatever measures it undertook. This task was
given to me, and I carried it forward with no inconsiderable success.
|
The terms "United States" and
"Department of State" are here foully
prostituted, by this supposed prose master, since they
are used as synonyms for Henry Kissinger.
Twenty years later, on July 11, 1995, Kissinger was
confronted with direct questions on the subject.
Publicizing and promoting his then latest book,
Diplomacy, at an event sponsored by The Learning
Exchange at the Park Central Hotel in New York City,
he perhaps (having omitted Timor from his book and
from his talk) did not anticipate the first line of
questioning that arose from the floor. Constancio
Pinto, a former resistance leader in Timor who had
been captured and tortured and had escaped to the
United States, opened the bidding:
PINTO: I am Timorese. My name is Constancio Pinto.
And I followed your speech today and it's really
interesting. One thing that I know you didn't mention
is this place invaded by Indonesia in 1975. It is in
Southeast Asia. As a result of the invasion 200,000
people of the Timorese were killed. As far as I know
Dr. Kissinger was in Indonesia the day before the
invasion of East imor. The United States actually
supported Indonesia in East Timor. So I would like to
know what you were doing at that time.
KISSINGER: What was I doing at that time? The whole
time or just about Timor? ... What most people who
deal with government don't understand is one of the
most overwhelming experiences of being in high office.
That there are always more problems than you can
possibly address at any one period. And when you're in
global policy and you're a global power, there are so
many issues.... We had at that time, there was a war
going on in Angola. We had just been driven out of
Vietnam. We were conducting negotiations in the Middle
East, and Lebanon had blown up. We were on a trip to
China. Maybe, regrettably, we weren't ever thinking
about Timor. I'm telling you what the truth of the
matter is. The reason we were in Indonesia was
actually accidental. We had originally intended to go
to China, we meaning President Ford and myself and
some others. We had originally intended to go to China
for five days. This was the period when Mao was very
sick and there had been an upheaval in China.... So we
cut our trip to China short....
Timor was never discussed with us when we were in
Indonesia. At the airport as we were leaving, the
Indonesians told us that they were going to occupy the
Portuguese colony of Timor. To us that did not seem
like a very significant event, because the Indians had
occupied the Portuguese colony of Goa ten years
earlier, and to us it looked like another process of
decolonization. Nobody had the foggiest idea of what
would happen afterwards, and nobody asked our opinion,
and I don't know what we could have said if someone
had asked our opinion....
Now there's been a terrible human tragedy in Timor
afterwards. The population of East Timor has resisted,
and I don't know whether the casualty figures are
correct. I just don't know, but they're certainly
significant, and there's no question that it's a huge
tragedy. All I'm telling you is what we knew in 1975.
This was not a big thing on our radar screen. Nobody
has ever heard again of Goa after the Indians occupied
it.... And to us, Timor, look at a map, it's a little
speck of an island in a huge archipelago, half of
which was Portuguese. We had no reason to say the
Portuguese should stay there....
|
ALLAN NAIRN: Mr. Kissinger, my name is Allan Nairn.
I'm a journalist in the United States. I'm one of the
Americans who survived the massacre in East Timor on
November 12, 1991, a massacre during which Indonesian
troops armed with American M-16s gunned down at least
271 Timorese civilians in front of the Santa Cruz
Catholic cemetery as they were gathered in the act of
peaceful mourning and protest. Now you just said that
in your meeting with Suharto on the afternoon of
December 6, 1975, you did not discuss Timor, you did
not discuss it until you came to the airport. Well, I
have here the official State Department transcript of
your and President Ford's conversation with General
Suharto, the dictator of Indonesia.... It has been
edited under the Freedom of Information Act, so the
whole text isn't there. It's clear from the portion of
the text that is here that in fact you did discuss the
impending invasion of Timor with Suharto, a fact which
was confirmed to me by President Ford himself in an
interview I had with him. President Ford told me that
in fact you discussed the impending invasion of Timor
with Suharto and that you gave the U.S....
KISSINGER: Who? I or he?
NAIRN: That you and President Ford together gave
U.S. approval for the invasion of East Timor. There is
another internal State Department memo.... This is a
memo of a December 18, 1975, meeting held at the State
Department. This was held right after your return from
that trip, and you were berating your staff for having
put on paper a finding by the State Department legal
adviser Mr. Leigh that the Indonesian invasion of East
Timor was illegal, that it not only violated
international law, it violated a treaty with the U.S.
because U.S. weapons were used, and it's clear from
this transcript, which I invite anyone in the audience
to peruse, that you were angry at them first because
you feared this memo would leak and second because you
were supporting the Indonesian invasion of East
Timor.... If one looks at the public actions, sixteen
hours after you left that meeting with Suharto the
Indonesian troops began parachuting over Dili, the
capital of East Timor. They came ashore and began the
massacres that culminated in a third of the Timorese
population [being killed]. You announced an immediate
doubling of U.S. military aid to Indonesia at the
time....
KISSINGER: Look, I think we all got the point ...
NAIRN: My question, Mr. Kissinger, my question, Dr.
Kissinger, is twofold: First, will you give a waiver
under the Privacy Act to support full declassification
of this memo so we can see exactly what you and
President Ford said to Suharto? Secondly, would you
support the convening of an international war-crimes
tribunal under U.N. supervision on the subject of East
Timor, and would you agree to abide by its verdict in
regard to your own conduct?
KISSINGER: I mean, uh, really, this sort of comment
is one of the reasons why the conduct of foreign
policy is becoming nearly impossible under these
conditions. Here is a fellow who's got one obsession
... he collects a bunch of documents, you don't know
what is in these documents ...
|
NAIRN: I invite your audience to read them.
It's interesting to notice the final decomposition
of Kissinger's normally efficient if robotic syntax in
that final answer. It's also interesting to see, once
again, the operations of his denial mechanism. If
Kissinger and his patron Nixon were identified with
any one core belief, it was that the United States
should never be, or even appear to be, a
"pitiful, helpless giant." Kissinger's own
writings and speeches are heavily larded with rhetoric
about "credibility" and the need to impress
both friend and foe with the mettle of American
resolve. Yet, in response to any inquiry that might
implicate him in crime and fiasco, he rushes to
humiliate his own country and its professional
servants, suggesting that they know little, care less,
are poorly informed, and are easily rattled by the
pace of events. He also resorts to a demagogic
isolationism. This is as much as to claim that the
United States is a pushover for any ambitious or
irredentist banana republic.
This semiconscious reversal of rhetoric also leads
to renewed episodes of hysterical and improvised
lying. (Recall his claim to the Chinese that it was
the Soviets who had instigated the Turkish invasion of
Cyprus.) The idea that Indonesia's annexation of Timor
may be compared to India's occupation of Goa is too
absurd to have been cited in any apologia before or
since. What Kissinger seems to like about the
comparison is the rapidity with which Goa was
forgotten. What he overlooks is that it was forgotten
because (1) it was not a bloodbath on the scale of
Timor and (2) it completed the decolonization of
India. Timor represented the cementing of colonization
by Indonesia. And, quite clearly, an Indonesian
invasion that began a few hours after Kissinger had
left the tarmac at Jakarta airport must have been
planned and readied several days before he arrived.
Such plans would have been known by any embassy
military attache and certainly by any visiting
secretary of state. We have, in fact, the word of C.
Philip Liechty, a former CIA operations officer in
Indonesia, that
Suharto was given the green light to do what he did. There was discussion
in the embassy and in traffic with the State Department about the problems
that would be created for us if the public and Congress became aware of the
level and type of military assistance that was going to Indonesia at that
time. ... Without continued heavy U.S. logistical military support the
Indonesians might not have been able to pull it off.
The desire to appear to have been uninvolved
may--if we are charitable--arise in part from the fact
that even Indonesia's foreign minister, Adam Malik,
conceded in public a death toll of between 50,000 and
80,000 Timorese civilians in the first eighteen months
of Indonesia's war of subjugation: in other words, on
Kissinger's watch, and inflicted with weapons that he
bent American laws to furnish to the killers. Now that
a form of democracy has returned to Indonesia, which
in its first post-dictatorial act renounced the
annexation of East Timor and--after a bloody last
pogrom by its auxiliaries --withdrew from the
territory, we may be able to learn more exactly the
extent of the quasigenocide.
|
Kissinger's arrogance in 1975 did not dispose of
two matters of legality, both of them in the province
of the State Department. The first was the violation
of international law by Indonesia, in a case where
jurisdiction clearly rested with a Portuguese and NATO
government of which Kissinger (partly as a result of
its support for "decolonization") did not
approve. The second was the violation of American law,
which stipulated that weapons supplied to Indonesia
were to be employed only in self-defense. State
Department officials, bound by law, were likewise
bound to conclude that United States aid to the
generals in Jakarta would have to be cut off. Their
memo summarizing this case was the cause of the
tremendous internal row that is minuted below:
SECRET/SENSITIVE
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
Participants:
The Secretary [Henry Kissinger]
Deputy Secretary [Robert] Ingersoll
Under Secretary [for Political Affairs Joseph] Sisco
Under Secretary [Carlyle] Maw
Deputy Under Secretary [Lawrence] Eagleburger
Assistant Secretary [Philip] Habib
Monroe Leigh, Legal Advisor
Jerry Bremer, Notetaker
Date: December 18, 1975
Subject: Department Policy
The Secretary [Kissinger]: I want to raise a little
bit of hell about the Department's conduct in my
absence. Until last week I thought we had a
disciplined group; now we've gone to pieces
completely. Take this cable on Timor. You know my
attitude and anyone who knows my position as you do
must know that I would not have approved it. The only
consequence is to put yourself on record. It is a
disgrace to treat the Secretary of State this way....
What possible explanation is there for it? I had
told you to stop it quietly. What is your place doing,
Phil, to let this happen? It is incomprehensible....
Habib: Our assessment was that if it was going to
be trouble, it would come up before your return. And I
was told they decided it was desirable to go ahead
with the cable.
The Secretary: Nonsense. I said do it for a few
weeks and then open up again.
Habib: The cable will not leak.
The Secretary: Yes it will and it will go to
Congress too and then we will have hearings on it.
Habib: I was away. I was told by cable that it had
come up.
The Secretary: That means that there are two
cables! And that means twenty guys have seen it.
Habib: No, I got it back channel--it was just one
paragraph double talk and cryptic so I knew what it
was talking about. I was told that Leigh thought that
there was a legal requirement to do it.
Leigh: No, I said it could be done
administratively. It was not in our interest to do it
on legal grounds.
Sisco: We were told that you had decided we had to
stop.
The Secretary: Just a minute, just a minute. You
all know my view on this.... No one has complained
that it was aggression.
Leigh: The Indonesians were violating an agreement
with us.
The Secretary: The Israelis when they go into
Lebanon--when was the last time we protested that?
|
Leigh: That's a different situation.
Maw: It is self-defense. The Secretary: And we
can't construe a Communist government in the middle of
Indonesia as self-defense?
Leigh: Well ...
The Secretary: Then you're saying that arms can't
be used for defense?
Habib: No, they can be used for the defense of
Indonesia. The Secretary: Now take a look at this
basic theme that is coming out on Angola. These SOBs
are leaking all of this stuff to [New York Times
reporter] Les Gelb.
Sisco: I can tell you who.
The Secretary: Who?
Sisco: [National Security Council member William]
Hyland spoke to him.
The Secretary: Wait a minute--Hyland said ...
Sisco: He said he briefed Gelb.
The Secretary: I want these people to know that our
concern in Angola is not the economic wealth or a
naval base. It has to do with the USSR operating 8,000
miles from home when all the surrounding states are
asking for our help. This will affect the Europeans,
the Soviets, and China.
On the Timor thing, that will leak in three months,
and it will come out that Kissinger overruled his
pristine bureaucrats and violated the law. [Italics
added.] How many people in L [the legal adviser's
office] know about this?
Leigh: Three.
Habib: There are at least two in my office.
The Secretary: Plus everybody in the meeting so
you're talking about not less than 15 or 20.
You have a responsibility to recognize that we are
living in a revolutionary situation. Everything on
paper will be used against me.
Habib: We do that and take account of that all the
time....
The Secretary: Every day some SOB in the Department
is carrying on about Angola but no one is defending
Angola. Find me one quote in the Gelb article
defending our policy in Angola.
Habib: I think the leaks and dissent are the burden
you have to bear....
The Secretary: ... This is not minor league stuff.
We are going to lose big. The President says to the
Chinese that we're going to stand firm in Angola and
two weeks later we get out. I go to a NATO meeting and
meanwhile the Department leaks that we're worried
about a naval base and says it's an exaggeration or
aberration of Kissinger's. I don't care about the oil
or the base but I do care about the African reaction
when they see the Soviets pull it off and we don't do
anything.... The Chinese will say we're a country that
was run out of Indochina for 50,000 men and is now
being run out of Angola for less than $50 million....
The Secretary: It cannot be that our agreement with
Indonesia says that the arms are for internal purposes
only. I think you will find that it says that they are
legitimately used for self-defense.
There are two problems. The merits of the case
which you had a duty to raise with me. The second is
how to put these to me. But to put it in. to a cable
30 hours before I return, knowing how cables are
handled in this building, guarantees that it will be a
national disaster and that transcends whatever [Deputy
Legal Adviser George] Aldrich has in his feverish
mind.
|
I took care of it with the administrative thing by
ordering Carlyle [Maw] not to make any new sales.
How will the situation get better in six weeks?
Habib: They may get it cleaned up by then.
The Secretary: The Department is falling apart and
has reached the point where it disobeys clear-cut
orders.
Habib: We sent the cable because we thought it was
needed and we thought it needed your attention. This
was ten days ago.
The Secretary: Nonsense. When did I get the cable,
Jerry?
Bremer: Not before the weekend. I think perhaps on
Sunday.
The Secretary: You had to know what my view on this
was. No one who has worked with me in the last two
years could not know what my view would be on Timor.
Habib: Well, let us look at it--talk to Leigh.
There are still some legal requirements. I can't
understand why it went out if it was not legally
required.
The Secretary: Am I wrong in assuming that the
Indonesians will go up in smoke if they hear about
this?
Habib: Well, it's better than a cutoff. It could be
done at a low level.
The Secretary: We have four weeks before Congress
comes back. That's plenty of time.
Leigh: The way to handle the administrative cutoff
would be that we are studying the situation.
The Secretary: And 36 hours was going to be a major
problem?
Leigh: We had a meeting in Sisco's office and
decided to send the message.
The Secretary: I know what the law is but how can
it be in the U.S. national interest for us to give up
on Angola and kick the Indonesians in the teeth? Once
it is on paper, there will be a lot of FSO-6's who can
make themselves feel good who can write for the Open
Forum Panel on the thing even though I will turn out
to be right in the end.
Habib: The second problem on leaking of cables is
different.
The Secretary: No it's an empirical fact.
Eagleburger: Phil, it's a fact. You can't say that
any NODIS ["No Distribution": the most
restricted level of classification] cable will leak
but you can't count on three to six months later
someone asking for it in Congress. If it's part of the
written record, it will be dragged out eventually.
The Secretary: You have an obligation to the
national interest. I don't care if we sell equipment
to Indonesia or not. I get nothing from it. I get no
rakeoff. But you have an obligation to figure out how
to serve your country. The Foreign Service is not to
serve itself. The Service stands for service to the
United States and not service to the Foreign Service.
Habib: I understand that that's what this cable
would do.
The Secretary: The minute you put this into the
system you cannot resolve it without a finding.
Leigh: There's only one question. What do we say to
Congress if we're asked?
The Secretary: We cut it off while we are studying
it. We intend to start again in January.(3)
Nobody, it must be said, comes out of this meeting
especially well; the secretary's civil servants were
anything but "pristine." Still it can be
noted of Kissinger that, in complete contrast to his
public statements, he (1) forbore from any mention of
Goa; (2) did not trouble to conceal his long-held
views on the matter, berating his underlings for being
so dense as not to know them; (3) did not affect to be
taken by surprise by events in East Timor; (4)
admitted that he was breaking the law; and (5) felt it
necessary to deny that he could profit personally from
the arms shipments, a denial for which nobody had
asked him.
|
That Kissinger understood Portugal's continuing
legal sovereignty in East Timor is shown by a NODIS
memorandum of a Camp David meeting between himself,
General Suharto, and President Ford on the preceding
July 5, 1975. Almost every line of the text has been
deleted by official redaction, and much of the
discussion is unilluminating except about the
eagerness of the administration to supply naval, air,
and military equipment to the junta, but at one point,
just before Kissinger makes his entrance, President
Ford asks his guest: "Have the Portuguese set a
date yet for allowing the Timor people to make their
choice?" The entire answer is obliterated by
deletion, but let it never be said that Kissinger's
State Department did not know that Portugal was
entitled, indeed mandated, to hold a free election for
the Timorese. It is improbable that Suharto, in the
excised answer, was assuring his hosts that such an
open election would be won by candidates favoring
annexation by Indonesia.
On November 9, 1979, Jack Anderson's syndicated
column published an interview with ex-President Ford
on East Timor along with a number of classified U.S.
intelligence documents relating to the 1975
aggression. One of the latter papers describes how
Indonesia's generals were pressing Suharto "to
authorize direct military intervention," while
another informs Ford and Kissinger that Suharto would
raise the East Timor issue at their December 1975
meeting and would "try and elicit a sympathetic
attitude." The relatively guileless Ford was
happy to tell Anderson that the American national
interest "had to be on the side of
Indonesia." He may or may not have been aware
that he was thereby giving the lie to everything ever
said by Kissinger on the subject.
A WET JOB IN WASHINGTON?
As we have now seen, Kissinger has a tendency to
personalize his politics. His policies have led
directly and deliberately to the deaths of anonymous
hundreds of thousands but have also involved the
targeting of certain inconvenient individuals: General
Schneider, Archbishop Makarios, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.
And, as we have also more than once glimpsed,
Kissinger has a special relish for localized revenge.
It seems possible that these two tendencies
converge in a single case: a plan to kidnap and murder
Elias P. Demetracopoulos, a distinguished Greek
journalist with an unexampled record of opposition to
the dictatorship that disfigured his homeland between
1967 and 1974. In the course of those years, he made
his home in Washington, D.C., supporting himself as a
consultant to a respected Wall Street firm.
Innumerable senators, congressmen, Hill staffers,
diplomats, and reporters have testified to the
extraordinary one-man campaign of lobbying and
information that he waged against the military
gangsters who had usurped power in Athens. Since that
same junta enjoyed the sympathy of powerful interests
in Washington, Demetracopoulos was compelled to combat
on two fronts, and he made some influential enemies.
|
After the collapse of the Greek dictatorship in
1974, Demetracopoulos gained access to the secret
police files in Athens and confirmed what he had long
suspected: there had been more than one attempt made
to kidnap and eliminate him. Files held by the
KYP--the Greek equivalent of the CIA--revealed that
the then dictator, Georgios Papadopoulos, and his
deputy security chief, Michael Roufougalis, several
times contacted the Greek military mission in
Washington with precisely this end in view. Stamped
with the words "COSMIC: Eyes Only"--the
highest Greek security classification--this traffic
involved a plethora of schemes. They had in common a
desire to see Demetracopoulos snatched from Washington
and repatriated. An assassination in Washington might
have been embarrassing; moreover, there seems to have
been a need to interrogate Demetracopoulos before
dispatching him. One proposal was to smuggle
Demetracopoulos aboard a Greek civilian airliner;
another, to put him on a Greek military plane; and
still another, to get him aboard a submarine. If it
were not for the proven record of irrationality and
mania among the leaders of the junta, one might be
tempted to dismiss at least the third of these plans
as a fantasy.
One sentence in particular stands out in the COSMIC
cables:
WE CAN RELY ON THE COOPERATION OF THE VARIOUS AGENCIES OF THE U.S.
GOVERNMENT, BUT ESTIMATE THE CONGRESSIONAL REACTION TO BE FIERCE.
Seeking to discover what kind of
"cooperation" this might have been,
Demetracopoulos in 1976 engaged an attorney--William
A. Dobrovir of the D.C. firm of Dobrovir, Oakes,
Gebhardt, and Scull--and brought suit under the
Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy Act. He was
able to obtain many hundreds of documents from the
FBI, the CIA, and the State Department, as well as
from the Department of Justice and the Pentagon. A
number of these papers indicated that copies had been
furnished to the National Security Council, then the
domain of Henry Kissinger. But requests for
documentation from this source were unavailing. As
previously noted, Kissinger had upon leaving office
made a hostage of his own papers--copying them,
classifying them as "personal," and deeding
them to the Library of Congress on condition that they
be held privately. Thus Demetracopoulos was met with a
stone wall when he used the law to try and prise
anything from the NSC. In March 1977, however, the NSC
finally responded to repeated legal initiatives by
releasing the skeletal "computer indices" of
the files that had been kept on Demetracopoulos.
Paging through these, his attention was not
unnaturally caught by the following:
7024513 DOCUMENT = 5 OF 5 PAGE = 1 OF 1 KEYWORDS ACKNOWLEDGING SENS MOSS
BURDICK GRAVEL RE MR DEMETRACOPOULOS DEATH IN ATHENS PRISON DATE 701218
"Well, it's not every day," said
Demetracopoulos when I interviewed him, "that you
read about your own death in a state document."
His attorney was bound to agree, and he wrote a series
of letters to Kissinger asking for copies of the file
to which the indices referred. For seven years
Kissinger declined to favor Demetracopoulos's lawyer
with a reply. When eventually he did respond, it was
only through his own lawyer, who wrote that
efforts were made to search the collection for copies of documents which
meet the description provided. ... No such copies could be found.
|
"Efforts were made" is, of course, a
piece of obfuscation that might describe the most
perfunctory inquiry. We are therefore left with the
question: Did Kissinger know of, or approve, or form a
part of, that "cooperation of the various
agencies of the U.S. Government" on which foreign
despots had been counting for a design of kidnapping,
torture, and execution?
To begin with an obvious question: Why should a
figure of Kissinger's stature either know about, or
care about, the existence of a lone dissident
journalist? This question is quite easily answered:
the record shows that Kissinger knew very well who
Demetracopoulos was and detested him. The two men had
actually met in Athens in 1956, when Demetracopoulos
had hosted a luncheon at the Grand Bretagne Hotel for
the visiting professor. Over the next decade
Demetracopoulos had been prominent among those warning
of, and resisting, a military intervention in Greek
politics. The CIA generally favored such an
intervention and maintained intimate connections with
those who were planning it. In November 1963 the
director of the CIA, John McCone, signed an internal
message asking for "any substantive derogatory
data which can be utilized to deny [Demetracopoulos]
subsequent entry to U.S." No such derogatory
information was available, and when the coup came
Demetracopoulos was able to settle in Washington,
D.C., and begin his exile campaign.
He began it auspiciously enough, by supplying his
own derogatory information about the Nixon and Agnew
campaign of 1968. This campaign--already tainted badly
enough by the betrayal of the Vietnam peace
negotiations--was also receiving illegal donations
from the Greek military dictatorship. The money came
from Michael Roufougalis at the KYP and was handed
over, in cash, to John Mitchell by an
ultra-conservative Greek-American businessman named
Thomas Pappas. The sum involved was $549,000, a
considerable amount by the standards of the day. Its
receipt was doubly illegal: foreign governments are
prohibited from making campaign donations (as are
foreigners in general), and, given that the KYP was in
receipt of CIA subsidies, there existed the further
danger that American intelligence money was being
recycled back into the American political process--in
direct violation of the CIA's own charter.
Demetracopoulos took his findings to Larry O'Brien,
chairman of the Democratic National Committee, who
issued a call for an inquiry into the activities of
Pappas and the warm relations existing between the
Nixon-Agnew campaign and the Athens junta. A number of
historians have since speculated as to whether it was
evidence of this "Greek connection," with
its immense potential for damage, that Nixon and
Mitchell's burglars were seeking when they entered
O'Brien's Watergate office under the cover of night.
Considerable weight is lent to this view by one
salient fact: when the Nixon White House was seeking
"hush money" for the burglars, it turned to
Thomas Pappas to provide it.
|
Elias Demetracopoulos's dangerous knowledge of this
guilty secret, and his incessant lobbying on the Hill
and in the press against Nixon and Kissinger's client
regime in Athens, drew unwelcome attention. He later
sued both the FBI and the CIA--becoming the first
person ever to do so successfully--and received
written admissions from both agencies that they
possessed "no derogatory information" about
him. In the course of these suits, he also secured an
admission from then FBI director William Webster that
he had been under "rather extensive"
surveillance on and between the following dates:
November 9, 1967, and October 2, 1969; August 25,
1971, and March 14, 1973; and February 19 and October
24, 1974.
Unaware of the precise extent of this surveillance,
Demetracopoulos nonetheless more than once found
himself brushed by a heavy hand. On September 7, 1971,
he had lunch at Washington's fashionable Jockey Club
with Nixon's chief henchman, Murray Chotiner, who told
him bluntly, "Lay off Pappas. You can be in
trouble. You can be deported. It's not smart politics.
You know Tom Pappas is a friend of the
President." The next month, on October 27, 1971,
Demetracopoulos was lunching with Robert Novak at Sans
Souci and was threatened by Pappas himself, who came
over from an adjacent table to tell him and Novak that
he could make trouble for anyone who wanted him
investigated. On the preceding July 12,
Demetracopoulos had testified before the European
subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee,
chaired by Congressman Benjamin Rosenthal of New York,
about the influence of Pappas on U.S. foreign policy
and the Athens dictatorship (and vice versa). Before
his oral testimony could be printed, a Justice
Department lawyer appeared at the subcommittee's
office and demanded a copy of the statement.
Demetracopoulos had then, on September 17, furnished a
memorandum on Pappas's activities to the same
subcommittee. His written deposition closed with the
words, "Finally, I have submitted separately to
the subcommittee items of documentary evidence which I
believe will be useful." This statement, wrote
Rowland Evans and Robert Novak in their syndicated
column, caused "extreme nervousness in the Nixon
White House."
Demetracopoulos then received a letter from Louise
Gore. Ms. Gore has since become more celebrated as the
cousin of Vice President Al Gore and the proprietress
of the Fairfax Hotel in Washington, D.C., where the
boy politician grew up. She was then quite celebrated
in her own right, as a Republican state senator from
Maryland and as the woman who introduced Spiro Agnew
to Richard Nixon. She was a close friend of Attorney
General Mitchell's and had been appointed as Nixon's
representative to UNESCO. Demetracopoulos lived, along
with many congressmen and political types, as a tenant
of an apartment in her hotel. He had also been a
friend since 1959. On January 24, 1972, she wrote to
him,
Dear Elias--
I went to Perle's [Perle Mesta's] luncheon for Martha Mitchell yesterday
and sat next to John. He is furious at you--and your testimony against
Pappas. He kept threatening to have you deported!!
At first I tried to ask him if he had any reason to think you could be
deported and he didn't have any answer -- But then tried to counter by
asking me what I knew about you and why we were friends.
It really got out of hand. It was all he'd talk about during lunch and
everyone at the table was listening ...
|
Among those present at the table were George Bush,
then ambassador to the United Nations, and numerous
other diplomats. The attorney general's lack of
restraint and want of tact, on such an occasion, and
at the very table of legendary hostess Perle Mesta,
were clearly symptomatic of a considerable irritation,
even rage.
I have related this background in order to show
that Demetracopoulos was under surveillance, that he
possessed information highly damaging to an important
Nixon-Kissinger client, and that his identity was well
known to those in power, in both Washington and
Athens. Henry Tasca, the United States ambassador in
Athens at the time, was a Nixon and Kissinger crony
with a very lenient attitude toward the dictatorship.
(He later testified before a closed session of
Congress that he had known of the 1968 payments by the
Greek secret police to the Nixon campaign.) In July
1971, shortly after Demetracopoulos testified before
Congressman Rosenthal's subcommittee, Tasca sent a
four-page secret cable from Athens. It began:
FOR SOME TIME I HAVE FELT THAT ELIAS DEMETRACOPOULOS IS HEAD OF A
WELL-ORGANIZED CONSPIRACY WHICH DESERVES SERIOUS INVESTIGATION. WE HAVE
SEEN HOW EFFECTIVE HE HAS BEEN IN COMBATING OUR PRESENT POLICY IN GREECE.
HIS AIM IS TO DAMAGE OUR RELATIONS WITH GREECE, LOOSEN OUR NATO ALLIANCE
AND WEAKEN THE U.S. SECURITY POSITION IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN.
This was certainly taking Demetracopoulos
seriously. So were the closing paragraphs, which read,
I AM THEREFORE BRINGING THE MATTER TO YOUR PERSONAL ATTENTION IN THE
HOPE THAT A WAY WILL BE FOUND TO STEP UP AN INVESTIGATION OF
DEMETRACOPOULOS TO IDENTIFY HIS SPONSORS, HIS SOURCES OF FUNDS, HIS
INTENTIONS, HIS METHODS OF WORK AND HIS FELLOW CONSPIRATORS....
I BRING THIS MATTER TO YOUR ATTENTION NOW, BELIEVING THAT AS AN ALLEN
RESIDENT IN THE UNITED STATES IT MAY BE POSSIBLE TO SUBMIT HIM TO THE KIND
OF SEARCHING AND PROFESSIONAL FBI INVESTIGATION WHICH WOULD LIFT SOME OF
THE MYSTERY.
The cable was addressed, as is usual from an
ambassador, to Secretary of State William Rogers. Yet
it was also addressed--highly unusually--to Attorney
General John Mitchell. Mitchell, as we have seen, was
the only attorney general ever to serve on Henry
Kissinger's supervisory 40 Committee.
The State Department duly urged that "the
Department of Justice do everything possible to see if
we can make a Foreign Agents case, or any kind of a
case for that matter" against Demetracopoulos. Of
course, as was later admitted, these investigations
turned up nothing, as Demetracopoulos's influence did
not derive from any sinister source or nexus. But when
he said that the Greek dictatorship had trampled its
own society, used censorship and torture, threatened
Cyprus, and bought itself political influence in
Washington, he was uttering potent truths. Nixon
himself confirmed the connection between the junta and
Pappas and Tasca on a post-Watergate White House tape
dated May 23, 1973. He is talking to his renowned
confidential secretary, Rose Mary Woods:
Good old Tom Pappas, as you probably know or heard, if you haven't already
heard, it is true, helped, at Mitchell's request, fundraising for some of
the defendants.... He came up to see me on March 7th, Pappas did. Pappas
came to see me about the ambassador to Greece, that he wanted to--he wanted
to keep [Henry] Tasca there.
|
This same dictatorship had in June 1970 revoked
Demetracopoulos's Greek citizenship, so he was a
stateless person traveling only on a flimsy document
giving him leave to reenter the United States. This
fact assumed its own importance in December 1970, when
his blind father was dying of pneumonia, alone, in
Athens. Demetracopoulos sought permission to return
home under a safe conduct, or laissez-passer, and was
able to enlist numerous congressional friends in the
attempt. Among those who signed a letter, dated
December 11, to the Greek government and to Ambassador
Tasca were Senators Frank E. Moss of Utah, Quentin N.
Burdick of North Dakota, and Mike Gravel of Alaska.
Senators Kennedy and Fulbright also expressed a
personal interest.
Neither the Athens regime nor Tasca replied
directly, but on December 20, four days after the old
man had died without seeing his only son, Senators
Moss, Burdick, and Gravel received a telegram from the
Greek Embassy in Washington. This instructed them that
Demetracopoulos should have applied in person to the
embassy--an odd demand to make of a man whose passport
and citizenship had just been canceled by the
dictatorship. Meanwhile, Demetracopoulos received a
telephone call at his home, from Senator Kennedy,
advising him not to accept any safe-conduct offer from
Greece even if he was offered it. Had Demetracopoulos
presented himself at the junta's embassy, he might
well have been detained and kidnapped, in accordance
with one of the plans we now know had been readied for
his "disappearance." Of course, such a
scheme would have been extremely difficult to carry
out in the absence of some "cooperation"
from local American intelligence officials.
Declassified cable traffic between Ambassador Tasca
in Athens and Kissinger's deputy, Joseph Sisco, at the
State Department shows that Senator Kennedy's
misgivings were amply justified. In a cable dated
December 14, 1970, from Sisco to Tasca, the ambassador
was told,
IF GOG [Government of Greece] PERMITS DEMETRACOPOULOS TO ENTER, QUITE
CLEARLY WE MUST AVOID BEING PUT IN A POSITION OF GUARANTEEING ANY
ASSURANCES THAT HE MAY HAVE OF BEING ABLE TO DEPART.
Concurring with this extraordinary statement, Tasca
added that there was a possibility of Senator Gravel
attending the funeral of Demetracopoulos Sr. Elias,
wrote the ambassador,
UNDOUBTEDLY HOPES TO EXPLOIT SENATOR'S VISIT BY PROVIDING SOME WAY OF
PROVING THAT CONDITIONS HERE ARE AS REPRESSIVE AS HE HAS BEEN REPRESENTING
THEM TO BE. HE COULD EVEN TRY TO ARRANGE FOR SOME MANIFESTATION OF
VIOLENCE, SUCH AS A SMALL BOMB.
The absurdity of this--Demetracopoulos has no
record whatsoever of the advocacy or practice of
violence--also has its sinister side. Suggested here
is just the sort of pretext that the junta might need
for a frame-up, or to cover up a
"disappearance." The entire correspondence
reeks of the priorities of both the embassy and the
State Department, which reflect their contempt for
elected U.S. senators, their dislike of dissent, and
their need to gratify a group of Greek gangsters who
are now rightly serving terms of life imprisonment.
|
Now look again at the computer index disgorged,
after years of litigation, from Kissinger's NSC files.
It bears the date of December 18, 1970, and appears to
apprise Senators Moss, Burdick, and Gravel that
Demetracopoulos had met his end in an Athens prison.
Was this a contingency plan? A cover story? As long as
Dr. Kissinger maintains his stubborn silence, and the
control over his "private" state papers, it
will be impossible to determine.
Having avoided the trap that seems to have been set
for him in 1970, Demetracopoulos kept up his fusillade
of leaks and disclosures, aimed at discrediting the
Greek junta and embarrassing its American friends. He
also warned of the junta's designs on the independence
of Cyprus and of American indifference to, or
complicity in, that policy. In this capacity he became
a source of annoyance to Henry Kissinger. In a
Memorandum for the Record on a briefing presented to
President Gerald Ford in October 1974, there are
references to "derogatory traces from our
files" about Demetracopoulos, to "the
derogatory blind memo" about him, and to
"the long Kissinger memo" on him. Once
again, and despite repeated requests from lawyers,
Kissinger has declined to answer any queries about the
whereabouts of these papers, or to shed any light on
their contents. His National Security Council,
however, asked the FBI to amass any information that
might discredit Demetracopoulos, and between 1972 and
1974, according to papers since declassified, the
bureau furnished Kissinger with slanderous and false
material concerning, among other things, a romance
that Demetracopoulos was allegedly conducting with a
woman now dead and a supposed relationship between him
and Daniel Ellsberg, a man he has never met.
This might seem trivial, were it not for the
memoirs of Constantine Panayotakos, the ambassador of
the Greek junta to Washington, D.C. Arriving to take
up his post in February 1974, as the ambassador wrote
in his later memoirs, entitled In the First Line of
Defense,
I was informed about some ... plans to kidnap and transport Elias
Demetracopoulos to Greece; plans which reminded me of KGB methods.... On 29
May a document was transmitted to me from Angelos Vlachos, Secretary
General of the Foreign Ministry, giving the views of the United States
ambassador Henry Tasca, which he agreed with, about the most efficient
means of dealing with the conspiracies and the whole activity of
Demetracopoulos. Tasca's views are included in a memorandum of conversation
with the Foreign Minister Spyridon Tetenes of 27 May.
Finally, another brilliant idea of the most brilliant members of the
Foreign Ministry in Athens, transmitted to me on 12 June, was for me to
seek useful advice on the extermination(4) of Elias Demetracopoulos from
George Churchill, director of the Greek desk at the State Department, who
was one of his most vitriolic enemies. [Italics added.]
Ambassador Panayotakos later wrote in a detailed
letter, which is in my possession, that he had direct
knowledge of a plan to abduct Demetracopoulos from
Washington. His testimony is corroborated by an
affidavit, which I also possess, signed by Charalambos
Papadopoulos. Mr. Papadopoulos was at the time the
political counselor to the Greek Embassy--the
number-three position--and was bidden to lunch at the
nearby Jockey Club, in late May or early June of 1974,
by Ambassador Panayotakos and the assistant military
attache, Lieutenant Colonel Sotiris Yiounis. At the
lunch, Yiounis broached the question of kidnapping
Demetracopoulos, who was to be smuggled aboard a Greek
NATO submarine at a harbor in Virginia.
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Papadopoulos, who was Greek ambassador to Pakistan
at the time he swore his affidavit, has since said
that he was assured that Henry Kissinger was fully
aware of the proposed operation. By that stage, the
Greek junta had only a few weeks to live because of
its crimes in Cyprus. Since the fall of the
dictatorship even more extensive evidence of the
junta's assassination plans has been uncovered, if
only at the Athenian end of the plot. But this was not
a regime that ever acted without Washington's
"understanding." Attempts to unearth more
detail have also been made in Washington. In 1975,
Senators George McGovern and James Abourezk, seconded
by Congressman Don Edwards of the House Intelligence
Committee, asked Senator Frank Church to include the
kidnapping plot against Demetracopoulos in the
investigative work of his famous committee on U.S.
intelligence. As first reported by the New York Times
and then confirmed by Seymour Hersh, Kissinger
intervened personally with Church, citing grave but
unspecified matters of national security, to have this
aspect of the investigation shut down.
Some of this may seem fantastic, but we do know
that Kissinger was conducting a vendetta against
Demetracopoulos (as was Ambassador Henry Tasca); we do
know that Kissinger was involved in high-level
collusion with the Greek junta and had advance
knowledge of the plot to assassinate Archbishop
Makarios; and we do know that he had used the American
Embassy in Chile to smuggle weapons for the contract
killing of General Rene Schneider. The cover story in
that case, too, was that the hired guns were
"only" trying to kidnap him.
Thus the Demetracopoulos story, told here in full
for the first time, makes a prima facie case that
Henry Kissinger was at least aware of a plan to abduct
and interrogate, and almost certainly kill, a civilian
and journalist in Washington, D.C. In order to be
cleared of the suspicion, and to explain the
mysterious reference to Demetracopoulos's death in his
own archives, Kissinger need only make those same
archives at last accessible, or else be subpoenaed to
do so.
THE PROFIT MARGIN
In his furious meeting at the State Department on
December 18, 1975, shortly after his moment of
complicity with the Indonesian generals over East
Timor, Kissinger makes the following peculiar
disavowal:
I don't care if we sell equipment to Indonesia or not. I get nothing from
it. I get no rakeoff.
One might have taken it for granted that a serving
secretary of state had no direct interest in the sale
of weapons to a foreign dictatorship; nobody at the
meeting had suggested any such thing. How peculiar
that Kissinger should deny an allegation that had not
been made, answer a question that had not been asked.
It isn't possible to state with certainty when
Kissinger began to profit personally from his
association with the ruling circles in Indonesia, nor
can it be definitely asserted that this profit was
part of any "understanding" that originated
in 1975. And yet there is a perfect congruence between
Kissinger's foreign-policy counsel and his own
business connections. One might call it a
"harmony" of interests rather than a
"conflict." (See map, page 96.)
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Six years after he left office, Kissinger set up a
private consulting firm named Kissinger Associates,
which exists to smooth and facilitate contact between
multinational corporations and foreign governments.
The client list is secret, and contracts with the
"Associates" contain a clause prohibiting
any mention of the arrangement, but corporate clients
include or have included American Express, Shearson
Lehman Hutton, Arco, Daewoo of South Korea, H. J.
Heinz, ITT, Lockheed Corporation, Anheuser-Busch, the
Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, Coca-Cola, Fiat, Revlon,
Union Carbide, and Midland Bank. Kissinger's initial
fellow "associates" were General Brent
Scowcroft and Lawrence Eagleburger, both of whom had
worked closely with him in the foreign-policy and
national-security branches of government.
Numerous instances of a harmony between this firm
and Kissinger's policy pronouncements can be cited.
The best-known is probably that of the People's
Republic of China. Kissinger helped several American
conglomerates, notably H. J. Heinz, to gain access to
the Chinese market. As it was glowingly phrased by
Anthony J. F. O'Reilly, CEO of Heinz,
Kissinger and his associates make a real contribution, and we think they
are particularly helpful in countries with more centrally planned
economies, where the principal players and the dynamics among the principal
players are of critical importance. This is particularly true in China,
where he is a popular figure and is viewed with particular respect.
On China, basically, we were well on our way to establishing the
baby-food presence there before Henry got involved. But once we decided to
move, he had practical points to offer, such as on the relationship between
Taiwan and Peking. He was helpful in seeing that we did not take steps that
would not have been helpful in Peking. His relevance obviously varies from
market to market, but he's probably at his best in helping with contacts in
that shadowy world where that counts.
The Chinese term for this zone of shadowy
transactions is guanxi. In less judgmental American
speech it would probably translate as
"access." Selling baby food in China may
seem innocuous enough, but when the Chinese regime
turned its guns and tanks on its own children in
Tiananmen Square in 1989, it had no more staunch
defender than Henry Kissinger. Arguing very strongly
against sanctions, he wrote that "China remains
too important for America's national security to risk
the relationship on the emotions of the moment."
Taking the Deng Xiaoping view of the democratic
turbulence, he added that "no government in the
world would have tolerated having the main square of
its capital occupied for eight weeks by tens of
thousands of demonstrators." It is perhaps just
as well that Kissinger's services were not retained by
the Stalinist regimes of Romania, Czechoslovakia, and
East Germany, which succumbed to just such public
insolence later in the same year.
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Nor was Kissinger's influence peddling confined to
Heinz's nutritious products. He assisted Atlantic
Richfield/Arco in the marketing of oil deposits
discovered in China. He helped ITT (a corporation that
had once helped him to overthrow the elected
government of Chile) to hold a path-breaking board
meeting in Beijing, and he performed similar services
for David Rockefeller and the Chase Manhattan Bank,
which held an international advisory committee meeting
in the Chinese capital and met with Deng himself.
Six months before the massacre in Tiananmen Square,
Kissinger set up a limited investment partnership
named China Ventures, of which he personally was
chairman, CEO, and general partner. Its brochure
helpfully explained that CV involved itself only with
projects that "enjoy the unquestioned support of
the People's Republic of China." The move proved
premature; the climate for investment on the Chinese
mainland soured after the post-Tiananmen repression
and the limited sanctions approved by Congress. This
no doubt contributed to Kissinger's irritation at the
criticism of Deng. But while China Ventures lasted, it
drew large commitments from American Express,
Coca-Cola, Heinz, and a large mining-and-extraction
conglomerate named Freeport-McMoRan.
Many of Kissinger's most extreme acts and positions
have been taken, at least ostensibly, in the name of
anti-Communism. So it is amusing to find him exerting
himself on behalf of a regime that can guarantee safe
investment by virtue of a one-party ideology, a ban on
trade unions, and a slave-labor prison system. Nor is
China the sole example here. When Lawrence Eagleburger
left the State Department in 1984, having been
ambassador to Yugoslavia, he became simultaneously a
partner of Kissinger Associates; a director of LBS
Bank, a subsidiary of a bank then owned by the
Belgrade regime; and the American representative of
the "Yugo" mini-car. Yugo duly became a
client of Kissinger Associates, as did a Yugoslav
construction concern named Enerjoprojeckt. The Yugo is
of particular interest because it was produced by the
large state-run conglomerate that also functioned as
Yugoslavia's military-industrial and
arms-manufacturing complex. This complex was later
seized by Slobodan Milosevic, along with the other
sinews of what had been the Yugoslav National Army,
and used to prosecute wars of aggression against four
neighboring republics. At all times during this
protracted crisis, and somewhat out of step with many
of his usually hawkish colleagues, Henry Kissinger
urged a consistent policy of conciliation with the
Milosevic regime. (Mr. Eagleburger in due course
rejoined the State Department as deputy secretary and
briefly became secretary of state. So it goes.)
Much the same can be said for the dual involvement
of the "Associates" with Saddam Hussein.
When Saddam was riding high in the late 1980s, and
having his way with the departments of Commerce and
Agriculture, and throwing money around like the
proverbial drunken sailor, and using poison gas and
chemical weapons on his Kurdish population without a
murmur from Washington, the U.S.-Iraq Business Forum
provided a veritable fruit machine of contacts,
contracts, and opportunities. Kissinger's partner Alan
Stoga, who had also been the economist attached to his
Reagan-era Commission on Central America, featured
noticeably on a junket to Baghdad. At the same time,
Kissinger's firm represented the shady Italian Banca
Nazionale del Lavoro, which was later shown to have
made illegal loans to Saddam's Baathist regime.
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In the same year--1989--Kissinger made his
lucrative connection with Freeport-McMoRan, a
globalized firm based in New Orleans. Its business is
the old-fashioned one of extracting oil, gas, and
minerals. Its chairman, James Moffett, has probably
earned the favorite titles bestowed by the business
and financial pages, being beyond any doubt
"flamboyant," "buccaneering," and
a "venture capitalist." In 1989, Freeport
paid Kissinger Associates a retainer of $200,000 and
fees of $600,000, not to mention a promise of a 2
percent commission on future capital investments made
with the Associates' advice. Freeport also made
Kissinger a member of its board of directors at an
annual salary of at least $30,000. In 1990 the two
concerns went into business in Burma, the most grimly
repressive state in all of South Asia. Freeport would
drill for oil and gas, according to the agreement, and
Kissinger's other client Daewoo would build the plant.
That year, however, the Burmese generals, under their
wonderful collective title of SLORC (State Law and
Order Restoration Council), lost a popular election to
the democratic opposition, led by Aung San Suu Kyi,
and decided to annul the result. This development--yet
more irritating calls for the isolation of the Burmese
junta--was unfavorable to the
Kissinger-Freeport-Daewoo triad, and the proposal
lapsed.
But the next year, in March 1991, Kissinger was
back in Indonesia with Mr. Moffett, closing a deal for
a thirty-year license to continue exploiting a
gigantic gold-and-copper mine. The mine is of prime
importance for three reasons. First, it was operated
as part of a joint venture with the Indonesian
military government and with that government's maximum
leader. Second, it is located on the island of Irian
Jaya (in an area formerly known as West Irian), a part
of the archipelago that, like East Timor, is only
Indonesian by right of arbitrary conquest. Third, its
operations commenced in 1973--two years before Henry
Kissinger visited Indonesia and helped unleash the
Indonesian bloodbath in East Timor while unlocking a
flow of weaponry to his future business partners.
This could mean no more than the "harmony of
interest" I suggested above. No more, in other
words, than a happy coincidence. What is not
coincidental is the following:
(1) Freeport's enormous Grasberg mine in Irian Jaya
stands accused of creating an environmental and social
catastrophe. In October 1995 the Overseas Private
Investment Corporation (OPIC), a federal body that
exists to help American companies overseas, decided to
cancel Freeport's investment insurance because of
political risk, the very element on which Kissinger
had furnished soothing assurances in 1991. OPIC
concluded that Freeport's mine had "created and
continues to pose unreasonable or major environmental,
health or safety hazards with respect to the rivers
that are being impacted by the tailings, the
surrounding terrestrial ecosystem, and the local
inhabitants."
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(2) The "local inhabitants" who came last
on that list are the Amungme people, whose protests at
the environmental rape, and at working conditions in
the mine, were met by Indonesian regular soldiers at
the service of Freeport-McMoRan and under the orders
of Suharto. In March 1996 large-scale rioting nearly
closed the mine at a cost of four deaths and many
injuries.
Freeport-McMoRan mounted an intense lobbying
campaign in Washington, with Kissinger's help, to get
its OPIC insurance reinstated. The price was the
creation of a trust fund of $100 million for the
repair of the Grasberg site after it, and its
surrounding ecology, has eventually been picked clean.
All of this became moot with the overthrow of the
Suharto dictatorship, the detention of Suharto
himself, and the unmasking of an enormous nexus of
"crony capitalism" involving him, his
family, his military colleagues, and certain favored
multinational corporations. This political revolution
also restored, at incalculable human cost, the
independence of East Timor. There was even a
suggestion of a warcrimes inquiry and a human-rights
tribunal to settle some part of the account for the
years of genocide and occupation. Once again, Henry
Kissinger has had to scan the news with anxiety and
wonder whether even worse revelations are in store for
him. It will be a national and international disgrace
if the answer to this question is left to the pillaged
and misgoverned people of Indonesia, rather than
devolving onto an American Congress that has for so
long shirked its proper responsibility.
The subject awaits its magistrate.
A NOTE ON THE LAW
As Henry Kissinger now understands, there are
increasingly noticeable rents and tears in the cloak
of immunity that has shrouded him until now. Recent
evolutions in national and international law have made
his position an exposed and, indeed, a vulnerable one.
For convenience, the distinct areas of law may be
grouped under four main headings:
1) International Human Rights Law. This comprises
the grand and sonorous covenants on the rights of the
individual in relation to the state; it also protects
the individual from other actors in the international
community who might violate those rights. Following
from the French Revolution's "Declaration of the
Rights of Man," international human-rights law
holds that political associations are legitimate only
insofar as they preserve the dignity and well-being of
individuals, a view that challenges the realpolitik
privilege given to the "national interest."
The United States is directly associated with
sponsoring many of these covenants and has ratified
several others.
2) The Law of Armed Conflict. Somewhat protean and
uneven, this represents the gradual emergence of a
legal consensus on what is, and what is not,
permissible during a state of war. It also comprises
the various humanitarian agreements that determine the
customary "law of war" and that attempt to
reduce the oxymoronic element in this ancient debate.
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3) International Criminal Law. This concerns any
individual, including an agent of any state, who
commits direct and grave atrocities against either his
"own" citizens or those of another state;
covered here are genocide, crimes against humanity,
and other crimes of war. The Rome Statute, which also
establishes an International Criminal Court for the
trial of individuals, including governmental
offenders, is the codified summa of this law as
revised and updated since the Nuremberg precedent. It
commands the signatures of most governments as welt
as, since December 31, 2000, that of the United
States.
4) Domestic Law and the Law of Civil Remedies. Most
governments have similar laws that govern crimes such
as murder, kidnapping, and larceny, and many of them
treat any offender from any country as the same. These
laws in many cases permit a citizen of any country to
seek redress in the courts of the offender's
"host" country or country of citizenship. In
United States law, one particularly relevant statute
is the Alien Tort Claims Act.
The United States is the most generous in granting
immunity to itself and partial immunity to its
servants, and the most laggard in adhering to
international treaties (ratifying the Genocide
Convention only in 1988 and signing the Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights only in 1992). And the
provisions of the Rome Statute, which would expose
Kissinger to dire punishment if they had been law from
as early as 1968, are not retroactive. The Nuremberg
principles, however, were in that year announced by an
international convention to have no statute of
limitations. International customary law would allow
any signatory country (again exempting the United
States) to bring suit against Kissinger for crimes
against humanity in Indochina.
More importantly, United States federal courts have
been found able to exercise jurisdiction over crimes
such as assassination, kidnapping, and terrorism, even
when these are supposedly protected by the doctrine of
state or sovereign immunity. Of a number of landmark
cases, the most salient one is the finding of the D.C.
Circuit Court in 1980, concerning the car-bomb murder,
by Pinochet's agents, of Orlando Letelier and Ronni
Moffitt. The court held that "[w]hatever policy
options may exist for a foreign country," the
Pinochet regime "has no `discretion' to
perpetrate conduct designed to result in the
assassination of an individual or individuals, action
that is clearly contrary to the precepts of humanity
as recognized in both national and international
law." Reciprocally speaking, this would apply to
an American official seeking to assassinate a Chilean.
Assassination was illegal both as a private and a
public act when Henry Kissinger was in power and when
the attacks on General Schneider of Chile and
President Makarios of Cyprus took place.
As the Hinchey report to Congress in 2000 now
demonstrates that U.S. government agents were
knowingly party to acts of torture, murder, and
"disappearance" by Pinochet's death squads,
Chilean citizens will be able to bring suit in America
under the Alien Tort Claims Act, which grants U.S.
federal courts "subject-matter jurisdiction"
over a claim when a non-U.S., citizen sues for a civil
wrong committed in violation of a U.S. treaty or other
international law. Chilean relatives of the
"disappeared" and of General Schneider have
recently expressed an intention to do so, and I am
advised by several international lawyers that Henry
Kissinger would indeed be liable under such
proceedings.
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The Alien Tort Claims Act would also permit victims
in other countries, such as Bangladesh or Cambodia, to
seek damages from Kissinger, on the model of the
recent lawsuit filed in New York against Li Peng,
among the Chinese Communist officials most accountable
for the 1989 massacre in Tiananmen Square.
A significant body of legal theory can be brought
to bear on the application of "customary
law" to the bombardment of civilians in
Indochina. The Genocide Convention was not ratified by
the United States until 1988. In 1951, however, it was
declared by the International Court of Justice to be
customary international law. The work of the
International Law Commission is in full agreement with
this view. There would be argument over whether the
numberless victims were a "protected group"
under existing law, and also as to whether their
treatment was sufficiently indiscriminate, but such
argument would place heavy burdens on the defense as
well as the prosecution.(5)
An important recent development is the enforcement
by third countries--most notably Spain--of the
international laws that bind all states. Baltasar
Garz6n, the Spanish judge who initiated the successful
prosecution of General Pinochet, has also secured the
detention in Mexico of the Argentine torturer Ricardo
Miguel Cavallo, who is now held in prison awaiting
extradition. The parliament of Belgium has recently
empowered Belgian courts to exercise jurisdiction over
war crimes and breaches of the Geneva Convention
committed anywhere in the world by a citizen of any
country. This practice, which is on the increase, has
at minimum the effect of limiting the ability of
certain people to travel or to avoid extradition. The
Netherlands, Switzerland, Denmark, and Germany have
all recently employed the Geneva Conventions to
prosecute war criminals for actions committed against
non-nationals by non-nationals. The British House of
Lords decision in the matter of Pinochet has also
decisively negated the defense of "sovereign
immunity" for acts committed by a government or
by those following a government's orders. This has led
in turn to Pinochet's prosecution in his own country.
There remains the question of American law.
Kissinger himself admits that he knowingly broke the
law in continuing to supply American weapons to
Indonesia, which used them to violate the neutrality
of a neighboring territory and to perpetrate gross
crimes against humanity. Kissinger also faces legal
trouble over his part in the ethnic cleansing of the
British colonial island of Diego Garcia in the early
1970s, when indigenous inhabitants were displaced to
make room for a United States military base. Lawyers
for the Chagos Islanders have already won a judgment
in the British courts on this matter, which now moves
to a hearing in the United States. The torts cited are
"forced relocation, torture, and genocide."
In this altered climate, the United States faces an
interesting dilemma. At any moment, one of its most
famous citizens may be found liable for terrorist
actions under the Alien Tort Claims Act, or may be
subject to an international request for extradition,
or may be arrested if he travels to a foreign country,
or may be cited for crimes against humanity by a court
in an allied nation. The non-adherence by the United
States to certain treaties and its reluctance to
extradite make it improbable that American authorities
would cooperate with such actions, though this would
gravely undermine the righteousness with which
Washington addresses other nations on the subject of
human rights. There is also the option of bringing
Kissinger to justice in an American court with an
American prosecutor. Again the contingency seems a
fantastically remote one, but, again, the failure to
do so would expose the country to a much more obvious
charge of double standards than would have been
apparent even two years ago.
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The burden therefore rests with the American legal
community and with the American human-rights lobbies
and non-governmental organizations. They can either
persist in averting their gaze from the egregious
impunity enjoyed by a notorious war criminal and
lawbreaker or they can become seized by the exalted
standards to which they continually hold everyone
else. The current state of suspended animation,
however, cannot last. If the courts and lawyers of
this country will not do their duty, we shall watch as
the victims and survivors of this man pursue justice
and vindication in their own dignified and painstaking
way, and at their own expense, and we shall be put to
shame.
(1) The 40 Committee, named after the Old Executive
Office Building room in which it met, was chaired by
Kissinger between 1969 and 1976. It maintained
ultimate supervision over U.S. covert actions during
this period. For more, see Harper's Magazine, February
2001, page 40.
(2) For more on this episode, see Harper's
Magazine, February 2001, pages 53-58.
(3) The delivery of heavy weapons, for use against
civilian objectives did indeed resume in January,
after a short interval in which Congress was misled as
advertised.
(4) The Greek word here, which is exoudeterosi, is
pretty strong. It is usually translated as
"extermination," though
"elimination" might be an alternative
reading. It is not a recipe for inconveniencing or
hampering an individual but for getting rid of him.
(5) See especially Nicole Barrett: "Holding
Individual leaders Responsible for Violations of
Customary International Law," Columbia Human
Rights Law Review, Spring 2001.
Christopher Hitchens, formerly Washington editor of
Harper's Magazine, is the author of books on the
Cyprus crisis, Kurdistan, Palestine, and the
Anglo-American relationship. He is a regular columnist
for Vanity Fair and The Nation.
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